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FBIS-EEU-94-038 *25 February 1994*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Croatia's Granic Meets With Human Rights Group *[Bern Radio]* 1
Comments on Violations Examined *[TANJUG]* 1

ALBANIA

Article Views Implications of PDP Split *[KOHA JONE 22 Feb]* 2
IMF Representative Expects Sustained Growth *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 20 Feb]* 2

BULGARIA

'Dangers' of Greek Embargo on FYROM Viewed *[KONTINENT 22 Feb]* 4
Parliament Warned of 'Desolate' Army Budget *[DUMA 17 Feb]* 4
BSP 'Monopoly' on Foreign Policy Examined *[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK 22 Feb]* 5

CZECH REPUBLIC

Army's Incompatibility With NATO Examined *[CESKY DENIK 18 Feb]* 6

SLOVAKIA

Deputy Prime Minister To Resign 25 Feb *[Bratislava Radio]* 8
Moravcik: Foreign Policy Not To Change *[Bratislava Radio]* 8
New Television Director Assumes Office *[NARODNA OBRODA 22 Feb]* 8
Fifth Installment of Moravcik's Policy Report *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 8 Feb]* 8
Sixth Installment of Moravcik's Policy Report *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 9 Feb]* 12

HUNGARY

Jezsensky Interviewed on Balkans, Zhirinovskiy *[Madrid ABC 16 Feb]* 16
Boross Views Elections, Media, Russia, FRY *[UJ MAGYARORSZAG 24 Feb]* 17
MIEP Protests Police Confiscation of Petition *[NEPSZABADSAG 24 Feb]* 18
Popularity of Party Leaders Examined *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 24 Feb]* 19

POLAND

Defense Minister Views 'Partnership' *[DIMINEATA 22 Feb]* 21
Pawlak Views Domestic Policy, Coalition *[POLITYKA 19 Feb]* 21
New Military Intelligence Appointments *[PAP]* 24

ROMANIA

Government-Union Talks Fail; Strike Certain *[Bucharest Radio]* 25
Communique on Presence of SRI Chief at Strike *[ROMANIA LIBERA 22 Feb]* 25
Behavior of Security Chief Examined *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 18 Feb]* 26
Army Issues Communique To Answer Accusations *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 10 Feb]* 27
Official Forecasts Labor Cuts for Metal Workers *[ROMANIA LIBERA 21 Feb]* 28
Article Views Restructuring of Armed Forces *[DIMINEATA 17 Feb]* 28
Military Cooperation Accord Signed With Poland *[Bucharest Radio]* 29
Editorial Warns of 'Russian Encirclement' *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 22 Feb]* 30

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

HVO Attacks Convoy; UN Troops Return Fire *[Sarajevo Radio]* 31
Karadzic, Abdic Sign Peace Agreement *[TANJUG]* 31
Abdic Comments on Agreement *[Belgrade TV]* 31
Srpska Assembly Speaker Cited *[TANJUG]* 32
Izetbegovic: Serbs Not Observing Ultimatum *[AFP]* 32
Cease-Fire Violations Reported *[Sarajevo Radio]* 32
UN General Blames Bosnian Army *[AFP]* 33
Sarajevo Airport Meeting; Serbs Held Hostage *[Belgrade Radio]* 33
Routes to Muslim Areas Planned *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Bihac Appeals to UN To Stop Onslaught *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Shelling Avoiding Detection *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Vitez Suffers 'Devastating' Artillery Attack *[Zagreb Radio]* 34
Serb Missiles, Artillery Make Maglaj 'Hell' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
Serb Offensive on Tesanj, Maglaj, Fojnica *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
UNHCR Says Cease-Fire Gives Hope to Mostar *[AFP]* 35
Mostar To Be 'First Priority' for Cease-Fire *[AFP]* 35
Report Analyzes Serbian Tactics, Strategy *[Sarajevo Radio]* 36
Muslims, Croats Agree To Exchange Prisoners *[Zagreb Radio]* 36
TANJUG Views Vatican Moves in Bosnia 36
Interview With President Izetbegovic *[Sarajevo Radio]* 37

CROATIA

Delegation Leaves for Washington Negotiations *[Zagreb Radio]* 50
Western Slavonija Protests Blocked Bridge *[TANJUG]* 50
Discussions on Blockade *[TANJUG]* 50
UN Troops Take Control *[Zagreb Radio]* 51
Serbian Krajina, Croatia Extend Truce *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 1 Feb]* 51
Commentary: FRY Should Be 'Fully Isolated' *[NOVI LIST 13 Feb]* 51
Commentary Views Foreign Involvement in Bosnia *[VJESNIK 23 Feb]* 52

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Gligorov Sends Message to Papandreou *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 24 Feb]* 54
Greece's Reply Conveyed *[TANJUG]* 54
EU Commissioner Views Talks With Gligorov *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 24 Feb]* 54
Minister Warns of Consequences of Blockade *[MIC 24 Feb]* 55
PDP Reaches Agreement With Government *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 24 Feb]* 55

SLOVENIA

Normalizing Relations With FRY Considered *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 1 Feb]* 56
Speculation on Early Recall of U.S. Envoy *[VJESNIK 12 Feb]* 56
Commentary Views Impact of Party Merger *[DELO 21 Feb]* 56
Reorganization of Intelligence Services Suspended *[DELO 16 Feb]* 57

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Jovanovic Welcomes Yeltsin's Initiative *[TANJUG]* 58
Reactions To Yeltsin's Proposal Viewed *[TANJUG]* 58
First Month of New Economic Program Reviewed *[TANJUG]* 58

Serbia

Ruling Party Sends Delegation to Russia *[TANJUG]* 59

Kosovo

DSK Leader on Division of Bosnia *[TANJUG]* 59
Serbian Court Sentences 17 Albanians *[Tirana TV]* 59

Croatia's Granic Meets With Human Rights Group

LD2402173994 Bern Swiss Radio International in English 1700 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Croatia's Foreign Minister Mate Granic has called for continuing dialogue in order to find a lasting solution to the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Granic told the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva that negotiations were the only way to end the war and find a political settlement to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However Granic, who is also deputy prime minister, made no reference to Wednesday's statement by ethnic Croatians in Bosnia that they were willing to consider a union with Bosnia's Muslims. Croatians and Muslims in Bosnia have agreed a cease-fire, which comes into effect at midday on Friday.

Granic said that human rights have been violated as 6,900 people had been killed, 26,000 others wounded and 7,600 people perished in war (which broke out following Croatia's violent secession from former Yugoslavia), and that there were currently some 550,000 refugees and displaced people in Croatia.

Granic, however, failed to explain what this had in common with mass evictions of Serbs from their homes, with destruction of their property, with discharging them, and especially with banning the non-Croat children to attend classes, all of these listed in Mazowiecki's report as drastic examples of violation of human rights.

International humanitarian organizations, including the Croatian Helsinki Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, have warned intermittently that these actions spurred on ethnic cleansing campaigns against the Serbs, 300,000 of them already expelled from Croatia. This was why 10,000 Serb houses have been blown up and scores of Christian Orthodox churches destroyed in Croatia.

Granic assessed that the normalisation of relations with "the Serb minority in Croatia, especially in the U.N. protected areas" was "a key to stability in the area and in overall Croatian-Serb relations," and threatened in a familiar way that there should be no delusions that the Croatian Government would negotiate Croatia's territorial integrity.

In 1991, Serbs in Croatia proclaimed the Republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.), now a U.N. protected area, within their ethnic and historic territory in response to Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslavia and its attempt to reduce their status to that of a national minority.

Serbs in Croatia also decided to take such a step because they were afraid of a relapse of the genocide committed against them in World War Two, when in the Nazi puppet "independent state of Croatia," more than a million Serb civilians had been killed.

Comments on Violations Examined

LD2402232794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1859 GMT 24 Feb 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, Feb 24 (TANJUG)—Croatian Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Mate Granic on Thursday made an unconvincing attempt to absolve Zagreb from responsibility and attribute it to the Serbs.

Without denying that the Serbs' humanitarian rights have been violated on a large scale in Croatia, as confirmed in the latest reports by the U.N. special rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the U.S. State Department, in a speech to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva, Granic attempted to find an excuse in saying that "Serb armed forces still hold one-third of the Croatian territory."

Article Views Implications of PDP Split

AU2302132894 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 22 Feb 94 p 5

[Genc Rodonj article: "The Second Democratic Prosperity Party Congress—The Congress of Division"]

[Text] The early second congress of the Party of Democratic Prosperity [PDP] will be known from now on as the congress that split the largest Albanian party in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. The party had been unable to survive for four years before the serious incidents recently seen within its ranks took place; because of the impossibility of finding a consensus between the factions, these events led to a final division, which will no doubt not have a good influence on the unity of the Albanians in this former Yugoslav republic.

The early second congress held a few days ago in Tetovo could not achieve its own objective. After initial disagreements over what were called unimportant issues, but which were in fact not insignificant, a number of delegates, deputies, and government members left the hall and held their own congress in another hall in Tetovo. Thus, two parallel congresses were held. It is worth mentioning that, after the walkout, Dr. Ali Aliu, Dr. Rexhep Gjergji, and Edita Tahiri, the representatives of the Kosova Democratic Alliance [LDK], also left the congress where Menduh Thaci's supporters remained.

The origins of the division, like those of every split, go back a long way. One of the main factors was the weapons affairs, which Menduh Thaci's wing used to strike hard at the party leadership. The Albanian Democratic Party [PD] helped him in this attack, as did in particular the Albanian state media, which used the basest epithets for the PDP leadership, including even "quislings," "bootlickers," and "agents of Belgrade." Besides this, PD officials have several times taken part in events organized by Menduh Thaci's wing, to the extent that the Macedonian prime minister himself called this "interference in the Macedonian state's internal affairs." The more careful policy of the LDK contrasts with that of the Tirana PD. The LDK has tried to find ways to smooth over and settle the disagreements within the PDP. It is not significant that, whereas the LDK representatives not only did not greet the congress but left the hall, the PD representative Tritan Shehu remained to greet the congress of Menduh Thaci's wing.

In relation to the internal concerns of this party, Albanian Television has been unable to overcome its now familiar and persistent bias and objectively inform the public in Albania and via satellite in the diaspora about what is happening. This shows both its lack of independence and its total subordination to the ruling party in Albania. This was best shown by the introduction to the interview given by Tritan Shehu, PD delegate to the congress, in which the television journalist was not only unable to describe what had happened at the congress, but put himself in the position of a lackey, thus confusing the public even further. This is because media such as the newspaper RILINDJA reported that two congresses were held in Tetovo and two presidiums were elected, while Mr. Shehu asserted the opposite. In fact, one congress elected Arber Xhaferi as chairman, while that opposing Menduh Thaci's line, at which ministers and deputies were present, elected as chairman Xheladin Murati, deputy chairman of the Macedonian Parliament.

The split in the PDP and the two parallel congresses have taken place at a time when the Albanians in Macedonia are facing two important events: First, the census, and second, next autumn's general elections. One asks whether the Albanians are better placed to cope with these events divided or united. How will the Albanians appear at the coming elections, and how many parties will represent them in solving their problems? Will they succeed in achieving as good a representation as hitherto in the Macedonian state authorities, or better? These questions arise because the political forces that hitherto produced most results in this field are now divided. However, there is another worry: What will be the future strategy of the Albanians in Macedonia? Will they participate in the Macedonian state as before or abandon all its structures? A seed sown today will of course bear fruit later, and this fruit may be to the benefit of the Albanians in Macedonia. In conclusion, we note that Mr. Arber Xhaferi, PDP chairman according to Menduh Thaci's line, began work immediately after his election by meeting journalists and the CSCE representative in Skopje. At his meeting with journalists immediately after the congress, he said, "I am assuming this post with great anxiety, because many political processes have been carried through in Macedonia, and they must now be reversed." One asks what political processes must be reversed, to what extent, and by when....

IMF Representative Expects Sustained Growth

AU2302114094 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 20 Feb 94 p 3

["di. ann." interview with IMF Representative in Albania Wei Ding in Tirana; date not given: "How Albania Came First"]

[Text] Tirana—"Albania is the country with the highest growth rate in Europe, and with inflation similar to Poland's. The country's growth is expected to continue." This was the sensational statement by IMF Director Michel Camdessus. Albania grew by almost 11 percent in 1993, with its program of economic reform, fast privatization especially in agriculture, and the liberalization of trade, prices, and currency exchange. "The agricultural sector grew fastest," IMF Representative in Albania Wei Ding told GAZETA SHQIPTARE. "This branch is also the largest single component in the GNP."

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] What is the GNP in 1993 expected to be in absolute figures?

[Wei Ding] It is estimated that it will turn out to be approximately $1.1 billion. On the basis of a population of 3.3 million this corresponds to an average income of about $330 per person in 1993. Construction grew fast at 31.5 percent, transportation at 13 percent, and trade, tourism, and services at 1.5 percent. The 10-percent decline in industrial production has influenced the final total, but it must be borne in mind that the growth of the GNP of a modern economy is not measured solely by manufacturing production. Added value in all forms, i.e. selling for more than you bought, counts as growth. Here, one must also count for example what peasants produce for their own consumption.

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] Will growth continue in 1994?

[Wei Ding] Growth will continue. It is planned to be about 8 percent this year. We hope that industrial production will not continue to fall. Thus, Albania may be again be among the countries with the highest growth rates.

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] What work will the IMF do in Albania in 1994?

[Wei Ding] Our program is a continuation of last year's. It aims at technical assistance for the government in formulating its medium-term economic reform program. We also aim to mobilize international support for Albania.

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] Inflation is expected to reach 20 percent in 1994. How will this figure affect the revival of the economy and foreign investments?

[Wei Ding] Albania's inflation figure was not very high in 1993 either. The figure of 20 percent expected for 1994 indicates economic stability, and will attract foreign investors. They will want their long-term interests to be met, that is to profit from their investments, which they can only do in a stable economy.

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] What do you think of the banking system in Albania?

[Wei Ding] In my experience, this is the most difficult sector to reform not only in Albania but in all the countries of the East, because this was the most old-fashioned sector. The banking system in Albania has not been divided into two levels, with the Central Bank and the merchant banks. We would also like there to be private secondary banks that would service various branches of the economy. This would also help the process of bank privatization.

[GAZETA SHQIPTARE] Will private banks be opened in Albania?

[Wei Ding] In fact you have one private bank, the Italo-Albanian Bank. Its example shows that improvements to this system cannot take place overnight, because they involve the customers, the staff, the management, and the banking infrastructure. Meanwhile, we must decide what will be the best privatization scheme, and work is being done on this in cooperation with the government. There are applications to open private banks from Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Malaysia. I hope that Albanians too will have opened private banks by the end of this year. Perhaps some of these currency exchange bureaus will be turned into banks. There are still technical problems, such as the amount of starting capital that Albanian private banks must have. These matters are still under discussion.

[Box, page 3]

Growth in GNP in 1993, by sector:	
Industry	-10.0 percent
Agriculture	14.5 percent
Construction	31.5 percent
Transportation	13.0 percent
Others	11.5 percent

Structure of GNP (total 100 percent)	
Industry	14 percent
Agriculture	56 percent
Construction	9 percent
Transportation	3 percent
Others	18 percent

'Dangers' of Greek Embargo on FYROM Viewed

AU2502105494 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 22 Feb 94 p 6

[Atanas Matev commentary: "Close and Remote Interests"]

[Text] Greece's decision to impose an economic blockade on Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is extremely erroneous. If one doubts this, it is enough that they would listen to the salvos of criticism and denunciations of the decision that resounded throughout the world.

Greece apparently thinks that it could assert its long-range interests through a painful pressure upon the young republic at a very painful moment for the Balkans. Athens certainly wants to make sure that in the future Skopje will not present any territorial claims regarding the northern Greek province of Macedonia.

Such a possibility exists and it cannot be refuted a priori. However, this is not the greatest problem at the present.

It is a question for the future whether Skopje will declare territorial claims regarding Greek territory. However, an economic blockade, which is taking place at the present, already represents a clash between Greece and Macedonia.

This bodes great dangers against the background of the existing situation in the Balkans. One of them is in forcing the Macedonians into a too close alliance with Albania in order to obtain a commercial outlet to the world. This could violate the very fragile ethnic-political balance in Macedonia. The second danger is in Greece trying to apply pressure on other Balkan countries, including Bulgaria, in an attempt to prevent Macedonia from obtaining a commercial outlet. This could violate the fragile political balance in the southern Balkans.

One should not be puzzled if it appears that, while thinking about its long-range interests, Greece neglects the importance of the immediate ones. The trouble is that the states bordering on Greece could also pay for this mistake, despite the fact that this is the last thing they want.

Parliament Warned of 'Desolate' Army Budget

AU2502150094 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 17 Feb 94 p 7

[Commentary by Krum Asparukhov: "National Security Is Even More Important Than Parliament"]

[Text] For the first time in Bulgarian history, the parliament, at a meeting behind closed doors, heard a detailed account of the state of the Bulgarian Army submitted by Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of Army General Staff. With facts, figures, and sound arguments he explained to the deputies that the 11.6-billion-leva army budget could only cover the Armed Forces' needs for the next few months, until summer, unless personnel is cut by half, namely to 40,000 men.

The military budget is the price our people have to pay to defend the country. It is determined according to the extent to which the country's security is threatened. This is the basic criterion. It is followed by resources for the tasks the military units are expected to accomplish in order to cope with the threat, and last but not least, by the forces in charge of the aforementioned tasks. The military budget consists of four components: Current expenditures for the maintenance of the army; the supply of armaments and technical equipment; the building of defense facilities and facilities for the troops; and finally, theoretical research and developments in the military sphere. The experience of the last few years shows that most resources are spent on soldiers' everyday needs and for routine tasks of military service. The proposed budget excludes all possibilities of purchasing new technical equipment and armaments. Some 200 of the 230 existing barracks are in urgent need of major repairs. The condition of military equipment is absolutely desolate. Not even one officer has submitted a paper for an academic title in the last four years.

In 1989 the military budget represented 4.06 percent of GDP, while in 1990 it dropped to 3.2 percent; in 1991—to 3 percent; in 1992—to 2.8 percent, and in 1993—2.6 percent. In 1994 the percentage is expected even to drop to 2.4 percent. The downward trend is determined both by the country's serious economic crisis and by the inability to adapt the budget to the acute shortage of funds. In these circumstances the social problems in the army are likely to get worse, and morale is likely to fall because of the hopeless revenue policy, which in the long run will further delay the army reform.

Turkey's 1994 military budget amounts to $8.601 billion in addition to the $2 billion in military aid from the United States.

Greece's current military budget amounts to $28 billion, which represents 8 percent of the national budget, in addition to $1 billion in military aid from the United States and 340 million marks from Germany. The Romanian military budget amounts to $560 million, which represents 8 percent of the country's budget. States in the same desolate financial situation as Bulgaria still manage to find resources for their army because they consider it a vital institution. It is not a problem of one or another political force, of the government, or of a certain ministry. The problem affects our national security, without which the transition to democracy would be a mere exercise in rhetorics.

At the plenary session of the National Assembly General Petrov reportedly said that the General Staff cannot bear responsibility for the proposed military budget. He called for an additional 11 billion leva. Only a few National Assembly deputies, in their statements, supported the demands of the army leadership. Hence, it

would be quite normal for parliament to assume responsibility for the state of our national security, in the event the requested resources for the army are voted down, because national security is even more important than parliament.

BSP 'Monopoly' on Foreign Policy Examined

AU2502125694 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 22 Feb 94 p 1

[Neven Kopandanova commentary: "BSP Has Monopoly"]

[Text] On 21 February Zhan Videnov said that in addition to meeting the visiting Russian parliamentarians as Bulgarian Socialist parliamentarians, the two delegations also had unofficial contacts at the party level. Apparently next week there will be a meeting of Russia's leftist parties in which the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] will take part. On the Russian side, the meeting will be attended by the Socialist Labor Party, Rybkin's Agrarian Party of Russia [APR], and the "Free Russia" People's Party [as published]. Our Socialists hope that other CIS countries will also participate in the meeting.

The Socialists' active contacts with congenial parties in Serbia, Greece, and Russia, where those parties rule, could hardly be reduced to attempts on the part of the Bulgarian Socialists to overcome the difficulties along the road to Europe. There is a present danger that the BSP could monopolize a part of our foreign policy. This evokes an even greater concern against the background of the different views of the political parties in our country in anything related to foreign policy elements.

It is true that National Assembly Chairman and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] also received official invitations to visit Russia. On 21 February deputies of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] said that they also have been invited, but for the time being they consider their invitation as unofficial. In principle, the SDS was interested in strengthening relations with Russia, but for the time being there was no adequate program, [SDS deputy] Asparukh Panov said on 21 February. The main foreign policy expert of the blue coalition [SDS] did not hide his concern with the independent foreign policy tunnels the BSP is tracing. He noted that the BSP's foreign policy activity is becoming ever more intensive and that this hardly contributes to a uniform Bulgarian foreign policy.

Bulgarian tax payers noted a long time ago that there is no uniform Bulgarian foreign policy. If the president is closer to the SDS doctrine, the premier undoubtedly professes the BSP's doctrine. However, since according to the Constitution, there are two foreign policy centers in Bulgaria, it is reasonable to expect their chiefs to clarify the direction in which the wind blows. One could hardly doubt the fact that we need good economic and political relations with Russia. The question is to what extend we will be able to defend our independence and equality in our relations with Russia, something that the two centers, or at least one of them, apparently cannot guarantee. It cannot be natural that the political force with the greatest influence in our country—the SDS—does not have direct contacts with a great power such as Russia. Such relations would certainly introduce a new tone in international relations, which will break out of the narrow party track in which the Socialists pushed them through their monopoly.

Army's Incompatibility With NATO Examined

AU2402170794 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 18 Feb 94 p 10

[Article by Dr. Milan Hulik: "The Czech Nation Has Not Come To Terms With its Communist or Nazi Past"]

[Text] NATO does not want us. This issue is being discussed in our foreign and domestic policy. Let me be frank and leave no holds barred—why should it want us? President Vaclav Havel has expressed his view on the appropriateness of our incorporation into Western Europe's defense structure. With all due respect for his views, formulated with the brilliant reasoning of a great stylist, I can only say that they were merely a manifestation of an intellectual reasoning with which it is impossible to disagree, but they have no practical effect.

However, it is impossible to look at Europe (and all the more so the whole world) only from the perspective of a country that in this century has hardly contributed to the defense of democracy, if we do not count the handful of very courageous people—including the members of the small domestic resistance movement—who, during the First and Second World Wars, fought alongside the Allies. The far greater part of the nation—by its silent loyalty, its elbow grease, and its participation in demonstrations—supported both the throne of the aged kaiser and the Reich's struggle against Bolshevism and Western plutocracy. The cottage-beerhouse "resistance" during the recent totalitarianism is within living memory: Again, a handful of dissidents and—apart from them—the nation. The former marched with their heads against the wall and the latter with their faces turned against the May Day platform. Incidentally, little force was needed to import communism into the Czechoslovak Republic; it is enough to read the proclamation "Forward, Not a Step Back" published in RUDE PRAVO immediately after 25 February 1948. The names that we find there take our breath away: These names had the same significance and same symbolism in the later struggle against communism as do the names we come across, for example, in the list of State Security collaborators. This is not an accusation, it is a statement of the fact that the human disposition is changeable, because it is made up of human experience and sometimes—sadly—of human ignorance.

They do not want us in NATO for several reasons, which can be divided roughly into three groups:

1. Technical-military reasons;

2. Psychological reasons;

3. Moral reasons.

Technical-Military Reasons

Even for the Western states it would not—in the current economic crisis—be easy to finance the rearmament of the Czech Army, as some of our politicians are hoping. Some of our weapons are so obsolete that the term antediluvian comes to mind. The once state-of-the-art infantry weaponry, the core of which was formed by the type-57 assault rifle, is of a caliber that does not correspond to NATO's 5.56-mm ammunition. The electronic, radar, and radio-technical equipment does not correspond to the parameters for modern warfare and the obsolescence of the Air Force compared with the North Atlantic Alliance's air forces can be equated with the pre-war situation against the Luftwaffe. Our tanks, the main strike force of the armies in World War II, cannot—even though they are the top of the range of a series of celebrated Soviet T-types—compete with the German Leopard II's or the U.S. AM-I's. Assuming the financial burden of this rearmament is beyond the current ability of the Western economy and how our budget would take care of it, well, that is written in the stars.

Psychological Reasons

Relying on the military power of a partner, a power that—understandably—does not only consist of the strength of its armaments and the size of its army, would be risky for the NATO forces. This partner has already capitulated without a fight several times, and that with a well-equipped army. It would be all the more risky in view of the fact that, not so long ago, the representatives of the new democratic regime in the velvet euphoria of their first appearance on the international scene suggested to Western statesmen that NATO be abolished as a reciprocal gesture for the abolition of the (disintegrating) Warsaw Pact. The army of a nation and state that has still not come to terms with its previous capitulations and has not accepted them internally cannot be a reliable ally. This nation has not come to terms not only with its communist past, but also with its Nazi past.

One phenomenon links these two pasts—the weakness of the resistance or, at least, the resistance against the totalitarian regime! This is borne out by the fact that our domestic policy is today characterized by quarrels and disputes over whether the Czech Army should fight for "someone else's" interests. The strong left wing, and mainly its international communist militant part, are always trying to undermine any involvement by the Czech Army on the side of the Western democracies, which only yesterday were its mortal enemy. (It is possible to ask Comrade Ortman or Comrade Grebenicek if they still are today.) In our evaluation by the West, the meager psychological ability or inability to put up real resistance to violence and totalitarianism is—perhaps—our biggest failing. I can imagine what the outburst would be in parliament and the individual political parties (and, subsequently, among the public) if a request to dispatch our expeditionary force, for example, to Yugoslavia were to come up on the agenda.

Moral Reasons

If what was written in CESKY DENIK about General Nekvasil, chief of the Czech Army General Staff, is true, then it is unnecessary to write more: We really have no business being in NATO. Here even Vaclav Havel's most

effective reasoning loses its meaning. Even if it were not true, however, it is an incontestable fact that our generals studied in the USSR. There is no need to write that no one knows about the list of KGB agents. It would be illogical to ask the people now enthusing about democracy (for generals' and colonels' salaries, of course), people immersed in communist indoctrination, whose medal ribbons are overwhelmingly red and whose uniforms still glitter with stars, really to fight for this democracy or even fight for the democracy of Western countries. They are aware of this in the FRG, where former East German generals and colonels today command companies and squadrons as warrant officers and squadron leaders, if they are still in the army.

An army that, despite all the screenings and performance reviews, has not been able to purge itself and from which hundreds of young officers, the least affected by communist indoctrination (whom no one promoted or appointed to responsible posts in place of the "most orthodox") have resigned in disillusion cannot enjoy the confidence of NATO and cannot be its loyal partner—all the more so in view of the fact that, long after the anti-communist revolution, this army was commanded by a general who had previously served as the nomenklatura supremo of the communist army and later as the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia's camp spokesman.

If our army is not to play the role of a fifth column in the future struggle for the interests of civilization and democracy, many things will still have to change not only in Europe and the Czech Republic, but—first and foremost—in its corps of commanders. The issue involves making sure that the slogan of a fallen Soviet soldier in World War II, written in blood where he fell, also applies to it: "There is nowhere to withdraw to, Moscow is behind us." Our army still has somewhere to withdraw to—to its communist past or to its post-communist present.

Deputy Prime Minister To Resign 25 Feb

LD2402141294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac by correspondent Michal Tvarozek in Bratislava on 24 February—recorded]

[Text] [Tvarozek] Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, has the foreign minister's resignation influenced the decision you are making?

[Kovac] We discussed this matter with each other and reached the same conclusion: that it was necessary to make it easier for the president to make a decision about our dismissal from the cabinet, because if we do not make it easier for him, the confrontation between the castle and the cabinet might grow more serious. We do not see any sense in this. Both of us entered political life with the intention of seeking a consensus and a certain moderate attitude. If we continue to insist on our original stance, we think we would be betraying these principles.

[Tvarozek] Does this mean that you are also submitting your resignation?

[Kovac] Yes, I am. I am going to see the president tomorrow to submit my resignation.

[Tvarozek] A short while ago, you said—it was in this room—that it would mean that you had admitted your own mistakes if you resigned.

[Kovac] I insist that I have not made any mistakes great enough for me to leave the government because of them. This means that I insist that I have performed my work according to my abilities, and I am not convinced that I have performed badly. Despite this, I think that this step is necessary in the interests of calming down the situation in Slovakia. There is no point in increasing tension.

[Tvarozek] Is this not, for example, caused by the situation in the government being such that a new political entity—if we may call it that—would obstruct the government line and the program that the government has planned?

[Kovac] I am not altogether convinced that it is because of this. I truly think that a government in which the prime minister cannot cooperate with his deputy prime minister because the former proposed that the latter resign—thereby, in effect, demonstrating that he cannot cooperate—I would find it very difficult to work in such a government if I stayed in my post.

If a political entity comes into being, it will be a political entity that is based on the program principles that were declared by the Movement [for a Democratic Slovakia], but which could not be fulfilled.

[Tvarozek] Are your further ambitions of a political or a professional nature?

[Kovac] It is very difficult to give up responsibility for political development. I did not enter into top-level politics but into trade union politics and then transferred to so-called top-level politics. Because I entered political life, I had the duty to represent the views of a certain group of people, the people who elected me, the citizens who believed me. This was expressed in very beautiful letters, for which I thank the people who have morally supported me in this situation. I think that it would be irresponsible toward them to leave the political scene completely.

[Tvarozek] Let us decipher this: Do you plan to establish a new political entity?

[Kovac] I am considering this possibility.

Moravcik: Foreign Policy Not To Change

LD2402143794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Jozef Moravcik granted an interview to TA SR. He noted that after the prime minister's proposal to dismiss him, presented to the president, and in view of the current political situation as well as the foreign political interests of the Slovak Republic, he considered it necessary to solve the personnel question of the minister of foreign affairs. At the same time, he did not assume that his departure would change Slovak foreign policy in principle because a change in political course would not be supported by parliament.

New Television Director Assumes Office

AU2302163694 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Feb 94 p 16

[TA SR report: "Ivan Stadtrucker in Office; New Slovak Television Director"]

[Text] Bratislava—Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, introduced Ivan Stadtrucker into the office of central director of Slovak Television yesterday. He paid tribute to his practical and theoretical experience and expressed the wish that television should have mainly the viewer in mind and should not act as a political truncheon. Jozef Darmo, chairman of the Slovak Television Council, voiced his conviction that under the management of Ivan Stadtrucker, television broadcasts will meet the tasks arising from the law and will be constructive, politically tolerant, and of a high cultural standard.

Fifth Installment of Moravcik's Policy Report

AU1702091994 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 8 Feb 94 p 8

[Fifth installment of Foreign Minister Josef Moravcik's "Report on the Fulfillment of Tasks of the Slovak Republic's Foreign Policy" presented to the Slovak parliament on 2 February: "Slovakia in the World"]

[Text]

2.4 Relations With Asian Countries

From the viewpoint of the foreign policy interests of the Slovak Republic, Asia constitutes an important region with a growing economic potential and rising international prestige. The dynamic economic development of countries associated in the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) opens the way for the formation of a dominant center of world economy in this region in the near future.

The foreign policy of the Slovak Republic in 1993 proceeded from this realization. Its main objective was to establish prerequisites for the development and a higher level of Slovakia's bilateral relations with major Asian countries (Japan, PRC, India, Republic of Korea, and the ASEAN countries), with emphasis being placed on the creation of suitable conditions for the expansion of economic cooperation and the influx of capital investments to Slovakia.

The independent Slovak Republic is a new entity in the international arena, one that is unknown to many Asian countries. Therefore, our activities at various levels were also aimed at creating a truthful image of the Slovak Republic, its foreign policy, economic orientation, and internal development among representatives of the Asian countries.

The entrepreneurial circles of Asian countries need a political signal to launch their activities in another country. In the endeavor to improve the Slovak Republic's bilateral relations with individual Asian countries and promote the activity of their entrepreneurial circles in Slovakia, we made use of the opportunity to organize visits at the level of the minister of foreign affairs, the ministers of other government departments, and at the parliamentary level to the countries of primary interest, as well as visits by representatives of these countries to Slovakia.

The foreign affairs minister of the Slovak Republic visited the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Japan and the region of the Middle and Far East was also the destination of parliamentary delegations, the minister of economy, and representatives of financial, banking, and entrepreneurial circles.

Visits by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to the PRC and India are being prepared and should take place in 1994.

With a view to establishing suitable conditions for the expansion of economic cooperation and the influx of capital investments to Slovakia, we have been trying to update and complete the existing contractual basis, particularly in the sphere of agreements of economic nature (agreements on the protection and support of investments and on the prevention of double taxation). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated with the Ministry of Finance, which acts as the coordinator of this type of agreements, the expeditious signing of these agreements with the Republic of Korea and Thailand. We are waiting for the Japanese side's response to our draft of an agreement on the support and protection of investments. A trade agreement with the PRC is ready to be signed. Cooperation with Australia developed in interaction with our expatriates [living in Australia].

Some positive results have been achieved in relations with Japan, the country of the Slovak Republic's primary interest in the region:

—the Slovak Republic was granted benefits under the General System of Customs Preferences (GSP) (April 1993),

—an agreement was concluded on succession to the agreement on a $200 million loan in support of restructuring the economy of the former CSFR, of which $70 million are for the Slovak Republic (January 1993),

—discussions took place on the provision of a Japanese government loan (of approximately $200 million) to finance the construction of ecologically compatible sources of heat and electricity for the Presov-Kosice area, as well as on a $33 million loan in support of small and medium-sized businesses. It is expected that both loans will be granted,

—cooperation between Japanese firms and Slovnaft Bratislava, Tesla Prievidza, and other companies in establishing joint ventures is developing.

A more effective realization of our plans in Asia would be aided by the completion of the network of the Slovak Republic's representative missions in the region, including the selection of high-quality staff and the appointment of ambassadors.

Overall, it is possible to state that the implementation of the Slovak Republic's foreign policy plans laid down for the Asian region in 1993 was successful, considering the possibilities available to us. The realized contacts with representatives of countries of our primary interest in the region, along with the general foreign political activities, contributed to the presentation of Slovakia as a stable and reliable partner, to the development of bilateral cooperation, to greater interest in Slovakia among Asian businessmen and investors, and, in a wider context, to reinforcing Slovakia's international prestige. Important political and economic contacts were established, including the export of special products to designated countries.

The present level of the Slovak Republic's bilateral relations with major Asian countries and their interest in Slovakia establish good prerequisites for their further development and diversification in 1994.

2.5 Relations with Middle Eastern and African States

In the first half of 1993, main attention was paid to laying the foundations for a network of representative

missions, establishing material and technical conditions for the operation of individual offices, and to the practical implementation of dividing the property of the former CSFR. We have succeeding in securing that our embassies are at least minimally staffed. In view of the economic potentials of the Slovak Republic, steps have been taken to establish representative missions in only the most important countries of the region.

In the political sphere, we have achieved diplomatic recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations with practically all Arab countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Of the 46 states of sub-Saharan Africa, 18 countries have recognized the Slovak Republic thus far, most of which are the more important countries of the region.

We have been developing relations with the countries of the Middle East and Africa in the context of the present foreign policy priorities and with a view to asserting our economic and commercial interests in this region. The realization of tasks associated with recovering the Slovak Republic's claims, which we register in a number of countries of this region, is in its initial stage. The Ministry of Finance is acting as the coordinator of this task. Several meetings of heads of government departments were held but it is necessary, in the interest of boosting our economic relations, to continue developing a regular political dialogue and to intensify contacts at government level. Toward the end of the year, we therefore prepared a visit by the minister of foreign affairs of the Slovak Republic to Israel, which will take place in January 1994. We also regard as important the establishment of contacts with Egypt, which is one of the most influential states in the region and, at the same time, our traditional partner. Analogous agreements with other countries are in the preparatory stage and we are also establishing contacts in the sphere of culture and the arts.

2.6. Relations with the States of Latin America

The Slovak Republic's entry into the awareness of the political and economic circles in the countries of Latin America was complicated, to a certain extent, by these circles' perception of the Slovak Republic as the initiator of the breakup of the CSFR and by the problems faced by the representative missions of the Slovak Republic in this region, particularly in the first months of the year, with regard to the competent presentation of the new statehood. The development of the Slovak Republic's relations with the countries of Latin America is also adversely influenced by the fact that there is no ambassador of the Slovak Republic operating at any representative mission of the Slovak Republic in Latin America or accredited to any country of Latin America.

One of the consequences of the tendency to concentrate all resources of the Slovak foreign service on the European region is the low level of diversification of our external relations.

It is possible to state that Slovak foreign political and commercial activities vis-a-vis Latin America as a whole, as well as vis-a-vis individual countries, have led to the establishment of basic contacts, which, in the period to come, could create realistic conditions for more intensive political, economic, and commercial cooperation.

The highest level of relations has been achieved in our relations with Mexico, a contribution to which was made by the visit paid by the minister of foreign affairs of the Slovak Republic to Mexico in October 1993. An honorary consulate in Guadalajara was opened on this occasion.

In the second half of the year, political dialogue with Brazil and Uruguay started to develop more dynamically. Bilateral activities have established realistic prerequisites for the realization of a visit by the minister of foreign affairs to these countries. Argentina and Chile have declared their interest in more intensive cooperation. The realization of a visit by the minister of foreign affairs of the Slovak Republic to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay would raise the qualitative level of the Slovak Republic's relations with the aforementioned countries and, consequently, with the entire territory of Latin America.

The opening of honorary consulates in Brazil and Argentina is in the final phase of preparations. Negotiations on the conclusion of trade agreements with Cuba and Brazil are about to be wound up.

The building of a network of the Slovak Republic's representative missions in Latin America has not been completed this year and a certain makeshift arrangement persists in this area. A possible further restriction of our diplomatic representation in the Latin American region would reduce the volume of our political activities and cause a decline of commercial and economic cooperation.

3. Cultural Activities Abroad

Cultural activities abroad are presently one of the key elements in creating Slovakia's image in the world. Therefore, they should become an integral part of the strategy of asserting the foreign political interests of our state.

Following the division of the premises of CSFR representative missions and Cultural and Information Centers, a vacuum in the sphere of culture and information came about, which is felt also by institutions and citizens in the countries of their operation. It is expected of us that we follow up on the positive traditions of our cultural activities as soon as possible. Therefore, our efforts in 1993 were aimed, on the one hand, at establishing comprehensive relations in the spheres of education, science, and culture and, on the other, at reviving the activity of Slovak cultural centers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has worked out a concept for building cultural centers abroad, which should be put into practice in the years to come. Four Slovak cultural centers

were in operation in 1993—in Budapest, Sofia, Warsaw, and Bucharest. The cultural center in Budapest, in particular, is an example of the active and positive influence of culture on bilateral relations, even in a tense political situation such as prevails in relations with Hungary.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been active in preparing cultural agreements with individual countries that show interest in such cooperation and in expanding the possibilities for cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges. With a number of countries (such as Spain, Greece, Republic of South Africa, some Arab states, and the states of Latin America), we have been developing more intensive relations in these areas than in the political or economic spheres.

Societies of friendship with Slovakia operate in a number of countries, which also contributes to mutual knowledge and understanding and helps establish a good atmosphere in mutual relations (this applies, for example, to the Scandinavian countries).

4. The International Legal Dimension of Foreign Policy

4.1 Sphere of International Law

The priority task of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic in the sphere of international law in 1993 was to secure the process of the Slovak Republic's succession to contractual documents, to which the CSFR had been a party on 31 December 1992. The basic condition of talks on the Slovak Republic's succession to bilateral international treaties was the attainment of agreement on which treaties would remain valid without modification, which would be modified, and which would expire without substitution.

Talks on succession to bilateral agreements have been wound up with Poland, Austria, Russia, Slovenia, Romania, Japan, Finland, and Norway. Talks with France, Canada, Switzerland, Turkey, Hungary, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Luxembourg have been initiated. Talks with the FRG concerning the FRG's succession to treaties concluded by the former GDR are in a preparatory stage.

With regard to succession to multilateral contractual documents, succession to conventions concluded within the framework of the UN, UNESCO, the International Labor Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Organization for Intellectual Property, the The Hague Conference for International Private Law, as well as conventions in the sphere of international humanitarian law deposited in Switzerland has been comprehensively notified [notifikovana]. The Council of Europe has recognized a comprehensive succession to conventions concluded within the framework of this organization, the contracting party to which had been the CSFR.

The Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, within the framework of its powers, has confirmed the Slovak Republic's succession to international documents concerning the claims and financial liabilities of the former CSFR.

Another task of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic in 1993 was the preparation of bilateral political treaties with Italy, Ukraine, Romania, and Russia. All these treaties have been signed in the course of the year. The Treaty on Good Neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and Ukraine and the Treaty between the Slovak Republic and Italy on Friendship and Cooperation were ratified by the National Council of the Slovak Republic in November 1993. Prerequisites exist for all the aforesaid treaties to go into effect in 1994.

In the course of the year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic participated in the preparation of presidential and governmental contractual documents that were coordinated by other government departments. This concerns, in particular, the readmission agreements with Poland, Ukraine, and Romania [concerning the deportation of illegal immigrants], the treaty on state borders with Ukraine, treaties on the prevention of double taxation, on the support and protection of investments, and on trade and payments, treaties concerning road transport and aviation, and the like. In cooperation with other government departments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic also participated in the preparation of the Slovak Republic's accession to the Council of Europe Anti-Doping Convention, to the European Convention on Archaeological Heritage, to the European Charter on Sports, or to the European Convention Against Spectators' Improper Conduct at Sports Events. In cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic participated in the signing of the General Convention on Climatic Changes and the Convention on Biological Diversity. In the process of preparation of international treaties by other government departments, the International Law Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic attends to their formal legal aspect and to their conformity with the norms of international contractual law.

One serious issue to which Slovak diplomacy has been forced to pay increased attention from the first days of the Slovak Republic's independence, and to which it must still pay increased attention, are the problems concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros system of hydroelectric power projects. The two sides have agreed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice, the United Nations' supreme judicial body. A special department for the International Court of Justice has been set up at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The conclusion of a special agreement was officially announced on 2 July 1993, which initiated the court proceedings. A team of highly experienced and distinguished foreign legal experts has been set up to defend the interests of the Slovak Republic in this legal suit. In spite of the ongoing court proceedings, the Slovak

Republic allows for the possibility of the settlement of the dispute on the basis of a joint agreement.

4.2 Consular Sphere

In the first year of existence of the independent Slovak Republic, basic attributes [atributy] were laid at the Consular Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic for a professional consular service. Basic norms governing the execution of consular activities were drafted and finetuned in this period—the Consular Order and procedures for its enactment, documents that are essential to secure a uniform execution of consular activities at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at representative missions of the Slovak Republic abroad.

Based on the foreign policy interests of the Slovak Republic, the main principles and orientation of visa policy were drawn up in 1993 (and approved by Slovak Government resolution No. 732), on the basis of which proposals for the modification of visa relations with specific states were initiated in the course of the year. The proposals were submitted with a view to preserving good political and economic relations as well as in the interest of developing commercial activities with specific states.

Proposals for a modification of visa relations concerned the following states: South Korea, Israel, Iran, Chile, Argentina, Cyprus, Slovenia, Croatia, Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungarian Republic, and Romania. Negotiations with some of these states have already been concluded, as a result of which new agreements on visa-free travel have been signed (Cyprus, Slovenia) or are expected to be signed in the near future (Croatia). Negotiations with the Hungarian Republic, Lithuania, and Estonia have also been concluded and proposals for the conclusion of agreements on visa-free travel have been submitted to the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government of the Slovak Republic for approval. Negotiations with the other states continue.

A document concerning the establishment of a network of honorary consulates of the Slovak Republic abroad was drawn up in 1993 and submitted to the Government of the Slovak Republic. Last year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic started building this network, in particular, in advanced countries, as well as in third world countries where the Slovak Republic does not maintain a representative mission and where good prospects exist, in view of traditions and actual potentials, for the development of cooperation in trade, tourism, and other areas. In addition to the two previous honorary consulates (Calgary and Limassol), in 1993 an honorary consulate was established in Guadalajara (Mexico) and nine more honorary consulates have been approved: Hamburg, Bombay, Calcutta, Drammen, Alexandria, Mestre in Italy, Barcelona, Vaduz, and Port Said. These consulates have not yet commenced their activity because they still require the other side's approval. In the course of December, proposals for the establishment of additional honorary consulates were submitted (Montreal, Winnipeg, Vancouver, Toronto, Reykjavik).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic has on record specific candidates for the post of honorary consuls. The selection is made in cooperation with the relevant representative mission.

Sixth Installment of Moravcik's Policy Report

AU1802160794 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 9 Feb 94 p 5

[Sixth and final installment of Foreign Minister Josef Moravcik's "Report on the Fulfillment of Tasks of the Slovak Republic's Foreign Policy" presented to the Slovak parliament on 2 February: "Slovakia in the World"]

[Text]

4.3 Sphere of Human Rights and Minorities

In the very first months of its existence, the Slovak Republic avowed its allegiance to documents, by which the CSFR had been bound, and resolved the issue of continuity of its commitments by means of succession to international treaties dealing with human rights issues on UN premises. We accept the highest standard achieved, consisting in the right of the individual to submit a complaint against his own state for the violation of a right laid down in a contractual document (Optional Protocol to the Pact of Political and Civic Rights).

The most significant event of the year 1993 was the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, which was attended by a delegation of the Slovak Republic headed by President Michal Kovac. The conference confirmed the principles of the universality and indivisibility of human rights. The Slovak Republic, like other democratic states, endorsed the idea of establishing the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights under the UN. The range of duties entrusted to the newly formed UN office will be highly important. The Slovak Republic will participate in the formulation of documents associated with this office.

The activity of the Slovak Republic in UN bodies rested in its participation in codifying work. The draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on Torture Prevention is being prepared at present. The participation of the Slovak Republic in the work of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva and of the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly also plays an irreplaceable role. It is important from the viewpoint of making the Slovak Republic more visible on UN premises that the aforesaid Third Committee is chaired by a representative of the Slovak Republic. Improved cooperation with

the UN and promotion of human rights are also expected from the [UN] Center for Human Rights [to be opened] in Bratislava.

In the course of the World Conference on Human Rights, a seminar was organized in Bratislava on the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic, on the role and tasks of national centers for human rights. The seminar was attended by delegates to the World Conference on Human Rights.

Of exceptional importance for the young Slovak Republic was its admission to the Council of Europe, the basic criterion of which is respect for human rights. A prerequisite for acquiring Council of Europe membership is the signing of the European Human Rights Convention, which, owing to its control mechanism, represents today the most progressive system of human rights protection. The Slovak Republic at the same time accepted the authority of the European Commission for Human Rights to receive complaints from individuals and the jurisdiction of the European Court for Human Rights. In connection with our Council of Europe membership, a number of new tasks has arisen—the harmonization of the legal system of the Slovak Republic with the European Human Rights Convention and supplementary protocols, the gradual accession to conventions concluded on Council of Europe premises (of which there are about 150), and participation in codifying work (work is currently being wound up on the 11th supplementary protocol, which deals with the reform of the control mechanism). Another important task is to establish the office of the Slovak Republic's legal representative (agent) in proceedings before the European Commission and the European Court for Human Rights. In connection with these new tasks, the Slovak Republic adopted a specific timetable of work, which is being adhered to. The Slovak Republic also has its representatives in the European Commission and the European Court for Human Rights.

Another important international forum that is devoted to human rights and where the Slovak Republic presents its positions is the CSCE. Within the framework of CSCE seminars on the human dimension, the Slovak Republic took an active part in discussions and exchanges of views with the aim of providing an accurate picture of the state of human rights observance in the Slovak Republic. Continuation in this active participation should forestall in the future the dissemination of evaluations, based on unverified facts, such as the report prepared by the U.S. Congress Helsinki Commission. The Slovak Republic supports a coordinated and cooperative course of action by the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations with a view to preventing duplicity and negative rivalry in the sphere of the human dimension. It welcomes recent activities by the highest representatives of the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations aimed at the institutionalization and formalization of this cooperation. It is also possible to assess as positive the Slovak Republic's cooperation with the CSCE High Commissioner for Ethnic Minorities.

The issue of protecting the rights of ethnic minorities, which has recently moved into the foreground of attention of the international community in the United Nations, the CSCE, and the Council of Europe, is a chapter in itself. This manifested itself fully during the admission of the Slovak Republic into the Council of Europe when the attention of Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly reporters focused on the Slovak Republic's minority policy, which resulted in clearly formulated recommendations. These recommendations are being gradually met by the Slovak Republic. Another important task was participation by Slovak Republic experts in the preparation of legally binding documents dealing with the protection of rights of members of ethnic minorities. In view of the newly adopted procedure for monitoring new Council of Europe member states' compliance with their commitments, a mission by Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly reporters took place toward the end of 1993. It will be necessary to evaluate the results of this mission and to adopt the appropriate measures if necessary.

A serious problem of our foreign policy that has become clearly crystallized in the first year of the Slovak Republic's existence [as an independent state] lies in the Hungarian Republic's approach to the minority issue. With varied success, the Hungarian Republic casts doubt on the minority policy of the Slovak Republic. This is also contributed to by the Slovak Republic's frequently uncoordinated course of action and the inability to present to the international public the fact that minorities in the Slovak Republic have had, and continue to have, rights going beyond the framework of the relevant international documents, such as the CSCE document of Copenhagen. As a result, our position last year was rather defensive and, instead of launching our own activities, we more often reacted to external prodding.

At the beginning of the year, negotiations started on the premises of the Central European Initiative on a document on the protection of ethnic minority rights. From both the formal viewpoint and from the viewpoint of its contents, the text of the aforementioned document was from the beginning unacceptable to the Slovak Republic. Representatives of the Slovak Republic had to spend much effort to achieve that, by means of negotiations, the document gradually assumed a shape that was acceptable to the Slovak Republic.

In the period under review, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cooperated also with other government departments. This cooperation was assisted also by the formation of a new independent section dealing exclusively with the issue of human and minority rights.

4.4 Sphere of Migration and the Refugee Problem

From the very start of its independent existence, the Slovak Republic has been paying great attention to the

migration issue, which has come to the foreground recently throughout Europe. This arises from the geographic location of the Slovak Republic as a country of transit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic participated in the implementation of many projects in this area, in cooperation with other Slovak Government ministries. In November 1993 the Slovak Government approved the "Principles of Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic," which are binding also for the newly established Migration Office operating under the Slovak Ministry of Interior. A total of 2,483 persons, most of them from ex-Yugoslavia, are currently in the care of this office. In 1993 247 ethnic Slovaks from the Chernobyl area were resettled to Slovakia.

The Slovak Republic obtained the status of observer in the International Organization for Migration (IOM), retroactively from 1 January 1993. The Slovak side has demonstrated its interest in involvement in the project of monitoring migration in Central and Eastern Europe (MIU) [expansion unknown]. In October 1993 the Migration Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic organized a visit by an IOM mission to the Slovak Republic. Working negotiations aimed at evaluating the migration situation on the territory of the Slovak Republic were held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic and at the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic and an agreement on specific cooperation within the framework of the Migration Information Program and in the area of training and educational programs and seminars was reached. The Slovak Republic expressed its interest in becoming an IOM member state. The draft of an agreement on cooperation between the IOM and the Slovak Government was presented to the Slovak side, which comprises the agreed areas of cooperation and assistance to the Slovak Republic, as well as the opening of an IOM branch in the Slovak Republic.

Within the framework of activities carried out in the Council of Europe with regard to migration, the Slovak Republic participated in several meetings of working groups set up on the basis of the so-called Vienna process, which is at present the only discussion forum for countries most severely affected by the migration problem in the East-West context.

Cooperation with the leadership of the CDMG—the Council of Europe's European Committee for Migration—also started to successfully develop in 1993. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic participates in the implementation of many projects, in cooperation with other Slovak Government departments. A delegation of the Slovak Republic also took part in a meeting of CAHAR—the ad hoc committee of experts on the legal aspects of territorial asylum, refugees, and stateless persons.

Within the framework of activity of the Central European Initiative, a meeting of the Central European Initiative Working Group for Migration took place in June 1993, in which the Slovak Republic participated.

The activity of Slovak humanitarian and charity organizations (Slovak Red Cross, SHR [Slovak Humanitarian Council], Slovak Catholic Charity) in the period under review can be assessed as highly positive. Most shipments were sent to the republics of former Yugoslavia, Romania, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Slovak Republic also arranged the recreational stay of children from Chernobyl on its territory.

With regard to the refugee problem, the Slovak Republic secured its succession to international contractual documents pertaining to the status of refugees (Geneva Convention of 1951 and New York Protocol of 1967). Right at the beginning of the year 1993 the Slovak Republic established close contacts with the Geneva headquarters of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a result of which was the opening of an UNHCR branch in Bratislava in April 1993. The founding of this branch helped to deal with the problems of refugees on the territory of the Slovak Republic, especially by organizing training courses and seminars based on international experience in this area, including a solution to the problem of the refugees' legal protection. The UNHCR has presented to the Slovak Republic the draft of an agreement on cooperation between the UNHCR and the Government of the Slovak Republic, which will be assessed at a government meeting.

The most important activity with regard to the refugee problem was the Slovak Republic's participation in the 44th session of the UNHCR Executive Committee Program in Geneva (October 1993). Within the framework of this session, a working meeting took place with Mr. J. Horekens, the new director of the UNHCR European Office and an agreement was reached on cooperation in drafting projects of assistance to the Slovak Republic and in accessing the UNHCR data bases. The offer was also extended to us to receive Slovak trainees in the UNHCR headquarters. At this session the Slovak Republic acquired the status of observer, which will allow it to participate in meetings of subcommittees and in other informal sessions of the UNHCR Executive Committee.

Overall, it is possible to state that the Slovak Republic's cooperation with international organizations dealing with the migration and refugee issues brought satisfactory results in 1993 and has achieved a high standard.

5. Presentation of the Slovak Republic Abroad

Even though the situation with regard to the presentation of the Slovak Republic abroad improved in 1993, it needs to be said that a relatively low level of information on the Slovak Republic persists among foreign professional, political, and economic circles as well as among media workers and the general public. The interest of foreign mass media, political representatives, and experts is focused predominantly on expediently [ucelove] selected ranges of issues—the situation regarding the protection of ethnic minority rights, freedom of the

press, the problem of conversion of arms production, the status of the Romany ethnic community, and the like.

The main orientation in the activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was therefore focused on preventive measures. The point of gravity of efforts lay in the compilation and distribution of basic information about Slovakia. A number of documents and books were issued (History of Slovakia and Slovaks) in the course of the year, or their re-issue is being prepared (Slovakia's Five Shapes, and others). Among the major publishing feats, it is necessary to mention the representative encyclopedia "Slovakia in the World—World in Slovakia," being prepared for the first anniversary of the founding of the Slovak Republic.

Some justified reservations notwithstanding, the start of the publication of the English-language monthly SLOVAKIA can be considered a positive step. In 1993 we launched cooperation with the Babylon agency aimed at publishing a quarterly in Arabic, called SLOVAKIA TODAY.

In cooperation with the Slovak Government Office and other state administration bodies, foremost attention was devoted to the sphere of trade and economic cooperation. Emphasis was laid on our interest, and the Slovak Government's systematic activity, in establishing conditions for the influx of foreign capital and investments.

From the territorial viewpoint, the activities centered primarily on the neighboring countries, chiefly Hungary and Austria. Despite maximum efforts, with regard to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric power project we did not succeed in eliminating to the full extent the consequences of the Hungarian mass media activities directed against the Slovak Republic. The activities of the Slovak side were confined almost exclusively to standard methods (news conferences, publications, and the like) and very little or no use was made of offensive forms of mass media activities (appropriate cooperation with selected mass media prior to the adoption, or publication, of the Slovak side's relevant decisions).

In spite of an endeavor to do so, we did not succeed to the full extent in securing the publication of ad hoc materials on key foreign policy steps and activities of the Slovak Republic and on important domestic political events (such as statements by constitutional officials of the Slovak Republic).

An important role was played in 1993 by cooperation with foreign companies involved in shaping and influencing public opinion, particularly in the United States and the most important countries of Western Europe. Experience with the firm MWW/SC [expansion unknown] confirmed that it is essential to thoroughly prepare agreements on cooperation and to set aside a sufficient number of staffers assigned these public relations tasks. In view of the financial costs, it was not possible to make use of the aforementioned form of activity in the period under review. This type of cooperation clearly requires a coordinated course of action at the highest level and an adequate pooling of resources of all interested government departments.

6. Building the Diplomatic Service

As of 31 November 1993, 415 employees worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, 189 of them in diplomatic posts and 226 as desk officers in administrative and technical jobs. In the course of 1993, 120 university graduates and 87 people with secondary and basic education took up work with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Slovak Republic maintains abroad 54 embassies, 6 standing missions, and 3 general consulates, at which operate 219 diplomatic staffers (60 of which, those working at trade and economic sections, are under the methodological guidance of the Ministry of Economy, 1, working at the Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome, under the methodological guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture, and 1, working at the standing mission at Brussels, under the methodological guidance of the Ministry of Finance) and 200 administrative and technical staff. In the course of 1993, 42 diplomats and 53 administrative and technical staffers were dispatched into foreign service. A total of 10 diplomats and 2 administrative and technical staffers are currently undergoing preparation prior to being sent abroad.

A total of 26 diplomats operate in the rank of ambassador; another three diplomats have been approved as ambassadors by the government and the president of the Slovak Republic and are ready to depart for their post; two have been approved as ambassadors by the Government of the Slovak Republic and their nomination has been submitted to the president of the Slovak Republic for approval; and four proposals for ambassadorial appointments have been submitted to the Government of the Slovak Republic for approval.

Building the diplomatic service of the Slovak Republic in 1994 made it necessary not only to supplement the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with new personnel, but also to adapt its organizational structures and to draw up internal guidelines for the activity of both the Bratislava headquarters and representative missions abroad. Attention was also devoted to the problems of information flow, communications, and other technical and organizational problems of building the Slovak Republic's diplomatic service. Emphasis was placed, in particular, on the establishment of a basic technical platform for the Foreign Affairs Ministry's information system, on the drafting of a concept for the development of the telecommunications network, and on an effective substitution and completion of communications devices, including means of special communications. The set tasks have been fulfilled without any serious shortcomings, in defiance of complicated conditions caused, in particular, by the state of the installations inherited from the division [of federal property].

Jezsensky Interviewed on Balkans, Zhirinovskiy

PM2402155194 Madrid ABC in Spanish 16 Feb 94 p 30

[Interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jezsensky by Cristina Lopez Schlichting in Madrid; date not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Lopez] As neighbors of the Balkans, you have a sword of Damocles hanging over your heads. Last year, you were talking about the threat of the war spreading to Vojvodina—the Serbian region where a large part of the population is Hungarian. Do you believe that this eventuality is closer?

[Jezsensky] No, fortunately; partly thanks to our careful moves and partly also because Belgrade has now won through war what it wanted and is now interested in consolidating and wants no more problems. The defeat of the most extremist Serbian groups in the last elections must also be taken into account. It is true that the Hungarians of Voivodina remain innocent victims of the economic embargo and that they are harassed by certain sections of the population—especially Serbian refugees from Bosnia and Croatia—who are pressing them to leave, but we have detected in Belgrade signs in favor of granting this minority a certain cultural autonomy.

[Lopez] Around you, there is almost frantic diplomatic activity between Romania, Serbia, and Greece. Do you not feel isolated?

[Jezsensky] The three nations are Orthodox and share common—Byzantine—cultural roots, but it would be dangerous to see these moves as the beginning of a division between the Catholic and Orthodox cultural worlds in the area. It is true that Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia share a rejection of the Hungarian minorities' desire for autonomy, and that Greece and Romania vigorously supported Serbia at the worst point in the Balkans crisis, but I believe that the mutual rapprochement now is due more to a desire to end the Balkans conflict and to maintain an economic route to the West through Yugoslavia or Romania.

[Lopez] Hungary has just joined the Partnership for Peace. To what extent do you feel protected by this intermediate course between NATO and nothing?

[Jezsensky] We have always made it clear that our intention is to join NATO; from this viewpoint, we disagree with Partnership for Peace, but at the same time we understand the efforts of Europe and the United States to reassure Russia. Moreover, the Partnership is much more than we initially believed. In fact, NATO's future expansion has been accepted, and we are being allowed to prepare for later membership. We will take the opportunity.

[Lopez] I recall that you used to be very much in favor of strengthening the CSCE....

[Jezsensky] The CSCE is too uncoordinated. Its members are too numerous, and some of them are not actually European or, unfortunately, stable. The CSCE has shown itself unable to resolve the Balkans conflict. It has noble aims, but it is too large to guarantee European security. To some extent, when thinking about the CSCE, I recall Stalin's remark about the pope. How many divisions does he have? The CSCE has no divisions, but NATO does. That is why NATO is effective.

[Lopez] Speaking of effectiveness, NATO has just taken an initiative. What will become of this current ultimatum?

[Jezsensky] An ultimatum is a threat in order to try to secure something. It must be backed up by credible strength but also by common sense. NATO has this strength, and I believe that the Serbs will not venture to repeat their contempt of the ultimatum which was delivered in 1914. At least, Belgrade does not seem inclined to do so, and although everything depends on the Bosnian Serbs, I hope that they will withdraw and carry out what is being demanded, but I also hope that, even if they do not do so completely, NATO will not find itself obliged to intervene. Peace is the responsibility of all the parties involved. Responsibility for the origin of the war is a matter for an international court and history, but the most important thing now is to secure peace, even at the cost of not achieving everything that is demanded. The alternative is mutual annihilation.

Feel Nostalgia for Stalin

[Lopez] The Russian scene has changed substantially with the rise of opposition leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. What is Hungary's stance on this change of scene?

[Jezsensky] Look, Zhirinovskiy does not alarm me personally or Hungary. What does alarm me is Europe's not taking him seriously. Although there is no exact parallel, it must be recalled that Hitler was not taken seriously, either. The Russian people feel that they have lost an empire. They were told for decades that everybody loved Russia because it provided security. Now, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they find themselves abandoned by everybody and plunged into poverty. The West has done a great deal, but it must do more. It must help seek an economic solution and show them the advantages of the free market and democracy; help them understand, as was done with Germany and Japan after World War II, the evilness of the regimes which were left behind. If the Russians do not see an improvement in their immediate situation, they will feel nostalgia for Stalin. They will forget the 50 million dead but remember the price of bread when he was alive. Zhirinovskiy cannot be understood outside the Russian situation. That is why it is imperative to support the minority who see Russia's future in Europe and who, unfortunately for everybody, did not fare well in the last elections.

Boross Views Elections, Media, Russia, FRY

AU2502113494 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 24 Feb 94 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Peter Boross by Joseph Pozsgai; place and date not given: "We Need Calm"]

[Text] [Pozsgai] What are the chances of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the leading party of the government coalition, of keeping its position at the parliamentary elections in May?

[Boross] I cannot give you a percentage. I believe that it has a chance—undoubtedly, after a series of unpopular measures. A question mark always hangs over a chance like this. However, it is certain that the public view of the MDF has improved. This is, somewhat, also supported by the economic situation and the hopes based on this, therefore, if this continues, we might reach a better result in May than has previously been predicted by many people.

[Pozsgai] Can you expect a strong shift to the left in Parliament as happened in Poland, Lithuania, and Russia?

[Boross] Certainly not as strong, in my view. In addition, the left wing is rather divided. Certain coalition versions exist on the left wing but, I dare say, I do not think this will actually happen when the time comes. Hungary does not have a party that is so clearly committed to the successor party that it would also be suitable for coalition. As far as I can see, some of its members would welcome this, while other would not. Therefore, the Polish analogy does not apply to us. In the meantime, we also have to consider that the non-compliance with left-wing needs has its consequences in Poland and the Hungarian public is informed about this through television.

[Pozsgai] In 1993, we received unfavorable economic news from Hungary: Export reduction, agricultural decline, and the continuation of a restrictive monetary policy that reduces production, demand, and thus state revenue. It is self-evident that this monetary policy leads to further increases in the state's foreign debts. What is the justification for continuing this economic policy?

[Boross] In my view, the Hungarian monetary policy is not restrictive. This statement is certainly not true. Anyone who is familiar with the Hungarian economic conditions knows very well that Hungary is forced to be part of international trade. The ratio of exports and imports in the Hungarian economy is extremely high. The problem arose mainly from the fact that the Western economic recession induced reduced demand for Hungarian export products, and the often mentioned motor of Europe, Germany, did not show its best side with its economic growth being around zero percent instead of being higher. Evidently, all this is supplemented by the fact that we convert the economy at a certain speed and this is impossible without temporary losses, including the uneconomic export bases.

[Pozsgai] If the European Union continues to refuse the increase of imports from Eastern Europe, would it not be possible at least for the "Visegrad countries" to create a "common market" for themselves the way the six Western European countries began to set up the EEC in 1957? This could even accelerate gaining membership of NATO.

[Boross] Those were six developed West-European countries with very well developed economies. We once were part of a bloc based on an undeveloped economic basis, which destroyed the Hungarian economy. All Visegrad countries are in a state of change. Therefore, it is in their vital interests that they not only coordinate affairs between themselves (where, of course, practical relations do exist that have to be used and even improved), but they also adjust to the most developed region of the world that draws the Hungarian technical level, product quality, and therefore, many factors, toward its level. It makes demands against the Hungarian economy. We need these demands so that one day we will become suitable for common market membership, which, naturally, is one of our ambitions.

[Pozsgai] How are relations between Budapest and Bonn just now? I am asking this on the occasion of your forthcoming visit to Bonn. According to our information, relations were excellent at the time of the change of the regime, during the fuel crisis [not further specified], and even after that, but later they became more quiet.

[Boross] Fortunately, events do not always occur that would specially highlight good relations. During these crises, Germany did indeed support us, but this is continuing. Chancellor Kohl and former Prime Minister Jozsef Antall had a special relationship. I think that this is widely known. When Chancellor Kohl was here at the funeral, I had an opportunity to meet him and I was glad to see that he applied the same intimate style with me. This gives me hopes that this good relationship will continue on the same level. It is self-evident that, in a relationship, it is not possible only to ask for things and request donations. This is not my goal. I would like a cooperation that has more advantages for us—simply because of the power conditions—but I am certainly not thinking of relations that would embarrass Germany because we might not be able to keep within the limits. We are. I will be talking to the chancellor on these terms.

[Pozsgai] In the German television and press, it is mainly the Hungarian left wing that represents Hungary and it often gives a distorted picture of the domestic situation. Why is the Hungarian center passive in this area?

[Boross] Because we are lagging behind in communication. This communication is essentially the heritage of the former regime, including a large section of its personnel—mainly in the first two years of our operation. The result is that a keen political battle is going on here. The left wing suffered a great disappointment at the

1990 elections because it had been almost certain of its victory and, because of this, it often oversteps the limits that are adhered to by the communications experts of other countries' oppositions.

Indeed, these actions that damage our image are very disturbing for us. Many of our domestic political battles are also on this issue. Occasionally, astonishing news can appear in Germany, and I can read striking distortions of my words in newspapers. Similar images are shown on television, for example, on the Gypsy issue. As far as I can remember, this did happen, although it has nothing to do with the truth. We are not in a good position regarding communications.

[Pozsgai] So the media war is still on. In my view, the main reason for this is that the change of the regime has not been implemented in the area of the media. The daily newspapers had largely been privatized before the change of the regime, therefore, they avoided the change of the regime.

[Boross] First of all, I would like to say that I can remember that the Springer concern was a main enemy in the previous, socialist-communist system in the West because of the level of its anti-communism. Then Springer bought six communist newspapers, and these are still edited by the same people as before. I can only placet a large question mark next to this, nothing else. This kind of problem did not exist in Germany. The staff of the East German television was fundamentally changed, and the Czechs did the same. This did not happen in Hungary. There are many reasons for this, and we are now suffering the consequences. The Hungarian transformation insisted on legality and this prevailed during the changes. In fact, as opposed to the eastern part of Germany, this change actually began in the previous regime. Therefore, here, the government never made any illegal or anti-constitutional measures and was always moderate. This has many advantages, but some disadvantages too, as is shown by the media issue.

[Pozsgai] The political developments in Russia understandably worry the West. What do you think about Zhirinovskiy? Can he become Yeltsin's successor?

[Boross] I dare not predict this, because political personalities sometimes appear and then disappear from public life. However, I dare say that the imperialist view and the slogans corresponding to this may bring lasting popularity in Russia, and this might mean a special advantage in politics—even its extreme version. Therefore, in Russia, the imperial mentality is stronger than the Russian mentality in people's general views. A nationalist version of communism appeared there—I am now talking about the left wing.

[Pozsgai] Was Foreign Minister Jeszenszky's visit to Belgrade unavoidable right now when the Bosnian conflict has become more tense and the Serbs have been internationally isolated?

[Boross] Let us be precise! Jeszenszky's visit and the state secretary's visit preceding it took place before the events you mentioned. Certain factors could have been taken into consideration if communication in international politics had been adequate. However, we also had to remember after all that 400,000 Hungarians are living in fear in Vojvodina. I think that we waited long enough. The foreign ministers of other countries, for example of the NATO member Greece, had been to Belgrade long before our visit was made. Hungary's interest in putting the Vojvodina Hungarians at ease was expressed in this visit—some 100,000 members of this community have already left, some of them to Hungary, others to all parts of the world. In these circumstances, and recognizing that we will still be living next to each other for centuries, and historical experience also shows that it is dangerous to live in hostility, especially with Serbia, therefore, I believe that we had to make this step. We need peace here, on our southern border, and peace is needed for the Hungarians in Yugoslavia. We do not want to struggle with the problems of masses of refugees. They should stay at home and the feeling of danger that they have been living with for years should be reduced. Therefore, rump Yugoslavia is our neighbor and it will remain so. It is, of course, possible to give various pieces of advice. However, the advice is coming from many thousands of kilometers away from here. In such a case, we always have a strange feeling that they might not be living the situation as we have to live through it.

MIEP Protests Police Confiscation of Petition

AU2402184494 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 24 Feb 94 p 4

[Jozsef Szabo Bartha report: "Csurka Supports Csucs's Nomination in Mohacs—The MIEP's Budapest Elections List Is Complete"]

[Text] The unlawful police actions against the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] have become tendentious. The latest incident occurred on 18 February, when the MIEP's petition for a referendum was confiscated in the underpass at the Nyugati railroad station, MIEP Cochairman Lajos Horvath announced at the party's news conference on 23 February.

He said that a MIEP member who tried to clear up the matter immediately after this police action was ejected from the police station, being told "walkies outside, why should we deal with such a matter, you will not win the elections anyway!" In the MIEP's view, it is not impossible that police patrols had been given orders to act against the collection of signatures. A letter has been sent to National Police Chief Sandor Pinter asking him to investigate the responsibility for this politically motivated act.

In connection with the elections, it was said at the news conference that the Budapest list is complete and the number of their individual candidates exceeds 140. They are delaying the publication of the list of names because

running in MIEP colors involves the threat of losing one's job in a number of cases.

They are willingly to support Laszlo Csucs, deputy chairman of Hungarian Radio, if he runs as an independent candidate in Mohacs [southern Hungary]. Similarly, they would also be happy to support Gabor Nahlik, deputy chairman of Hungarian Television, either as a MIEP or as an independent candidate.

Answering NEPSZABADSAG's question in connection with the Hungarian Democratic Forum's [MDF] National Convention last weekend, [MIEP Co-Chairman Istvan] Csurka stated: "The MDF's ship is already nose down in the sea. We are lucky that we had been removed from this Titanic before it started to sink. The current three captains will not be able to repair the hole that was caused by the previous captain Jozsef Antall when the ship collided with the iceberg of the pact."

Popularity of Party Leaders Examined

AU2502121094 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 24 Feb 94 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "Popularity of Party List Leaders"]

[Text] At the request of MAGYAR HIRLAP, the Median Public Opinion and Market Research Institute will, until the elections, regularly examine the popularity or the parties' list leaders and how well they are known.

At the top of the list, no move has been made from December 1993 to January 1994: Gyula Horn [Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) chairman], [Republic Party (KP) Chairman] Janos Palotas, and Zoltan Kiraly [Social Democratic Party of Hungary (MSZDP) chairman] continue to be in the first three places.

However, it cannot be ignored that these politicians are not in the same position: In the case of the Socialists, the party and its first man are equally popular, but the very popular Palotas and Kiraly lead parties whose support does not even reach the minimum required to get into parliament. People link Horn to his party with rather big certainty, while the party links to the other two popular politicians are unknown to many people.

By the beginning of 1994, almost all significant political parties named their leading person on the election list. From now on, it is of outstanding importance on the basis of what information the citizens will make their decision on 8 May, whether they know who the main actors of political life are, what they represent, and how popular they are.

Since the beginning of December, Peter Boross who was elected prime minister in the meantime, has become known virtually to the whole adult population. Although he had previously also been among the known politicians, in the first month as prime minister, this increased by almost 10 percent and reached the virtual maximum. The level of how well known the other list leaders are has not changed in the past month apart from accidental variations, and Gabor Kuncze's [list leader of the Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ] popularity and how well he is known, which had formerly increased fast, has also stagnated.

On the basis of how well they know the politicians, the citizens can be put into three groups: The first group consists of people who know the politician, have an opinion about him, and are aware of which party he belongs to; the second group consists of those who know the politician's name, can express their opinion on him, but do not know, or incorrectly know, his party affiliation; and people in the third group have heard of the politician's name but will not form a view on him and do not know where he belongs.

Knowledge About the Parties' List Leaders (as percentage of the questioned people)

Name	Knows His Party	Has a View on Him	Knows His Name
Jozsef Torgyan	80	92	97
Viktor Orban	77	89	94
Peter Boross	71	92	97
Gyula Horn	68	92	95
Laszlo Surjan	50	88	92
Gabor Kuncze	36	64	65
Istvan Csurka	34	88	93
Janos Palotas	33	90	93
Zoltan Kiraly	20	82	83
Tamas Nagy	17	44	45

Out of the 10 list leaders, people know the party affiliation of five on the average (12 percent could not name the party of any of the politicians and no one was able to name them all).

Four-fifths of the people who were surveyed know about the best-known Jozsef Torgyan and that he belongs to the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP]. Viktor Orban's party [Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz)] membership is also well known. A quarter of the questioned people were unable to link Gyula Horn and Peter Boross to a party, but the number of people who gave the wrong party name is negligible in the case of these two.

The party link of Laszlo Surjan [Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) chairman] is only known correctly by 53 percent of those who know him, 37 percent cannot link him to any party, and 8 percent gave the wrong party name (out of this, 5 percent said he was an MDF member). Only a little more than half of the people who know Gabor Kuncze are also aware that he is the prime minister candidate of the SZDSZ, and the proportion of the wrong answers is similar in his case, 7 percent, but there is not a typical wrong answer.

Few people know which parties the otherwise popular leaders of the smaller parties represent. Half of the people who know Istvan Csurka [chairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIEP] do not know to which party he belongs, and 12 percent gave incorrect answers (9 percent of these still think he is an MDF member). More than one-third of the questioned people cannot place Janos Palotas on the party palette, and one-quarter link him to the wrong party (19 percent of these said he is a member of the Entrepreneurs' Party). Zoltan Kiraly's party position is the least known for the public, almost two-thirds of the people did not even attempt to place him anywhere, and 19 percent gave the wrong party name.

The popularity of politicians is shown on the following table.

Popularity of Party List Leaders Among Those Who Know the Politician

Name	Percent
Gyula Horn	65
Janos Palotas	64
Zoltan Kiraly	60
Laszlo Surjan	57
Viktor Orban	56
Gabor Kuncze	52
Peter Boross	51
Tamas Nagy	46
Jozsef Torgyan	29
Istvan Csurka	21

On this question, people were allowed to give their views on all politicians, and as can be seen, the popularity of most of the list leaders was said to be average or a little better than average. However, when people said whom they would welcome at the head of the government after the next elections—that is, when they were only able to select one person for this important political role—most named Horn.

Although there is little difference in the general views on most leading politicians, these differ as regards their suitability for the prime ministerial position.

Who Should Be the Next Prime Minister? (percent)

Gyula Horn	22
Peter Boross	16
Janos Palotas	11
Viktor Orban	8
Gabor Kuncze	7
Laszlo Surjan	6
Zoltan Kiraly	4
Jozsef Torgyan	3
Istvan Csurka	1
Tamas Nagy	1
None of them	10
Does not know	11

Nine percent more people would welcome the current prime minister back in his position than the number of people who would vote for his party. Horn would also be welcome as prime minister by 4 percent more people than who would vote for the MSZP. However, 3-4 percent fewer people can see the leaders of the liberal parties as prime minister than the number of people who would vote for their parties.

Although Palotas continues to be popular and, for many people, appears to be a politician suitable to be leader, his party has not yet been able to utilize this popularity. The situation is similar in the case of the MSZDP where the party chairman is considered to be popular by many people but this sympathy does not come across to his party—although it is true that not many people would like him to be prime minister either.

Defense Minister Views 'Partnership'

AU2402184294 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 22 Feb 94 p 5

[Unattributed report on interview with Polish Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk; place and date not given: "The Polish Minister of Defense: 'Partnership for Peace Is Less Than I Expected...'"]

[Text] In an interview granted to ROMPRES national news agency, Polish Minister of Defense Piotr Kolodziejczyk said, in connection with his country's participation in the "Partnership for Peace" [PFP] initiative and NATO integration:

"The PFP concept is less than I expected, but it also represents an essential step in an adequate direction. It is the beginning of the road to the aim pursued, namely to a European security system. We are counting on mutual contacts between the Polish Army and the armies of the NATO countries and we favor joint maneuvers; for the time being, at the lowest tactical levels. We are trying in various ways to become acquainted with and get used to each other. In this sense, we are creating numerous opportunities, the West is doing the same, and this inspires us with moderate optimism."

In connection with the stage of Polish-Romanian military relations and their development, the Polish defense minister said:

"Were we to check the history of the two peoples, we would find numerous elements of friendship, fruitful cultural contacts, economic, and, of course, military cooperation. Now, we are jointly solving problems linked to higher military training and improving cooperation between our topographical services and in the area of health care. We are relying on technical cooperation. The access by our two countries to the PFP initiative is opening up new opportunities for cooperation."

Pawlak Views Domestic Policy, Coalition

AU2302154794 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 19 Feb 94 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak by Janina Paradowska and Jerzy Baczynski; place and date not given: "Sometimes It Is Better Not To Say Anything"]

[Text] [POLITYKA] How has the problem inside the coalition been solved? The communique from the talks does not say much except that the coalition wants to sit out its full parliamentary term. But how? What was decided?

[Pawlak] The confusion was largely the result of automatic processes. There was no tension among the politicians, but people on the outside thought there was a major problem. This might be just my own private view, but I think that if less publicity had been given to this business, the outcome might have been different.

[POLITYKA] Might Deputy Prime Minister Borowski have kept his job?

[Pawlak] Quite possibly. In politics one has to watch one's actions. I am frequently accused of being too quiet and having poor relations with the media, but I think that sometimes it is safer to be quiet than to say one word too much. Our partners simply do not have an easy way out. The Middle East accord might never have happened if the talks had not taken place in Norway, far from journalists.

[POLITYKA] But we still do not know why you fired Deputy Minister Kawalec in such a way.

[Pawlak] We discussed this matter with the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] when the coalition was formed, so it cannot have come as a surprise. What happened was this. I sent Deputy Prime Minister Borowski his notice to quit. He refused to accept it, so I delivered it personally. I fail to see what this has to do with later events. Later, Borowski's dismissal was given such prominent media treatment that it was difficult to shut one's eyes and pretend nothing had happened. I decided that the best thing to do was to explain everything and put the whole issue behind me. The decision to dismiss Mr. Borowski was not an easy and pleasant one either for Mr. Borowski or for me. But that is how things are in politics. Sometimes, one is on one side of the barricade, and sometimes on the other. The most important thing is to have cooperation.

[POLITYKA] You did not expect Kawalec's dismissal to cause such an avalanche?

[Pawlak] No. I think the significance of the matter has been exaggerated. But I do not shun responsibility. I realize it might be the result of my own actions, but I think that each political group should ask itself whether such an end result really had to come about.

[POLITYKA] Not just Deputy Prime Minister Borowski, but also the SLD wanted to tidy up the rules governing cooperation with the the coalition, the functioning of the Council of Ministers, personnel policy, and a curb on the powers of the chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers.

[Pawlak] I have never heard that the powers of the chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers should be curbed.

[POLITYKA] But we have. The SLD has spoken out loudly about it.

[Pawlak] Be that as it may, but we have never discussed this at the coalition forum. You see what happens when people gossip in public? Misunderstandings occur.

[POLITYKA] We understand that other postulates have been presented to you. So what have you decided?

[Pawlak] I think the communique presents quite clearly the compromise that was reached. Basically, we decided that government issues would be discussed and resolved at government level, and coalition issues at coalition level. There must be a clear distinction between the government and the coalition. As far as the functioning of the government is concerned, I realize that there are many discrepancies. Soon after I became prime minister we entered a difficult period, for we had to work out a budget, after which the Sejm Committee debates started. This prevented me from taking a closer look at administrative procedures and the entire administrative system. Our administration may function far more efficiently if it tidies itself up. A central office or ministry, and even a provincial office, sometimes functions according to its own principles. Some operations are common to all administrative units, such as bookkeeping, organization, and communications, but often there is no comparison between the way one office performs them and the way another does. Such problems occur in every office, and yet the administration must be functional.

[POLITYKA] But let us return to the crisis and the solving thereof. Are we to understand that the SLD has accepted your personnel policy, for example your changes to governor posts? Aleksander Kwasniewski has accused you of nepotism.

[Pawlak] That is not true. There are just as many Polish Peasant Party [PSL] governors as there are SLD governors.

[POLITYKA] No. Almost every single governor belongs to the PSL.

[Pawlak] As fare as deputy governors are concerned, there is a difference. Deputy goverors are appointed by the prime minister, but at the governors' recommendation. So I have no influence on whether a candidate for deputy governor belongs to the PSL or SLD.

[POLITYKA] So PSL people are not hungry for posts? We thought they were.

[Pawlak] There was a time when we never discussed posts. It was one of the coalition partners who announced the need to replace a few governors and deputy ministers. You did not know that. In the United States, nobody objects when a new president comes into office and the entire administration is replaced top to bottom. No one talks about nepotism.

[POLITYKA] We believe that today in Poland, the policy is to adopt any kind of system, as long as it works. Right now everything is geared toward a certain political model.

[Pawlak] No, we are not pursuing a personnel policy that is geared toward any political model. Some old employees have remained, and others have left. During this time of change, it is important not to create the impression that we are writing off people immediately because of their party membership or political convictions. That way, we would lose qualified people. But there are changes, there have to be. If we want politics to undergo at least a slight change, then we must replace some personnel.

[POLITYKA] You said that government issues should be kept distinct from coalition issues. But such a distinction is impossible. The government has been formed by a specific coalition, and the government's operation is governed by the coalition pact. Is this pact still in force?

[Pawlak] In every coalition, key issues should be governed by agreements. However, the members of the government should have freedom of action. When we talk of a violation of agreements, am I the only one who violates them? I am not going to tell you about all the surprise moves that have taken me unawares, because that is an internal government matter. These matters must be set in order, there is no doubt about that.

[POLITYKA] The sequence of events was as follows: First there was a personnel dispute, the SLD turned it into a dispute concerning authority, and you interpreted this as a political dispute concerning differences in the assessment of economic policy. How differently from each other do the SLD and PSL view economic policy?

[Pawlak] Differences occur not just between the parties that form the coalition. They also occur within a particular party, in the SLD and in the PSL. But the general path of reform pursued since 1989 is not being questioned by anyone. We are all committed to democracy and a free market. The problem is what kind of solutions we apply, what kind of economic processes we set in motion, and how we handle privatization. And last but not least, the speed of these changes is also significant.

[POLITYKA] Differences between parties are rather hazy, we find it hard to accept that there are no strong groups that question the basic path of reforms. There is no doubt that in the eyes of the West, Marek Borowski and the SLD have become the main guarantors of continuing the reforms.

[Pawlak] You are thinking in socialist terms. You make it sound as if this party is guaranteeing the chosen path of the reforms. This reminds us of the past when, in addition, this guarantee was enshrined in the Constitution. By the way, I remember people saying in September and October that democracy and the market changes might be in danger if the SLD and PSL won the elections. But when I was in Brussels, I had the impression that my interlocutors were not so much interested in my party affiliation as in my policies and actions. In Brussels they were not interested in noble declarations that we want to join NATO as quickly as possible. They were interested in the practical measures that we were implementing in order to reach that objective. For the West and for out own society, effective solutions are the best guarantees, and no single person or party has exclusivbe rights to them. We must also be flexible and revise our opinions from time to time. One could have taken an easier path

and drawn up a better budget, better from the point of view of accountancy, a budget with secure income and low expenditure. But would the economy and the population have withstood it? If we say that there is a general and firm desire to build a market economy and democratic system, we have to know that there are other paths that lead to this goal.

[POLITYKA] So, along what path do you and your government want to lead us?

[Pawlak] First, we have to establish what our main problems are, and there is no doubt that such problems are the drop in production and the sky-high increase in unemployment. Last year we experienced economic growth. In order to continue it this year, given society's present standards of living, we must on the one hand concentrate on expanding the domestic market, and on the other hand increase exports of our products. We have been experiencing an increasing trade deficit in recent years. Poland, a poor country, has become an exporter of capital. This problem requires very precise actions, which is why from the very beginning my government has been laying emphasis not just on security, but on economic issues, and saying all the time how important it is to have a trade balance. The accords that we have concluded with the European Union contain an imbalance in our favor, but in financial practice the situation is quite the opposite, because various non-tariff barriers are being applied.

We propose concrete solutions to revive the domestic market. It is true that budget requirements necessitate an increase in taxation, but we are increasing the tax on private incomes, and not on the profits of firms. We have also introduced a system of concessions for investment. I am not saying this system is perfect and that everyone will reap benefits from it, but those with profitable enterprises can allocate income for investment purposes. One can also take a look at the solutions applied in other countries. The general principle of buying Polish goods before other goods is not recognized by our media, and yet that would be the best way to help our economy. Of course, our Polish products do not always match our wishes, but prosperous countries also promote their own products. Therefore we have undertaken concrete activity to point the economic processes in a slightly different direction. We have not made a 180-degree turn, there is no need to do so, but nevertheless we are clearly altering the method of implementing the reforms.

[POLITYKA] I think most people, including opposition politicians, will agree with what you have just said, but in your last television interview you said that the budget must be made more socially friendly, and people think that that means increasing consumption.

[Pawlak] Surely investment projects and the creation of new jobs are socially friendly activities? I repeat, one can restrict oneself to activities that provide an easy budget. But the point is not to have a budget that is easy for the accountants to manage, but to have one that provides social and economic effects.

[POLITYKA] One can have a budget that is financially easy, and one can have a budget that is politically easy. A financially easy budget is usually politically difficult. The present budget has not been badly received, but people have the impression that you and some of the parties oppose it, and that you would prefer a politically easier budget.

[Pawlak] It is difficult for me to explain away people's impressions. As I said, there are even differences inside each party. But when a budget is drawn up and certain financial proportions are proposed, the final version is never the only correct one. The present draft budget was drawn up at the end of December, so there are going to be adjustments to it. But its basic financial proportions will not be touched. The Sejm committees have indicated the possibility of changes in spending, and it has transpired that last year's budget deficit was less than expected. So changes are possible. Not major ones, but important all the same.

[POLITYKA] So a socially friendly budget does not mean greater spending on social benefits, pensions, and subsidies?

[Pawlak] Of course it does, but it means more than just that.

[POLITYKA] Today you are facing a picket of miners outside your offices, and a great Solidarity strike. Do you not feel that the state should abandon its role as entrepreneur?

[Pawlak] That is our aim. We want the chairmen of enterprise management boards to decide how their enterprises should be managed, because these are people who concentrate on economic matters. Some old habits have to be eliminated, such as the habit of writing to the prime minister when there is a problem about an enterprise's functioning, instead of solving the problem at management level or provincial level. But generally speaking, it is far easier to say we want a free market and democracy than to bring these things about in practice. One really needs a lot of ideas to dispense with old habits. But I think there is a chance of success. For example, in neglected areas, we can introduce modern technology immediately. If the Poles could not get used to the industrial age because the idea of working on an assembly line and producing the same piece of equipment for eight hours was alien to them, they will certainly have to do so now that we are in a difficult situation, with a recession in Poland and the West, and we have to seek new ideas and solutions everywhere.

Every country and society is struggling to achieve a good position. We still have to learn how to play this game, and to play it together with others. In Poland, the situation is still similar to that of two farmers, one of whom has one cow, and the other has five, and the farmer with only one cow, instead of praying for another

four cows, prays that four cows belonging to the other farmer will drop dead. This is part of our mentality, and it is worth pondering over this.

New Military Intelligence Appointments

LD2402230094 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1916 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Warsaw, 24 Feb—Major General Boleslaw Izydorczyk was on Thursday appointed to the post of head of the National Defense Ministry office for intelligence services affairs by the National Defense minister, National Defense Ministry press spokesman, Colonel Wielsaw Rozbicki, reported on 24 February.

Command of the executive structures of these services, answerable to the chief of the Polish Army General Staff, has been entrusted to Colonel Konstanty Malejczyk, the communique passed to PAP by the spokesman reads.

General Izydorczyk was born in Lodz in 1943. He completed higher studies at the Military Technical Academy in Warsaw in 1968. From 1970 to 1973 he served in the operational and training section of the staff of the deputy chief of the Polish Army General Staff responsible for economic and technical affairs. He took part in UN peace missions, in the office of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Middle East-Suez and also the UN force staff for the observation of the separation of forces in Damascus.

From 1978 to 1981 he served in the second department of the Polish Army General Staff. In the years 1982-84 he was the deputy military attache at the Polish Embassy in Washington. In the years 1985-88 he again served in the second department of the Polish Army General Staff. He was inter alia a military observer in the framework of the implementation of the CSCE process and the Stockholm document. From 1988 to 1990 he was head of the international group of military observers in the UN mission in Namibia. From 1990 to 1991, he was deputy chief of the board of the Military Foreign Services. From 1991 to 1992 he filled the post of head of the board in the command of the Military Intelligence Services; from June 1992 he was the head of the Military Intelligence Services. He is married with two daughters.

Government-Union Talks Fail; Strike Certain

AU2402201194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] At Victoria Palace today Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu and other representatives of the executive held a meeting with seven leaders of the CNSLR [National Confederation of Romania's Free Trade Unions]-Fratia Trade Union Confederation intended to further discuss the 14 union demands.

After the conclusion of the talks Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu made a statement to the press in which he reviewed yesterday's and today's meetings with the trade union confederations, saying that each of those demands has been examined separately. The premier said that many of them refer to issues for which there are no financial resources, whereas others are in connection with the problems of the economic reform and the 1993-1994 program for economic restructuring and privatization, whereas other demands lack realism. Some of the demands have nothing to do with the unions' activity, the Romanian prime minister assessed adding that those claims pursue other goals.

Vacaroiu also mentioned the fact that issues related to social protection were also approached, especially the ensuring from the state budget of the necessary funds to improve the standard of living of employees working in the public sector. In that context the premier expressed his hope that by the end of this year the standard of living will increase to a certain extent, but the essential prerequisite of that is the increase of production.

The prime minister concluded his statement by saying that interruptions of work lead to considerable losses in the national economy.

In turn, the chairman of CNSLR-Fratia, Mr. Victor Ciorbea, stated that the majority of their claims date back four to 13 months, and they have still not been settled, whereas in the case of certain demands the solutions that were found have not been applied. During today's meeting they agreed that negotiations should be continued between CNSLR—Fratia and the government intended to settle the 14 demands forwarded to the government by the union confederation.

Ciorbea also pointed out that none of the claims was settled during today's meeting, and, as a consequence of this, the general strike on 28 February will take place as scheduled.

Today we were sent via fax the decision adopted by the National Council of the National Trade Union Bloc [BNS] in connection with the continuation of their labor actions. The text outlines the fact that BNS continued its efforts to conclude an economic-social pact, provided the signatory partner is a credible and generally accepted executive. The document also says that after taking note of the state power's refusal to cooperate with BNS in order to extinguish the current conflict, as well as of its refusal to answer the suggestions forwarded to it by that union confederation, the BNS National Council decided to continue the labor conflict against the government that was begun on 10 January last year.

The document also points out that in order to avoid making the same mistakes that were previously made by Romania's trade unions, the BNS National Council decided to commence ample actions to mobilize basic union structures and to organize a national referendum intended to establish the opportunity, viability, and the concrete schedule of the continuation and implementation of the labor actions that were begun on 29 November 1993.

Communique on Presence of SRI Chief at Strike

AU2402123894 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 22 Feb 94 p 9

[Communique of the Press Bureau of the Romanian Intelligence Service on Virgil Magureanu's presence at miners rally in Targu Jiu released in Bucharest on 21 February; published under the headline: "The Great Rally of the Miners in Targu Jiu. 'Who Is There? My Good People!'—As Far As We Know, the Applause Was Actually Booing"]

[Text] In connection with mass-media allegations about the presence of Mr. Virgil Magureanu, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] in Targu Jiu—some of which are purely tendentious and slanderous—the SRI Press Bureau is authorized to release the following:

1. The SRI director's presence in Targu Jiu on the afternoon of 18 February was exclusively linked to the activity of the respective SRI county branch in 1993.

There is no political connotation to the meeting between the SRI director and Mr. Miron Cosma [leader of the Mining Trade Union Confederation of Romania]. The purpose of the meeting, which took place at the SRI headquarters in Targu Jiu at the latter's express request, was to brief our institution on the actual situation in the field.

2. The SRI director's gesture of addressing himself to the crowd of miners gathered in front of the Lignitul [Brown Coal] Public Corporation headquarters in the town—which many considered "spectacular"—was solely motivated by the desire to diffuse the still explosive state of spirit prevalent among many of the miners there and to assure them that the relevant institutions will be given a correct briefing on the situation.

3. Consequently, we can see no justification to the allegations about an so-called intervention in a labor conflict or to those implying that one thus stood to gain some political advantage to the detriment of others.

No promises were made aside from passing the correct information to the relevant state authorities.

To back our position, we herewith publish the text of the speech made by the SRI director on that occasion:

"My good people,

"I did not come here to earn some cheap popularity points. Please listen to me, rather than applaud.

"Therefore, I beg you to listen to what I have to say, rather than applaud me, since, with all your problems here, one hardly feels the need for applause.

"Second, the last thing this country needs is for people to die and fight. This country needs honest work and the defense of all rights, primarily yours.

"There is no need for you to fight or die to defend your leader. Nobody is threatening him.

"We took note of the fact that there are many irregularities pointed out by your delegation.

"We also know that a miners' delegation is now in Bucharest explaining the situation to the people there.

"I assure you that I will report what I saw and heard here to the appropriate authorities, up to the highest level.

"It is never to late to do justice, if this is what the people want.

"Nobody stands to gain anything if they are trying to obtain by force what they can very well obtain through legal means.

"You have sent your leaders to talk to us and to all those with a say in resolving the situation. Now, you must be patient for two or three days.

"One needs these few days of respite, if we are to establish the guilt and responsibility of various people. Nothing can be done overnight."

The SRI Press Bureau can make the video recording of the speech available to any interested party.

The SRI Press Bureau.

Behavior of Security Chief Examined

AU2402101994 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 18 Feb 94 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "Why Does Virgil Magureanu Keep Silent?"]

[Text] I think that everyone has been able to note that Virgil is silent. Some might respond to such a statement by saying that it is precisely the duty of a man like Virgil Magureanu to keep silent. He is the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI]. In this position, it is not only his duty, but also a priority to be as discreet as possible in the area of our public activity. In this respect, Virgil Magureanu is an exception to the rule. For a long time, he was a true star of present-day Romania: Statements in the press and on television, long conversations in magazines and on various wavelengths, more or less flattering photographs, and televised talk shows. Lately, however, Virgil Magureanu has no longer displayed the same self-possession in public. He no longer gives so many interviews or news conferences, and especially, no longer makes public appearances. From the difference between his former and current conduct, we may draw the conclusion that Virgil Magureanu keeps quiet.

In [writer] Marin Preda's "Delirium" there is an extremely interesting scene. It takes place during the night of the Iron- Guard uprising. Horia Sima's supporters are destroying stores, setting fire to houses in which Jews live, and attacking soldiers. Bucharest is reverberating with gunfire. There is tension in the streets. Gathered in a room, a few figures in this novel ask themselves with concern: Why is the general keeping silent? The general being, of course, Romania's future Marshal Ion Antonescu [wartime military dictator]. Many strange things are happening in our country these days. A number of people belonging to the executive power have been accused of espionage for a foreign country. The minister of defense, Niculae Spiroiu, one of the most fervent advocates of army modernization and integration in North- Atlantic structures, has been accused of corruption. The campaign against him is based on information that is believed to have come from the Romanian Intelligence Service. The son of General Marin Pancea, secretary of the Supreme Defense Council and presidential adviser, has been accused of being involved in dishonest deals. One of his partners, Radu Popa, was crudely arrested. Iosif Boda, the presidential adviser most convinced of the need for dialogue with the opposition and Romania's orientation to the West, is to leave for Switzerland as ambassador. True, the country is thus gaining an intelligent representative abroad. It loses, however, because the group of reformers around Ion Iliescu is weakened, while the conservative group represented by Marin Pancea and Vasile Ionel triumphs. Although it is clear to everyone that this will harm Romania's image abroad, negotiations are conducted to create a nationalist-communist government, the government of the so-called Red Pentagon. On his return from Washington, Petre Roman said the State Department would not like such a shift to the left. The leaders of the Red Pentagon, mainly Adrian Nastase, wince and say the Americans did not broach the subject. These are strange things. They do not, however, match the strangeness of those during the Iron-Guard uprising. Virgil Magureanu is not Ion Antonescu either. Nevertheless, keeping a sense of proportion, we can copy the characters in "The Delirium" and ask: Why does Virgil Magureanu keep silent? There is, however, a connection between Ion Antonescu and the strange things during the night of the Iron-Guard actions. The order in the country depends on the leader of the state. It was normal for simple citizens to ask themselves why the general keeps silent. In this respect, one could argue that there is no connection between the strange things of late and Virgil

Magureanu. And that, thus we cannot ask, as in Ion Antonescu's case, why the SRI director keeps silent? Close study, however, shows that this argument is unjustifiable. The strange things these days are closely linked to Virgil Magureanu. Not only because he could clarify the enigma of them, but also because they began to happen exactly when Virgil Magureanu fell silent. There have been so many strange things since the SRI director withdrew from the public scene that we would risk nothing by asking another question: Do they not happen, by any chance, just because Virgil Magureanu keeps silent?

Army Issues Communique To Answer Accusations

AU1802142394 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 10 Feb 94 p 3

[Army Press Bureau "communique"]

[Text] Regarding the serious accusations against the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense published in the weekly ROMANIA MARE, the Press Bureau of the Army is authorized to state the following:

1. The entire activity of the Ministry of National Defense is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the strategy of the government program, under the control of Romania's Parliament, the Supreme Defense Council of Romania, and the government. Therefore, no action taken by the leadership of the ministry, including the minister, has taken place without the previous approval of the institutions authorized in this respect (...)

2. Although the consequences of the economic recession and of the other difficulties specific to the transition period are seriously felt in the army, too, the Ministry of National Defense has obtained noteworthy results, which have been mentioned as such at the meeting of the Executive and the public has been informed about them.

We mention a few of these results:

—the equidistance of the army from any political or party ideology;

—the actions aimed at improving the training of all military groups, while the budget is being reduced every year—last year's budget was three times lower than in 1989 and was among the lowest in Europe.

—courses of flying instruction for military pilots, with an average duration three times longer than before 1990, but which, unfortunately, is still below international norms. In 1993 we succeeded in promoting all military pilot trainees to the first stage of full command [iesirea in simpla comanda a tuturor pilotilor militari], an unprecedented fact in the past 15 years;

—the improvement of military discipline while action to restructure the system of social values is taking place, with respect for the traditional standards of the military institution thus being weakened. In this respect, through appropriate measures in the army, we achieved a threefold reduction of the number of serious violations of standards in 1993 compared with 1991;

—the implementation of certain measures of social protection for all military ranks, including reserve officers, retired officers, and veterans.

3. Through legal measures and government decisions initiated by the Ministry of National Defense together with the Ministry of Industry, which bear responsibility for private corporations that produce military equipment, we succeeded in preserving the production capacities of the defense industry. They have continued their specific activity, ensured the production of 74 percent of combat equipment, equipment taken over by the army in 1993, and ensured the fulfillment of export orders, as well as products for civilian use.

No type of military equipment that can be produced at home has been imported (thus, no tanks from Israel either!), and the export of special products has been constantly increasing since 1990.

With Israel and other countries we have organized ventures to jointly produce certain special products, but actual production has been exclusively the job of industrial capacities in Romania.

4. A reduction of combat technology is currently taking place in our country and as in the case of other European countries—including our neighbors—this action is carried out strictly in accordance with programs under international treaties that Romania has signed, treaties signed by the country's political leadership and approved by parliament.

5. Regarding the so-called "Kent" affair [cigarette smuggling affair involving a number of military personnel], the Military Prosecuting Magistracy's investigation in connection with the case before the court established that the renting of storage space from the "Romtechnica" Autonomous Public Corporation was a legal act and did not result in any material damage to the Ministry of National Defense. From documents provided to the investigators by the "Romtechnica" Corporation, the identity of the guilty party was established—Lebanese citizen Nassar Elias—and the amount of the damage to the Romanian state through evasion of customs duty with the use of fake stamps was recovered. The military cadres guilty of certain violation of the military norms, on the basis of which the customs evasion took place, were removed from their positions and turned over to the appropriate legal authorities.

6. Regarding the alleged damage to the army's patrimony as a result of the contract with the Delta Design firm—whose owner is Iulian Rosengren—a firm that had to supply us with oil products, using its own means, the Ministry of National Defense detected a lack of trustworthiness of the partner—who cheated other institutions as well—and thus canceled the contract in time and

recovered all the money that represented the payment, together with interest on the amount owed by the firm (...).

We express our regret that, at this time that is extremely important for speeding up the process of our country's integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures, accusations that are in flagrant contradiction with reality are made public. These actions show ill will, the more so, since the ministry leadership has submitted to the democratic bodies of our country all the requested information regarding the activity of the army.

Official Forecasts Labor Cuts for Metal Workers

AU2402120594 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 21 Feb 94 p 4

[Interview with Petru Ianc, chief of the Metallurgical Industry Department, by Romulus Maier; place and date not given: "Professional Retraining Program: In 10 Years, the Labor Employed in the Metallurgical Industry Will Be Cut Back By More Than 50 Percent"]

[Text] According to a study on restructuring the metallurgical industry carried out by the Ministry of Industry, it is estimated that by the year 2000 the number of personnel employed in the steel, nonferrous metallurgical, and fireproof material industries will be cut back by more than 50 percent. For details, we approached Petru Ianc, state secretary and chief of the Metallurgical Industry Department.

[Maier] What are the social implications of your department's restructuring policy?

[Ianc] More than 145,000 people are currently working in metallurgy in various activities: Transportation, the actual production process, repair and maintenance, and research and design. In the West, in countries with market economies, when people refer to metallurgy they actually mean the basic structure: Raw material storage, iron and steel works, rolling mills, and storage for finished products. Other, complementary activities are organized in a separate system of services, which are paid for. This delimitation between the basic activity and complementary activities would mean to shift down from 145,000 employees to some 80,000. Thus, it would not mean a cut in personnel, but simply a separation of activities. Obviously, it is only natural that this process should continue in each of these components combined with appropriate measures resulting from correlating the volume of work with the number of personnel. This, however, will not have a drastic effect, at least not for the time being. Given the prospects for modernizing the production flow, a labor cut from 80,000 to some 40,000 is expected over a period of 10 years. A major part of this cutback will occur naturally. A further part of employees will be absorbed by specific ecologically-motivated actions. Obviously, a retraining program is also needed.

[Maier] As a representative of the ruling center-leftist party, do you believe the Vacaroiu government will look favorably on the program you propose?

[Ianc] I think it will be supported by the current government. And I also think that this program should not only be supported by a leftist government, but by any government in power over these 10 years. That is what has happened in all countries in the world, both in those with a leftist government such as France and in countries with center or center-rightist governments such as Britian. Social problems are the focus of the current government and must be the focus of any government.

Article Views Restructuring of Armed Forces

AU2202174994 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 17 Feb 94 p 2

[Marian Ivancu article: "Reform and Restructuring the Armed Forces"]

[Text] In the 1993 inventory of the Army, those responsible for the Romanian Armed Forces emphasized the fact that new Army levers and command structures were established and verified during the previous year: the Supreme Council for the Country's Defense; the Ministry of National Defense; the State Secretariat, the General Inspectorate, the General Chief of Staff, and directorates; the Ground Troops Command, the Aviation Command, and the Navy Command. In 1994, the restructuring of lower echelons will be finalized: Army corps, brigades, and independent battalions. Thus, it is believed that in this way the mobility and effectiveness of troops will improve.

The government strategy program of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] has set up the coordinating instrument for the activity of the Ministry of National Defense. Given the efforts to stabilize the economy and the difficulties characteristic of Romania's transition to the market economy, the Army has made indubitable progress. The Army's noninvolvement in politics and its increased credibility form the starting point for training our troops even under difficult financial conditions—three times fewer funds than in 1989.

One of the Army's successes was maintaining the national defense industry intact (Defense Minister Niculae Spiroiu recently said that "not even a single drill press was given away") and ensuring 74 percent of the combat equipment from our own supplies. Aside from this, all export orders have been finalized and, given the fact that the military conversion process has begun, we have started manufacturing products designed for civilian purposes. The Army has not imported anything that can be manufactured in our country, except for top technologies to be used in the defense industry. As a result of this technological adjustment, high performance systems on the basis of licenses from the NATO member countries or Israel have been manufactured in our country.

In the area of electronics, Israel benefits from valuable U.S., French, or own technologies not to be matched by similar Soviet technologies (speed, precision, pattern, consumption, and so forth). Let us recall that during the Arab-Israeli war the big tank battle in the Sinai (1973) was won by Israel with a lot of leeway. General Ariel Sharon's victory in the second biggest tank battle of all time was not a battle of more powerful and bigger tanks, but a battle of more "intelligent" tanks with better night "vision" and more precise computer-guided weapons. The same thing was reconfirmed during the Gulf war.

Other highly technological products manufactured in Romania in cooperation with Israeli experts are the components of the aeronautical industry (navigation, targeting, and fire-contol systems). It is known that the training of pilots in Israel (a country with limited resources like we ourselves) and technology have tripled their combat capacity and the number of sorties of each plane and pilot. This is how they ensured their supremacy in the air, although they had half as many planes as the Arabs. The most interesting argument, however, is the fact that all NATO members (including the U.S., France, Germany, and Great Britain) are sending their elite pilots and engineers to attend courses in Israel to perfect their knowledge.

The contracting of Romania's exercise planes IAR-99 and IAR-108 by Israel and the United States will be all the more successful. Anyhow, these planes are being tested in the two countries.

On the other hand, instead of procuring expensive, modern planes like the MiG-21, using Israeli electronic devices would mean important savings.

In the area of reducing combat equipment under international supervision, the Ministry of National Defense was able in 1993 to abide by what was established during negotiations and thus able to scrap 25 percent of the planned equipment (especially used and outdated ones). In 1994, scrapping will be increased to 35 percent, and what is left for 1995 is 40 percent.

In the area of cutting back troops, their number will amount to 268,000 (on 1 January 1994) and 230,000 (in 1995). They will be, first and foremost, fighters, not people from auxiliary branches, because the "Army can no longer be jack of all trades and do everything" (as Lieutenant General N. Spiroiu put it).

Given the East European conflicts, the only area of balance and security is the one under NATO's umbrella. Romania's tendency to avoid dangerous imbalances and to get closer to NATO is justified and necessary because NATO remains the only political-military body able to offer guarantees for territorial integrity and the continuation of our democratic process.

A gradual getting closer to and integration in the North Atlantic structures are possible on the basis of compatible and complementary military standards and doctrines based on the following principles: 1. The inviolability of national and European security; 2. The defensive nature of forces and limiting them solely to the national territory; 3. The preparation of the territory and of the economy for defense; 4. The national exclusiveness of ordering Romanian military components.

Certainly, NATO integration involves high costs. Restructuring the Army and the national defense industry will entail important financial efforts throughout several years. We have to bear in mind, however, that beginning in 1968 Romania detached itself from the sole Eastern supplier in this respect and began the construction of its own defense industry on the basis of Western standards: Aviation (on the basis of French and British licenses), artillery (partly on the basis of NATO standards), air-to-ground and antitank missiles (French licenses), and so forth. The main Romanian accomplishments in this respect are based on Western type of components and technologies.

Even in the area of telecommunications, everything, beginning with small- and medium-size portable equipment (which is needed by the troops), has been manufactured in our country with transistors, integrated circuits, connections, and computers on the basis of such licenses as Souriou, IBM, Control Data, and so forth.

This is why Romania only has to preserve its specialized labor force and to modernize its production capacities by introducing new technologies. This is precisely what is happening now. True, there are dysfunctions, but they are kept under control. Thus, the Army is able to do its duty at all times.

Military Cooperation Accord Signed With Poland

AU2302165294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 23 Feb 94

[Text] The ministers of national defense of Romania and Poland, Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu and Mr. Piotr Kolodziejczyk, signed an agreement on military cooperation between the two Ministries of National Defense in Bucharest this afternoon. The signing ceremony was followed by a news conference given by the two ministers.

Lieutenant General Niculae Spiroiu said that the visit by a Polish military delegation, the first since 1989, is an outstanding moment in bilateral cooperation. He recalled that Mr. Piotr Kolodziejczyk was received today by Romanian President Mr. Ion Iliescu and yesterday by Mr. Adrian Nastase, president of the Chamber of Deputies, and by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu. He also mentioned that the guest had talks with the chairmen of the Commissions for Defense, Public Order, and National Defense of the two chambers of Parliament, that is Senator Radu Alexandru Timofte and Deputy Petre Roman, respectively.

The discussions conducted during the visit, Mr. Nicolae Spiroiu said, emphasized the readiness of the two ministries to regulate their multifaceted relations of cooperation and collaboration, in keeping with the foreign policy promoted by Romania and Poland. They also decided to hold consultations and engage in various activities in accordance with the Partnership for Peace, which both Romania and Poland have joined.

Mr. Piotr Kolodziejczyk said in his statement that Romania and Poland and the armies of the two states are going through similar processes. In his opinion, the long road to the European structures, which entails great financial efforts, can be covered more rapidly through very good cooperation.

Editorial Warns of 'Russian Encirclement'

AU2402161294 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 22 Feb 94 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "Is There a Russian Encirclement of Romania?"]

[Text] On Sunday evening, 20 February, the world's major television stations carried footage of the entry of the Russian contingent of UN peacekeeping forces into Pale in Bosnia. Television viewers were surprised by one thing. In every respect, the arrival of the Russian contingent in that area is a routine matter. The UN troops are made up of contingents belonging to various nations. Thus, numerous national contingents have been replaced since the UN intervention. Some have come, others have gone. Local people were hardly disturbed by this. They continued to pursue their affairs, that is to fire their guns and let themselves be filmed in their tragedy by foreign television crews. This is why the arrival of the Russian contingent had to be welcomed as well. It could have been viewed as a mere replacement of a contingent under UN flag. It was, however, viewed differently. The Serbs in Pale welcomed the Russian troops like liberators. The television images from Pale were strikingly reminiscent of the atmosphere in which allied troops were welcomed in a Western city during the last year of World War II. The enthusiasm among the Serbs about the appearance of the Russian troops draws our attention to a fact whose real dimension is not yet perceived by Europe and the entire world. The Russian troops came to Bosnia under the UN flag. Following Moscow's diplomatic actions, the Serbs agreed to withdraw their heavy weaponry provided that the UN troops in the area also included Russian troops. So far, this had not been possible, because the West was, naturally, afraid that these troops might become partisans for the Serbs. The only thing is that, in reality, the arrival of the Russian contingent—through all its implications—turned into Russia's return to former Yugoslavia. Almost half a century ago, in 1948, the Serbs were emerging from the traditional influence of their Slav big brothers—the Russians. After a few years of hesitation, Tito, however, opted for the West. For almost half a century, Yugoslavia was, if not hostile, then at least indifferent to Russia. The arrival of the Russian troops in Bosnia was the price that the United States had to pay to come unscathed out of the mess called the NATO ultimatum. Russia's initiative solved a crisis that worried the entire globe. The Serbs withdrew their heavy weaponry. Even though NATO declared that it was going to maintain the ultimatum, it is clear that the question of air strikes is no longer valid. At least for the time being. The price that the United States have to pay for this face-saving operation is the loss of new Yugoslavia. Is it too high? Is it too low? In my opinion, for the United States this price is not as high as some people may think. First, because the Serbs were lost anyway from the very moment that the United States chose to side with the opponents of the Serbs—Slovenia, Croatia, and the Muslims in Bosnia. Second, as I have stated before, the United States is less and less interested in Europe. In the new U.S. world plans, Europe is increasingly being eclipsed by Asia. Within this context, the loss of the Serbs does not seem to count a great deal. In exchange for this loss, the United States could win over the Muslims throughout the world. Which means not only the most attractive part from an economic point of view, but also the most aggressive part from an ideological point of view. The great analysts of the U.S. Administration must have realized that communist ideology is being replaced, with every passing day, by Islamic fundamentalism, a sort of religious Bolshevism.

Things are satisfactory for the United States. For Romania, however, things are a little different. For the Serbs to fall under Russia's sphere of influence is tantamount to the beginning of a Russian encirclement of Romania. Not so long ago, we used to meet with Russia only in the east. Now there it is waving to us from the west. Bearing in mind the increasingly closer relations between Hungary and Russia, we cannot rule out that soon we will see the Russians waving to us from the north. All that is left is the south. I do not believe, however, that there is any Romanian who, even for a moment, would have any doubts about the true relations between the Bulgarians and the Russians. Thus, one cannot rule out that, in a short time, we will really be an island of Latinity in a great sea of Slavs.

HVO Attacks Convoy; UN Troops Return Fire

AU2402154794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Colonel Bill Aikman, representative of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR], stated today that the UN convoys had come under attack three times yesterday, once near Visoko and twice near Gornji Vakuf. He accused the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] of attacking convoys near Gornji Vakuf. On both occasions British troops escorting the convoys returned fire on the HVO positions, silencing the attackers. No casualties or serious damage was inflicted on the convoys.

The UN soldiers could not say with certainty who attacked the convoy on the Kiseljak-Visoko road, so they did not return fire, Colonel Aikman said.

Karadzic, Abdic Sign Peace Agreement

LD2402204894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1849 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Feb (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, and Fikret Abdic, the president of the autonomous province of western Bosnia, signed an agreement on guaranteeing peace along all borders and lines of separation. The agreement was signed in Belgrade today through the mediation of the President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic.

The agreement was signed on the basis of a mutual commitment to restoring peace throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible, and in line with the Belgrade declaration of 22 October 1993, a statement says.

The text of the agreement is:

—Peace is guaranteed along all borders of the autonomous province of Western Bosnia and the Srpska republic, along the entire line of separation between the forces of the autonomous province of Western Bosnia and the Srpska republic army, without exception.

When units of the national defense of the autonomous province of Western Bosnia are deployed on the section of the front from where the Fifth Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army launches military actions against the Srpska republic army, permanent peace will immediately be established in this remaining sector of the front too.

—Liaison officers, responsible for preventing incidents, have been appointed in all sectors on the line of separation between the forces of the autonomous province of Western Bosnia and the Srpska republic army.

—The governments of the autonomous province of Western Bosnia and the Srpska republic will jointly provide conditions and undertake measures to enable communications links, traffic, and commerce between the autonomous province of Western Bosnia and the Srpska republic.

—Borders between the autonomous province of Western Bosnia and the Srpska republic will be defined in line with the Belgrade declaration, and exclusively between the legal bodies of the autonomous province of Western Bosnia and the Srpska republic.

Abdic Comments on Agreement

AU2402204494 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Statement by Fikret Abdic, former Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member and leader of the Cazin Krajina separatists, to Belgrade Television in Belgrade on 24 Feb—recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Abdic, do you wish to give a statement for Television Serbia on the essence of the agreement that you have reached here in Belgrade with republic of Srpska president Radovan Karadzic, mediated by Serbian President Slobdan Milosevic?

[Abdic] Of course I wish to make a statement because I came here publicly, in the function of peace, because it is known that 18 days ago a fierce armed clash occurred between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps and the Srpska army. For the past 18 days I have been trying to do what could be done over the telephone in contacts with Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic to stop the armed clashes. It is known that we have drawn up a cease-fire agreement and an agreement on the cessation of all hostilities, however, there are still instances of violating this agreement. Therefore, this was actually the reason why I turned to Slobodan Milosevic to ask Radovan Karadzic to meet with us here in Belgrade and to review once again the declaration which we signed on 22 October 1993, which Slobodan Milosevic also signed.

I can conclude with great pleasure that Mr. Milosevic expressed readiness to call Karadzic, and that he remained committed to all the principles we agreed to on 22 October. That is why we have signed this agreement, and with this agreement I can guarantee the citizens of Bihac—and the citizens of western Bosnia—peace. That is the most important thing. Moreover, I believe that when peace is the issue, one must choose neither the time nor the place, nor spare oneself or fall under the influence of various comments, but must rise to the occasion since it is people and lasting peace that are at stake. It is the duty of all of us to do everything possible to ensure peace returns to all the territories. I have been criticized for striving too hard for peace in the autonomous province of Western Bosnia, rather than for peace throughout Bosnia- Herzegovina. I have to say that in my opinion, peace must have a starting point. The most realistic starting point is precisely in the autonomous province of

Western Bosnia. I believe that we can establish peace throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina based precisely on the principles of this peace.

Srpska Assembly Speaker Cited

LD2502151194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1303 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Nis, 25 Feb (TANJUG)—The signing of the peace agreement between the Srpska republic and the autonomous province of western Bosnia was a result of the situation where both peoples needed peace rather than war, Momcilo Krajisnik, the Srpska parliament speaker told Nis radio "Radio about politics" program.

"We have nothing against the other people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is the Croats, organizing themselves the way they find best," Krajisnik said.

Commenting on the establishment of a Confederation of Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Krajisnik said such a confederation was not an expression of the will of the Muslim and Croat people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, but a result of great pressure by the mentors who are helping the Muslims and the Croats.

"The [mentors] objective is to prevent the formation of a Muslim state and to prevent the area, which is under the influence of the western powers, from becoming split and from falling under somebody else's influence in the near future," Krajisnik said.

"The Muslims are much more closely linked with the Serbs [than with the Croats], and perhaps they would opt for an association with Serbia," Krajisnik said, adding that this was obviously against the interests of certain strong forces in the West, which use the United Nations to achieve their objectives.

Referring to the demands for the opening of Tuzla airport Krajisnik said: "We will be cooperative and we will make maximum concessions, but only up to a limit that does not threaten the interests of the Serb people."

"We have achieved our objective in Sarajevo, although the Muslim side had set a trap for us. They wanted to disarm us and win in that way. Instead of bombing the Serbs they have now got the Russians in—this is a joke now circulating both among our soldiers and among the Muslims," Krajisnik said in "Radio about Politics" program.

Izetbegovic: Serbs Not Observing Ultimatum

AU2402193294 Paris AFP in English 1924 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 24 (AFP)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic charged here Thursday that Serbs have failed to honor the NATO ultimatum to withdraw all artillery from Sarjaevo. He said many Serb heavy guns were still in position against the mainly Moslem Bosnian capital.

In a statement read to reporters by Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic, Izetbegovic gave a list of weapons not pulled out since the NATO ultimatum expired Monday. "According to reliable data, the realization of the ultimatum is not accomplished," the statement said.

It listed sitings by Bosnian sources from Monday to Wednesday of eight tanks, three armored personnel carriers and at least 16 artillery pieces in the 20-kilometre (12-mile) exclusion zone NATO had called for around Sarajevo by last Monday. NATO threatened air strikes as of Monday to destroy the arms. Whether these weapons remained Thursday could not be immediately confirmed.

UN spokesmen here say there is effective compliance since Serb forces have been pulling out artillery and have not shelled Sarajevo.

UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Aikman said Thursday, however, that there were still at least eight weapons sites to be checked. Aikman said there were in addition sites where Serbs were refusing to hand over arms to UN troops.

Ganic charged that the 260 pieces of artillery UNPROFOR has collected so far from the Serbs included many obsolete arms and many below the high calibre weapons the Serbs possess. He spoke of UN Bosnian commander British General Michael Rose "saying he was going to go to sleep comfortably (at the time the deadline fell Monday at 0100 GMT) since the job was done." "Now it is a mess," Ganic said.

Cease-Fire Violations Reported

AU2402203494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps report from Sarajevo]

[Text] The chetniks are continuing to violate the cease-fire flagrantly. They have again today provided enough evidence of the fact that they have not removed all the weaponry to the distance required.

This morning they fired with an antiaircraft machine gun from (Kromolje) at Brekin Potok, and small arms fire could be heard all day. This was particularly evident in Brijesce, Sokolje, Mijatovica Kosa, and Hotonj, while an antiaircraft gun from (Nadvozici) fired at (Visocje).

The Chetnik snipers have been active in various locations, where they have been seeking out victims using weapons with silencers. According to reports, there have been no casualties so far, but this behavior by the aggressor warrants extreme caution.

UN General Blames Bosnian Army

AU2502104994 Paris AFP in English 1024 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 25 (AFP)—UN commander for Sarajevo French General Andre Soubirou on Friday blamed ceasefire violations here on provocations by the mainly Moslem Bosnian army.

In a statement read out to reporters by a French officer, Soubirou said trench digging by Bosnian soldiers drew fire from Serbs who thought the Bosnians were trying to advance their lines.

"The cease-fire is overall respected. However some shots fired break it from time to time," Soubirou said in the statement read by Major Guy Vinet. "Most often they are the result of Serb reaction from anxious soldiers who shoot at the Muslims who dig some trenches regularly. These diggings are a Bosnian provocation," the statement said.

The ceasefire between Serbs besieging Sarajevo and the Bosnians defending it was agreed by the two sides on February 9, the day NATO issued an ultimatum for heavy artillery to be withdrawn from Sarajevo.

The ceasefire has held and Sarajevo is the calmest it has been since war began in April 1992. Meanwhile a nationwide ceasefire in Moslem-Croat fighting was due to take effect at 1100 GMT Friday.

Sarajevo Airport Meeting; Serbs Held Hostage

AU2402164894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Report by Slobodan Jankovic from Pale]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] A meeting of the Commission for Cooperation with the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] began at Sarajevo Airport at 1100. Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Srpska republic, set off to the meeting armed with several proposals regarding the opening of Sarajevo and the normalization of life in both parts of the city. The proposals in question concern the so-called blue roads leading toward Sarajevo, which would be controlled by the peace forces, and the free departure of civilians from the city, primarily Serbs who since the beginning of the war have been hostages of the Muslim authorities. The outcome of this meeting is awaited impatiently, and it will depend to a great extent on the Muslim side's position.

Routes to Muslim Areas Planned

LD2402231094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Excerpt] Within the next two days UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] will put forward a proposal for a document on the use of blue routes to and from Sarajevo in accordance with the UN resolutions adopted so far. This was one of the most important conclusions reached at today's negotiations between our and the Serb aggressor delegation at Sarajevo airport. The document, which will most probably be adopted, provides for the opening of a road corridor from Sarajevo via Vogosca [Serb-held district north of Sarajevo center] to Visoko and Zenica [Muslim-held towns in central Bosnia] for humanitarian convoys and all other users with valid documents issued by the relevant authorities. [passage omitted]

Bihac Appeals to UN To Stop Onslaught

AU2502121594

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1100 GMT on 25 February in its regular 15-minute newscast carries several reports on the situation in the republic.

Mirza Sadikovic reports from Bihac that "the Chetniks are mindlessly attacking, obviously planning it to be do or die in their blitzkrieg in which they plan to occupy the right bank of the Una. Therefore, they are bringing in fresh manpower and military hardware." Sadikovic says that "during last evening as well as in the early morning hours, the artillery was destroying Bihac, Cazin, and their suburbs. Several civilians have been injured and the material damage is huge. There is no peace along the separation lines with the remainders of the paramilitary of the so-called Kladusa autonomy. After operating at [word indistinct], the commune of Cazin, provocations continued at other parts of the separation lines."

Hajrudin Sermic describes the situation in Maglaj as "extremely dramatic. The attacks by Chetniks and Ustashas on Maglaj are increasing by the minute and the encirclement is tightening more and more. Everything that the aggressor possesses is being used today; helicopters are flying over in an unperturbed manner carrying out combat activity with guided missiles on our fighters' positions. Tanks are coming ever closer to the town and trucks and transport vehicle are constantly bringing in manpower reinforcements. All this is taking place at a (?critical) line of the (?Ploca)-Plana section on the northern section with the generous aid of Ustashas dressed up in Chetnik uniforms. Many of them have been recognized and the [word indistinct] traffic of Chetniks and Ustashas speaks of their coordinated action. There are some dead fighters on our side and tanks are rolling over their bodies. On behalf of 35,000 civilians of this town, we demand that UNPROFOR forces enter Maglaj urgently and immediately and prevent an unprecedented catastrophe."

Shelling Avoiding Detection

AU2402204094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[Text] On this the 19th day of the fiercest offensive on Bihac, the Serb aggressor continues his bestial orgy of

destruction. The artillery and infantry, and tank and infantry attacks and attempts to break through on the Grmuski part of the front have continued today, as have attacks on (Hasino Brdo) and the Grmusko-Srbljanski Plateau, where the chetniks have again directed most of their forces.

They have been using a new method of shelling the town. Probably because of the increasingly frequent overflights of NATO aircraft, they have rescheduled their shelling of Cazin and Bihac with howitzers, tanks, and mortars from the hills surrounding Bihac to mornings and nights.

The defenders—the heroes of the 5th Corps—have been courageously resisting the attacks, defending with their bodies every inch of this blood-soaked land. Today they have repulsed several attempts at tank and infantry breakthroughs.

Today there have again been provocations along the demarcation lines with the remnants of the paramilitary of the so-called Kladusa autonomy, and the 5th Corps Command has lodged a strong protest with the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR], since the commander of the UN French Battalion promised to mediate and to take on responsibility for the observance of the latest cease-fire.

All in all, the [words indistinct] is continuing with a new uncertainty.

Vitez Suffers 'Devastating' Artillery Attack

LD2402190894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Ivica Saric reporting for Croatian Radio. Vitez is going through one of the most devastating Muslim artillery attacks since the aggression began on 15 April last year. The usual afternoon mortar provocations this evening turned into artillery barrage fire directed at the center of Vitez, the Croatian Defense Council's [HVO's] Vitez operational zone reports.

Tank-fired missiles and 122-mm howitzer shells are landing on residential areas and other civilian facilities. The attacks from the direction of Preocica and Pocuica and other positions along the Zenica line have been coupled by 60-mm mortar shells from the direction of Mahala, the part of Stari Vitez under the control of the Muslim army.

The command of the Vitez operational zone reports that two children have already died in this infernal shelling. Nobody bothers to estimate the extent of the material damage any longer. The population has been warned by the local radio station and in other appropriate ways to descend into bomb shelters. The general alert sounded on 15 April last year is still in force. It is 1800 hours and the pounding goes on. HVO units are responding to the hostile fire with the means at their disposal, the Vitez operational zone command said.

Serb Missiles, Artillery Make Maglaj 'Hell'

AU2402200494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Article by Hajrudin Sermic from Maglaj]

[Text] Maglaj has been going through hell today. The town is definitely disappearing under the onslaught of several thousand artillery shells. This afternoon two Luna missiles were fired at Maglaj, killing and wounding several civilians. The Maglaj defense lines are also ablaze under the unabated attacks by masses of equipment, weapons, and manpower coming in waves. The enemy has been intensifying his attempts to break through with infantry at Lijesnica, and has been using tanks in frontal attacks on Plane on the northern part of the front. The fighters of the 201st Chivalrous Brigade have been resisting these attacks. It was said here a long time ago that even a retreat of just one meter would mean deserting the people of this town to a horrible massacre. That is why the morale, the will, and the heroism of the Golden Lilies [Bosnia-Herzegovina flag] are superhuman.

Serb Offensive on Tesanj, Maglaj, Fojnica

AU2502135194

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1300 GMT on 25 February within its regular 4-minute newscast carries reports on situation in the republic.

In a report on the situation in the zone covered by the 7th Operations Group, Smail Terzic says that it is "very difficult in the zone. The aggressor is incessantly launching shells and destroying civilian buildings. Since the morning hours, he has fired about 2,000 shells on the defense lines and the towns of Tesanj and Maglaj. The situation in the zones covered by the 201st, 207th, 203d, and the 110th Glorious HVO [Croatian Defense Council] Brigade is fierce, but our brave fighters are withstanding all attacks. About 200 tank shells have been fired at the regions of Kriz, Obli Kamen, and Filipovici. Moreover, the enemy is bringing in new forces, mainly from Bosnian Krajina, and several dozen guns and mortars have been brought to the temporarily occupied region of Novi Seher. Since last night, two enemy batteries of 122mm and 150mm are present in the Potocani region, which means that the enemy has not given up his offensive."

A studio announcer says that "our correspondent from Fojnica reports that at about 1100 [1000 GMT] today, 12 projectiles from a 128-mm multiple rocket launcher fell. Therefore, Ustasha artillery hit civilian targets in the town for the third time in a month. Some people are injured, but the final number is still not known. Ustasha snipers are particularly active and are opening fire along defense lines. They are active along the entire zone covered by the 310th Mountain Brigade."

UNHCR Says Cease-Fire Gives Hope to Mostar

AU2402153194 Paris AFP in English 1507 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Geneva, Feb 24 (AFP)—The ceasefire between Bosnian Croat and Moslem forces could mean the return of basic services such as water supplies in the besieged Moslem areas of Mostar, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said Thursday [24 February].

The UNHCR is also planning to reestablish its permanent office in the city, after moving it to Medjugorje last year when fighting between HVO [Croatian Defense Council] Croat forces and the Moslem-led Bosnian government army made the place too dangerous, UNHCR spokesman Ron Redmond told AFP.

The office, staffed by five foreigners and about 20 local people, should be set up in the Croat-controlled west of Mostar, and "we would hope to have access to the east," said Redmond.

The eastern Moslem enclave has been under constant Croat fire for the last 10 months and the UNHCR's information chief Sylvana Foa recently described the situation there as "worse than Sarajevo ... 55,000 people live there like rats, without water, electricity or sanitation," she said.

In Rome, the foreign ministry announced Thursday that the first humanitarian aid convoy since the weekend's Sarajevo ceasefire had arrived at Mostar. Four trucks, escorted by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), arrived Wednesday with some 30 tonnes of food, clothing and medicine, it said.

Redmond said the ceasefire, due to take effect Friday noon (1100 GMT), was "a good sign" which could "change a lot for the drivers who risk their lives under the shelling and snipers (...) allow setting up a water purification unit taken there last week and be of great help for the mobile hospital."

According to UNPROFOR, about 48 people died from Croat shelling during the week of February 11 to 19 alone.

Mostar To Be 'First Priority' for Cease-Fire

AU2402181994 Paris AFP in English 1742 GMT 24 Feb 94

[By Milan Dragovic]

[Excerpts] Zagreb, Feb 24 (AFP)—The beleaguered Moslem enclave of Mostar is first priority for UN troops enforcing a ceasefire between Croat and Moslem forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a UN official said Thursday [24 February].

"We are going to intervene at the most contested points on the front line," an official from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) General Staff told AFP.

Some 1,200 UN troops from the Spanish battalion, based at Medjugorje 25 kilometres (15 miles) south of Mostar, should be the first to be deployed once the ceasefire takes effect Friday at 1100 GMT, but an effective intervention would depend on a significant increase in UN ground troops.

"In the circumstances, we are going to use our resources in the most honest and rational way possible," the official said.

The 55,000 Moslems living in the east of Mostar have been under constant fire for the last 10 months by Croat forces, who want to make Mostar the "capital" of their self-proclaimed Bosnian republic.

On Wednesday, the day the ceasefire was agreed, Croat forces fired 15 mortar and artillery shells on the sector, UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said in Sarajevo on Thursday.

The agreement between General Rasim Delic of the Moslem-led Bosnian army and General Ante Roso, commander of the Bosnian Croat HVO [Croatian Defense Council] militia, calls for a "total and immediate end to hostilities" and the deployment of UNPROFOR troops in "sensitive areas and key sites."

It resembles the February 9 accord concluded by Moslems and Serbs for Sarajevo under UNPROFOR auspices and reinforced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ultimatum issued the same day, made effective last weekend.

Heavy arms bigger than 12.7 mm are to be withdrawn from specified front lines—10 kilometres (six miles) for mortars and 20 kilometres (12 miles) for artillery guns and tanks—or put under UN control by midday March 7.

A joint commission chaired by UNPROFOR was to be set up on Friday at Kiseljak to help reopen roads, allowing free movement and the "return to normal life" for the population. [passage omitted]

Fighting between Croat and Moslem forces continued Wednesday in central Bosnia, especially at the Croat-controlled town of Vitez where mortar and artillery fire intensified. [passage omitted]

In Zagreb's UNPROFOR headquarters on Thursday, questions were raised about the will of Croat and Moslem forces to stop fighting. "In the face of people who want to fight each other, we cannot do much," said a senior official.

But Kofi Annan, visiting head of the UN peacekeeping operations department, took an optimistic tone after meeting with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

"We are both encouraged by the latest developments and the involvement of the major powers," he said after the meeting in Zagreb on Thursday. "Both the United States

and Russia are active and, apart from Sarajevo, we hope there is going to be a real movement for peace in the region."

Annan said he had raised the question of extending the mandate for the 15,000 UN troops deployed in Croatia, which expires at the end of March.

"The president raised the issue of a more assertive implementation of the UNPROFOR mandate, to create a situation where displaced people will be able to return to their homes," he said.

According to the Croatian government, some 25,000 Croats have been driven from their homes by separatist Serb forces, which control a quarter of Croatian territory.

Report Analyzes Serbian Tactics, Strategy

AU2402195094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Report by Hajrudin Redzovic from Tesanj]

[Text] The Serb aggressor's fierce attacks have been coming in waves against the unified free territory under the control of the 7th South Operative Group. The enemy has been launching heavy attacks along the entire defense line. However, our men are not giving in and they have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in the operational zones of all their six brigades.

This enemy offensive is by far the strongest in intensity and it is also the most extensive so far. The aggressor has deployed eight brigades with over 15,000 men, six of which are local and two from elsewhere, consisting of soldiers from Banja Luka, Prnjavor, Mt. Romanija, Pale, Sokolac—in other words, from the Sarajevo front—and from Serbia and Montenegro. Every day the enemy is using over 100 artillery pieces of over 82-mm caliber, tanks, and armored personnel carriers.

These, the heaviest artillery pieces of the occupying forces, are being accompanied by unprecedented psychological propaganda activities, particularly via local radio stations. [words indistinct] propaganda during the first days of the offensive that started on 17 January was aimed at the Croats, that is, at the 110th Glorious HVO Usora Brigade, which was constantly being urged to join the Serb aggressor. That failed, and then the Chetniks launched fierce attacks on Croatian villages and the entire defense line of the 110th Brigade. The attacks are continuing.

There have been questions as to what will change here in view of the NATO ultimatum, but no one expects the Sarajevo model to be applied in this region, even though Maglaj has been mentioned as an option but only as a protected area.

The Serb aggressor now has four strategic aims: The conquest of the free territory under the control of the 7th South Operative Group, attacks in the direction of Posavina, the linking of Banja Luka via Bihac with Knin and its railroad line, and the linking of Chetnik territories via Olovo. Therefore the target of the heaviest aggressor's attacks will still be the operational zone of the 7th South Operative Group.

According to reliable assessments, these attacks will take the following course: The enemy will again try to cut the Doboj-Teslic route, and occupy the valley of the Usora River. There it will launch a massive offensive on the (links) of the 110th Glorious HVO Usora Brigade and other units, with renewed calls for Croatian betrayal. [Words indistinct] of besieging Tesanj by capturing the dominant hills around it and gradually destroying it. The aggressor's next step will be to cut off the Maglaj-Tesanj route and thus close the circle around Maglaj, which is at the moment under heavy attack. All this would create the conditions for the complete occupation of the Tesanj and Maglaj territories.

However, to judge by the military results achieved so far by the army units from the 7th South Operative Group and their outstandingly high morale, it is certain that the enemy offensive will end in complete collapse, and—according to Mustafa Cerovac, commander of the 7th South Operative Group—the siege of this area could even be lifted with the cooperation of other army units.

Muslims, Croats Agree To Exchange Prisoners

LD2402215494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] An agreement on the exchange of prisoners has been reached at a meeting held in the HQ of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] Spanish Battalion in Medjugorje between HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and Bosnia-Herzegovina army representatives. One thousand prisoners from Mostar, Jablanica, Prozor, Bogojno, Capljina and Stolac are to be exchanged. It was also agreed that the time and method for the exchange will be determined over the next few days in cooperation with the International Red Cross in Medjugorje.

TANJUG Views Vatican Moves in Bosnia

LD2402165894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1627 GMT 24 Feb 94

[By Dragan Milosavljevic]

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 24 (TANJUG)—Vatican's proposal to western political centres in late January that Bosnia should not be divided and that NATO steps up pressure on the Serbs, is turning into open pressure for the renewal of the Croat-Moslem coalition.

Vatican's re-involvement and its pressure on Zagreb to return to the anti-Serb coalition with the Islamic fundamentalists rallied around Bosnian Moslem Leader Alija Izetbegovic, aim to oust Russia from the Balkans and give the United Nations a role inferior to NATO.

Following talks with Vatican's Secretary of State Cardinal Toran, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic confirmed that the Holy See had assessed as positive Croatia's acceptance of its proposals, Radio Vatican reports.

The turnabout of the Croatian policy in Bosnia, which is also based on the ceasefire agreement with the Moslems, could have been unreservedly accepted only by those who are poorly informed about Vatican's underlaying strategy and who see this region as the threshold of Catholicism.

The unnatural alliance with the 'isle' of Islam in Europe, imposed by Vatican, is only the initial stage in pushing back the orthodox religion over the Drina river which separates the Bosnian Serbs from their brothers in the east.

In view of this, it is hardly surprising that the agreement between the Serbian and Croatian presidents, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, on the gradual normalization of relations, was strongly criticized by Vatican.

The Catholic Church, and specially Cardinal Kuharic in Zagreb and Archbishop Vinko Puljac in Sarajevo, were given the task of preventing any kind of rapproachment in the interest of peace between Zagreb and Belgrade.

In view of the pressure by Germany, Italy and the Holy See to freeze Croatia's military presence in Bosnia, the Serbs are still described as the aggressors and threatened with possible new ultimatums, while the Russian initiative for a summit meeting of the five big powers on the Bosnian crisis, is viewed as unfavourable.

Interview With President Izetbegovic

LD2202231494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1903 GMT 22 Feb 94

[Rebroadcast of Sarajevo TV interview and phone-in program with Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, by unidentified announcer in Sarajevo on 22 February—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Let us begin with what interests our viewers and listeners the most—yesterday [21 February], the expiry of the NATO ultimatum, and everything that happened. You declared last night that our spring was at hand, that the withdrawal of Serb heavy artillery was a victory for us, but that it was not complete and flawless.

[Izetbegovic] Yes. Some had commented that my statement was overly optimistic, and, indeed, it was pronouncedly optimistic intentionally. All day long I was listening to people moaning about how all this was not good. I could not understand why. I am afraid we are becoming slightly inclined to fall for enemy propaganda. The Serbs tried to convince their own people that this absolute moral, military, and political defeat was in fact a victory for them, and they tried to convince us as well. I heard certain defeatist statements to that effect, so I wanted to counter it by making a slightly overly optimistic statement.

However, it is a fact, in my opinion, that it was a moral, military, and political defeat. Why? Moral because they withdrew. That is undeniable. One must pack up and go—it a moral fiasco. Political because the dreams they had been dreaming for two years on those hills about conquering the city were finally jettisoned. They were certainly not up there for the fun of it. Although their initial and main objective was to diminish our numbers by striking at the civilian population, their paramount objective was to conquer the city. They were compelled to give that up and leave. Militarily? Because they left most of the weapons behind.

[Announcer] We saw all they had withdrawn—all those tanks, cannons, howitzers, mortar launchers. In the long run, it must be said that this was their defeat. If they could keep us encircled with all those weapons without accomplishing anything except for killing civilians....

[Izetbegovic, interrupting] I am not sure anyone noticed that it has become clear only now what we had to put up with for almost two years. The world has been taken aback by the sheer might of all that iron, the tanks that remained here, and those armored personnel carriers, those barrels that remained, and those that were withdrawn—all that has been registered by television cameras belonging to foreign TV networks. Those columns of vehicles. All those things were overlooking the city. We managed to get rid of all that, we liberated ourselves from that, and we certainly have to consider that as our victory. And another thing. Our people say: He who punches strongly is not the tough one, but he who endures the punch. We have endured those punches.

[Announcer] UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] units have been deployed along the separation lines, although it remains to be seen whether they will stay there. How do you view the future of Sarajevo in the light of the proposals for it to become a UN- administered city?

[Izetbegovic] The immediate future of Sarajevo is UN administration. Of course, it is a temporary solution which will last for less than two years. Not longer than two years, maybe up to two years. It is a period in which it will be possible to salvage what we have always wished to do to have an undivided city.

We think that first at the beginning.... [pauses] Naturally after.... [pauses] The first was by all means necessary, the first condition above all other conditions was to stop shooting, to stop the immediate killing in the city, although I must say straight away, perhaps it is partially a reply to the question put a while ago, we cannot think that there will be no killing here and there. Their infantry is still there. Of course, we are going to resist that infantry much more successfully than before. If you can remember the city was full of snipers in the first couple of months of the spring 1992; we have managed to mop up all those, we have silenced them all. We are probably

going to silence them gradually, even more so because now that their artillery has been withdrawn. Without their artillery they are nothing. They are used to having a heavy gun next to them. When the gun is gone, they are going to be something completely different. But still, here and there they are going to snatch a victim or two. Therefore, people should be wary of that. That is past.

However, we are now trying.... [pauses] The next step would be gradually to restore communications. Let people meet, let them see each other, let them go; we shall see whether it is possible to achieve that thing, that our people go to Serb-held Grbavica, let people from Grbavica come here. People are something different from their soldiery that was deployed there.

[Announcer] And criminals who were there?

[Izetbegovic] They are not going to be able to come here. But ordinary people who suffered in Grbavica as much as we suffered here, who shared our suffering and hardships, maybe we shall understand when we have a look at each other that we are not monsters. I think that communication is the next step, after that a bit of trade will come. Before that, normalization in water and electricity supply. Somewhat better food supplies, better and more regular humanitarian aid. That would be a path to preserve the city as a whole. One day a question will probably be asked on what Sarajevans want from Sarajevo. And that is the real question. See, we have all been discussing the issue of Sarajevo. The question is how much we are authorized to resolve the Sarajevo issue. Sarajevo has to be resolved by the Sarajevans. And most probably one day we shall demand a referendum.

Sarajevo has to be resolved by the people of Sarajevo and, most likely, one day we shall ask them whether they want a divided or undivided Sarajevo and let it be the way the people want it. I have almost no doubt at all that the people will say they want to live together in the city. How would the people from Grbavica [words indistinct].

Where will people ask for medical help? You can see that the city cannot be divided The city is an organic entity, and I have no doubt that, if asked how they want to live, the city will be opened.

[Announcer] [Question indistinct]

[Izetbegovic] [words indistinct] I must be honest and say that nobody ever said that any new UNPA [UN protection area] zones should be created here—the UNPA zones in Croatia have proven to be a bad solution. Something like that has not been on offer here.

Here we accept only patrols and control points, not even the demarcaton lines, or control points, but lines. I think such a possibility does not exist.

[Announcer] Mentioning that, those people on Pale and Trebevic have celebrated this as a great victory. They have after all got what they have always wanted—the Russians.

[Izetbegovic] Let me say, as we are talking about the Russians. I sent a letter today to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali asking him what happened to the Pakistani soldiers whose arrival was expected six months ago. Then it was delayed until September, then till November, etc. They have not arrived—ostensibly the problem was how to equip 3,000 people, for they were soldiers without any equipment. It cannot be possible that the West cannot provide equipment for 3,000 people to come here. Obviously this is a case of some other kind of games.

I demanded his reply to this question. After I had talked this morning with Turkish Foreign Minister Cetin—who, as you know, has offered 10,000 people to come here, which is really too many—I also demanded in the letter that 2,000 or 3,000 Turkish soldiers be sent here.

As to the arrival of the Russians. They did not come because of the Serbs. Anyone who understands anything about politics knows very well that this is in fact.... [pauses] You know that their arrival was supported by the Americans. The question arises: why did they support it? They gave it their support, most importantly, to help Yeltsin at a very difficult time in Russia. Since Yeltsin began to make some more radical moves in Russia, he has managed to shut up whatsis name.

[Announcer] Zhirinovskiy?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, Zhirinovskiy. He has shut him up a bit. I believe that in such a situation the Americans and the West wanted to strengthen Yeltsin's position. I think that was a good move. They succeeded in strengthening his position. The tide there had to be stopped, the nationalist tide in Russia, which does not suit us or the West either, the nationalist tide, and its derivative, Nazism. A strong wave of Nazism is being felt in Russia and is reaching Europe as well. I believe that in this way they have managed to suppress it a little, in the general interest of the free world.

I therefore think that the arrival of the Russians was not motivated by the desire to simply help the Serbs. It helped Yeltsin.

[Announcer] As we are speaking about the Russians, we have had an opportunity to see pictures shot by foreign TV companies. We have seen the kissing, hugging, and even the three-finger salutes [Serbian] through the little window of the Russian armored vehicles, where a gun should normally be positioned. We have seen them giving away cigarettes and even exchanging hats. Generals exchanging hats!

[Izetbegovic] Yes, and I have been told that today, as they were passing by the Bosnian Presidency building they did approximately the same thing. I held talks last night with Sergio di Mello and General Rose, and we drew their attention to the Russian behavior. They apologized for that, for these Russians are, after all, UN soldiers. They said they would talk to the Russians and

warn them strictly about their behavior. We said that the Russians would get correct treatment in exchange for correct behavior.

[Announcer] We shall see now what was happening. For this program we have selected a video for our viewers to see once again, although majority of them have already seen, but as electricity supply was restored we have received requests from Tuzla, Zenica, and other areas, Kakanj, Sarajevo, to repeat this video. Here is officer asking where your people are and so on and so on. Let us recall once again in brief what and how [words indistinct] those that arrived in Grbavica to keep peace, here you can see the infamous three-finger salute from an armored personnel carrier. Can we trust them in their supervision of that heavy weaponry?

[Izetbegovic] We can trust them as much as we can trust UNPROFOR. We can trust them [word indistinct] with some reserve. They are UNPROFOR soldiers, and I hold that.... [pauses] There are between 12,000 and 13,000 UNPROFOR soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The number of 400 Russians represents a couple of percent.

[Announcer] Have there been discussions about a higher number?

[Izetbegovic] There have been discussions, but I think that it will not happen, but we shall demand some other troops to be deployed here parallel to them. As I said earlier we have called....

[Announcer, interrupting] Here you can see these pictures.

[Izetbegovic] We have called others, if the Russians can come, the Turks can also come.

[Announcer] And other [word indistinct], of course. Today we received an interesting report. On the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs have blocked an UNPROFOR unit. Several tanks are also mentioned in the report, and the news speaks about calls for NATO air force to act but only by carrying out overflights. Will the Sarajevo issue trigger off NATO actions in this area. And here we have another question from Sarajevo: will there be air strikes against Serb positions or is that story nearly finished?

[Izetbegovic] I think that at least we can say one thing for sure: air strikes have not been ruled out. Their likelihood has considerably decreased since the evening when Chetniks accepted to hand in their weapons, to withdraw or to abandon them. They simply abandoned some of their weapons, being unable to withdraw them and being unwilling to die sitting next to those weapons. They simply abandoned them and informed UNPROFOR that they had left them in the snow up there.

People who were overflying Sarajevo could see many pieces of abandoned weaponry, abandoned heavy guns. Since then the likelihood has decreased because it was important for UNPROFOR whether Chetniks would shoot. As they were claiming they would not shoot, UNPROFOR informed their relevant commands up there, and they postponed it.

It would be best to say that this is something that has been postponed. In case they shoot on the city, no matter where from, either from within the 20-km radius, or outside this radius, or if they attack UN troops anywhere else, air strikes will probably be applied. I think that in this respect, this is my impression, there will be no hesitating.

Of course, they are trying to avoid that. Let us make it clear, they were very happy not to carry out attacks. They were not enthusiastic about carrying out attacks. As you know there was a trick with a report that was launched at the last hour saying that the infamous shell was fired from our positions. That was an attempt to somehow avoid a decision to carry out air strikes. What is strange is that a good part of the international press and some responsible people accepted it as something that had to be seriously examined. They would be very happy if something like that could be proven to avoid air strikes. Then they would not have to intervene, and so on and so on. Simply they are not enthusiastic about doing that, but I think that in case of flagrant violation of the agreements and conditions of the declaration, in case the city comes under shelling, if UN troops are attacked, I do not doubt that air strikes against attackers would take place.

[Announcer] Do you believe NATO forces will react somewhere else if UNPROFOR does not?

[Izetbegovic] That could happen in two instances: in case Sarajevo was bombarded and attacked and in case UNPROFOR units were attacked. In these two cases they would.... [pauses] It would all depend on the intensity of the attack, whether the troops were in danger. In case they were attacked and suffered casualties, there is no doubt they would retaliate.

[Announcer] Let us return to the shell. A viewer is asking: They formed a commission to find out who fired the shell at Markale on 5 February. What can you say about that, let us link your reply to what was said on French television's Channel Five.

[Izetbegovic] Yes. I recently replied to that question. You see, it was a little cynical. People ask themselves where a shell came from. What about the other 300,000 shells? Who slaughtered 1,300 children, who maimed 10,000 children, who wiped out so many thousands of Sarajevans, who destroyed everything in Sarajevo, the city hall.... [pauses] Who fired hundreds of shells at the military hospital? This person is asking about this one shell?! Finally, it would be very difficult today to technically establish who fired the shell, no one can say for sure. That is all that can be said at the moment.

Therefore, they wished to say this: well, as it is known that it would be technically impossible to establish who fired the shell—it cannot be established—then the air strikes cannot be carried out. Approximately that line of

reasoning. Thank God, it did not go down well this time; people could not be fooled this time. What I told you a minute ago is very interesting. How false information fabricated by a reporter and launched at a critical moment, a dramatic moment when decisions were being made, how that information was accepted by a certain group of people with relief because they said to themselves: fine, now we do not have to intervene because that would be inconvenient.

But I want to say that it is an insult to the dead, the people buried here, the commission is an insult to those dead people lying in our graveyards, as well as to the living.

[Announcer] All the more so as it as it was proven who had fired the shell at Dobrinja the day before [4 February], who fired the shell at that part of Alipasino Polje, and so on and on. It can always be proved who killed up to 10 people, but when it comes to more than that it suddenly becomes impossible.

[Izetbegovic] A shell landed on Dobrinja the day before; those children were killed. It was established with certainty that the shell had come from Serb positions, they did not even bother to deny it. It was concluded that the shell in Markale was of the same kind, of the same make. In any case, let us not waste time on that, things are perfectly clear. It was fired by those who had fired the other 300,000 shells.

[Announcer] What can be done to deblock other towns—Bihac, Mostar, Maglaj, and now, particularly at this time, Tesanj—and to have heavy weapons withdrawn from there as well?

[Izetbegovic] We shall have to see what further arrangements we shall accept. We accepted the arrangement with Sarajevo without hesitation because it was in any case envisaged that Sarajevo should be UN administrated, which is good.

[Announcer] If I am not mistaken, only Mostar is also envisaged to be EU administered.

[Izetbegovic] We shall probably demand that this is also applied in the case of Mostar. As to other towns we shall have to think seriously whether to accept this. I am afraid that this could bring about the freezing of the situation on the ground. We would be willing to have these lines positioned elsewhere, not on the actual front lines. We are analyzing the question. It is very complex. Admittedly, such a solution prevents the Chetniks or the other ones making further advances into our lines, but it also prevents our struggle for freedom. It prevents us from liberating those lines. So, we shall have to think seriously what to do about it. I can only tell you that the question is just being analyzed—it is very complex.

[Announcer] The same principle could be applied in protected areas—Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica. The same principle as in Sarajevo could be applied there and, after all, that has to be done.

[Izetbegovic] Not exactly the same principle. That is where the difference lies: in Sarajevo we agreed to surrender our weapons as well. According to Resolutions 824 and 836, it is not our obligation to surrender our weapons in the safe areas. We knew that here the Chetniks would have been delighted if we had disputed this, they would have then procrastinated the decision forever. After the contacts with our friends, we decided to accept the well-known point seven of the NATO decision, for it suited us in this case. But in other towns we shall demand consistent implementation of Resolutions 824 and 836, which specify that the Serb weapons, and not ours, must be withdrawn from the safe areas. This will be our demand.

[Announcer] The situation in Bihac is almost the most critical, as critical as in Maglaj and in central Bosnia.

[Izetbegovic] We are defending ourselves there with a lot of success, and there would probably be no problems there if it was not for the unfortunate [Fikret] Abdic on our back. I believe that our people would not accept a Sarajevo-type solution in Bihac. We would accept Resolution 836, and that is what we shall insist upon.

General Rose and Akashi wanted to bring it up two or three days ago, on Friday or Saturday. I asked them to postpone it until this week, to avoid complicating the situation in Sarajevo. We want to resolve the question of Sarajevo, and anyway General Delic is travelling to the UNPROFOR base in Zagreb for the talks with Akashi, General Rose, and General Cot.

[Announcer] To sum it up now. If the West decides, as it has decided this time, to issue a threat, it means that something can be done.

[Izetbegovic] We have earlier said that the recipe is to combine negotiations and pressure; that is force. This is the only formula leading towards the achieving of some objective. We have been constantly told, throughout the 18 months of the war, to negotiate and negotiate. We said that it could not produce any results. It can, if combined with a pressure on the aggressor. It has been proven here that this is the only successful and efficient formula.

[Announcer] One interesting question: the Serbs got the corridor in Posavina. Why cannot we get such a corridor linking us with Bihac?

[Izetbegovic] People often ask that question. I think that the wrong verb is used here. They did not get it, they took it. They are holding the corridor militarily. We cannot take it back from them. If we can, we shall take it. In this war one does not get anything, nobody gives anything to anyone as a present. Everything has to be taken. They have taken it. Please, let our people bear this in mind when they say: why are you giving them something. We are not giving them anything. They have simply, as you know, taken it by force, a vast force in comparison with our forces, and they will not give it back. They will not

give it back although our rights to it are evident. But they have seized it, we have not given it to them.

[Announcer] Let us end this part of our program with a report from the White House. Today again a warning has arrived from there that the ultimatum is still in force, and that all heavy weapons within the 20-km zone that are not under UN control will be targeted by air attacks.

[Izetbegovic] In that respect the U.S. position is very clear. The French and German positions are clear up to a point, the English one to a lesser extent, the Russian almost not at all. But the important thing is that in this respect the American position is very clear. I think that they are leading the game here.

[Announcer] We have received many questions for you. Let us start with politics. We have received some new initiatives. Russia launched an initiative that was rejected. Now we have a French initiative again. What is really taking place in connection with the global resolution of problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] Something is taking place behind the scenes. Nothing is happening on the main stage. Talks involving experts were held in Bonn today [22 February]. I do not know the outcome of the meeting. I think it ended late this evening, an hour or two ago. I do not know if the results will be made public. Experts from several states involved in the problem took part, including America and Russia and some European states. They were supposed to make some kind of project, perhaps some kind of plan for that hypothetical summit that was discussed and that would have Bosnia on its agenda.

As far as our activities are concerned, as you are aware, we held negotiations with the Croatian side two days ago in Frankfurt, between Silajdzic and Granic. Silajdzic has been in the United States since yesterday. He held talks with Christopher yesterday and I think he will meet him again. Today he held talks with other American officials. Therefore, something is cooking, but most of it is taking place behind the scenes. We shall see the outcome. We know our positions and we will defend them adequately. We have several options in mind, depending on the direction in which the things move. However, our people's interest will be protected in all options.

[Announcer] Nothing has been solved in Geneva. Are we finally going to ask the UN Security Council to take everything in its hands?

[Izetbegovic] It is most likely that another round of talks will take place and, should it fail, there is nothing left to do but to return to the United Nations again. If that happens we would remind them of their resolutions, of the London Conference, and so on. However, I think that another round of talks will take place, yet another attempt to find a solution based on previous projects.

[Announcer] The issue of Croatia and the presence of its regular army in Bosnia-Herzegovina is on the agenda of the UN Security Council. What do you expect will happen with that problem?

[Izetbegovic] Well, I did not watch the evening newscast because I was on the way to your studio. I do not know if the Security Council discussed the issue today. I have instructed our delegation to delay a decision on the matter for a day or two because we are holding intense negotiations with the Croats over certain issues. Delic is going to Zagreb tomorrow where he is supposed to meet General Roso. Delic will demand the withdrawal of Croatian troops again, although Roso has denied the presence of these troops in a recent statement. What counts is UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] verdict according to which at least 5,000 well- equipped troops are present. They will have to withdraw them or they will face sanctions. We have no doubt about this and neither does the international community. It is only a matter of days for some kind of peaceful solution to the problems.

[Announcer] You mentioned the talks between Messrs. Silajdzic and Granic, but after the talks it was said that another meeting would be held at the highest level. Does that mean that you and President Tudjman will meet?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, if any results are achieved. I must be frank: It does not seem at the moment that there will be any results. I am not an optimist regarding a solution to the problems between us and Croatia, which are not our fault. We are trying to solve those problems. After all, I do not think we should fight if we can solve this by agreement for people to stop suffering.

Our people in Vitez—in the old part of Vitez—in Novi Travnik, and Mostar are in a very difficult situation. The situation in the old part of Vitez is particularly difficult. There are about 1,000 of our citizens there who have been cut off for a long time. Of course, there are more hotspots, such as Gornji Vakuf.

[Announcer] It seems that the situation is calming down there. There was not much fighting there today.

[Izetbegovic] Yes, it has quieted down somewhat. UNPROFOR has been trying: They bring up the Sarajevo solution; whether it would be possible to apply a similar solution there.

That is why Gen. Delic will go to Zagreb tomorrow. We have tried to organize the meeting here, but Akashi could not come to Sarajevo because he has a lot of work to do in Zagreb tomorrow. I was very enthusiastic about Akashi's presence. He offered for the meeting to take place at Sarajevo airport without him or at Zagreb airport where he would be present. So we agreed for Delic to go there because we are interested in finding a solution. I am not a great optimist concerning all this, judging by certain indications that I have had. However, miracles are possible.

[Announcer] There has been talk about new proposals of a confederation. It has been said that the West and the United States want it.

[Izetbegovic] The U.S. wish, which has been conveyed to us, is that we solve our problem with Croats. They believe that this is in the interest of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. When they said Croats, they referred to our internal misunderstanding with Bosnian Croats and to the two states. They advised us and suggested we try to find a solution because that would greatly simplify the problem of implementing the agreement. On the other hand, they said very clearly that they would lend their support to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia concerning their joining future European integrations, and they would give us assistance for a speedy reconstruction of both countries and so on. Therefore, they have given us very appealing offers to encourage us to proceed in that direction.

[Announcer] We have to remember that Boban has been replaced. A new president of the so-called Herzeg-Bosna has been elected, but Prime Minister Jadranko Prlic has said that Mostar will be the capital of that parastate. In that area there is nothing new.

[Izetbegovic] We have always said that the replacement of Boban was important, for moral reasons as well. We believe that he is to blame for the suffering down there. He organized the war crimes in Herzegovina, and partly here in Bosnia. But we have always said that it was not important to replace Boban, but to change the policy. I am afraid that there has been no change in policy.

[Announcer] Convoys have reached Zenica—if I am not mistaken—and Nova Bila. I think that the one for Maglaj has failed to go through again.

[Izetbegovic] The one for Maglaj has unfortunately not passed through because of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] objections. However, these indications of a change in the policy are very unconvincing. Much more should be done to be able to say that a change in the policy is on the agenda. I cannot see that for the time being.

I know that Germany and America—primarily those two countries, but also other European countries including Belgium and Holland—insist on us solving our problems with Croatia. They insist the Croats do too, they exert pressure on them too. They have also suggested to us that a solution is in our interest. We will see whether all this yields result in the next few days. Unfortunately, for the time being I cannot see any progress.

[Announcer] We have received many questions from our viewers. We have already answered most of them. I will try not to repeat questions. Still, there are a lot of questions that have not been answered. Let us start from here: Has Bosnia-Herzegovina been divided despite all these negotiations?

[Izetbegovic] Regarding the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Some kind of draft, a project on this has been made—that is true. Specifically, this is the reconstruction of Bosnia- Herzegovina, which some people call division and which at the same time could and could not be a division depending on the direction things develop in the future. Optimists could interpret the union as a form, a way of keeping Bosnia together at this most critical moment when it is in the greatest danger, when there are three armies operating within it, and when the situation cannot possibly deteriorate further but only improve in the future. Therefore, the union would be a guarantee for a future reintegration of Bosnia, because the framework would be preserved. Pessimists believe that this is a phase in the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

History is not prefabricated. What Bosnia will become depends to a large extent on us. It depends on our efforts, on our struggle. We will try to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina, to realize the beliefs of the optimists. I explained on one occasion how we imagine this if it turns out that no solution is possible other than the union and the three republics, which is currently on the agenda because nothing else has been offered. In fact, we did offer the internal set-up envisaging cantons, but I think that neither the Serb nor Croat sides accepted it. If we are talking about solving the problem by agreement, that will not work. Bosnia- Herzegovina could perhaps be reunited by military means on some new basis. The solution that seems to be rather realistic today, the direction in which things are going, is the union and the republics, among which our Bosnian republic would be the example of a democratic country that would exert influence on the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the strength of its political model. Therefore, what Bosnia-Herzegovina will turn out to be if it becomes a union depends to a large extent on us.

[Announcer] We have answered many of these questions: Is this a division of the city? Is this the freezing of the situation in Sarajevo? But there is one interesting question. A viewer called and asked whether you know about new concentration camps—for example near Han Pijesak, in Mrkalj, and in Pjenovac—whether the International Red Cross knows about them and what is being done concerning that?

[Izetbegovic] We have heard about these things and informed Mazowiecki—you know that he is the UN secretary general's envoy for human rights on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. His latest report was made public yesterday [21 February]. We have also informed the Red Cross. However, it is difficult to reach those areas. If commissions come to inspect, the Serbs relocate the camps and hide the inmates. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to solve that problem with them.

However, we have people who deal exclusively with that issue and who follow the problem of human rights, the concentration camps, and crimes. They are in constant contact with the Red Cross and relevant bodies. We have

managed to do a lot in that area. Many camps have been discovered and many people released owing to those efforts. Many people have been exchanged and saved. We have recently held talks on the release of some of our civilians from Kiseljak. We are talking about 500-600 civilians. I think that we will manage to free them in the next two or three days.

[Announcer] How do you comment on this escalation of evil, violence and everything else that has befallen us in almost 23 months in this region?

[Izetbegovic] It is a phenomenon that will probably attract the attention of the world's scientists. It has truly had no precedent—and this is not an empty phrase. It is difficult to find something to compare it with in the history of the past few hundred years. We are talking about the killing and expulsion of people, about the destruction of cultural monuments, and so on.

The question arises of how such evil could happen here. Some people will say: The root of the evil was in Nacertanije [writings on Serbian national issues] by a Serbian nationalist late last century and early this century. But Nacertanije existed before too. It is a very interesting question—how this evil has been brought about. I have a feeling that no moral force rose in opposition to the evil.

I think that the 40 years of Communist rule here will probably have to be included in the explanation of this phenomenon. That ideology propagated that everything is allowed. If you read the Communist Manifesto, you will see that they say that morality is an illusion and so on. Morality is only that which is useful for a future aim, or—as they used to say in the better part of their rule—what is useful for the working class and then what is useful for the ruling class. Everything is allowed. In my opinion, that destroyed all moral buttresses. Nationalists came to power in a moral wasteland, and they implemented their policies without any obstacles. No moral values opposed them. There are nationalists such as we see today in Russia, such as Zhirinovskiy. There is xenophobia in, for example, Germany. There are always people who will preach evil, but they fail to implement it on a large scale. [passage indistinct]

I have a feeling that nothing opposed the evil here. Very little in people rose in resistance. Something was destroyed in people—their criteria, their moral values. People grew up and were educated with the idea that everything was allowed in the name of authority. All that was needed was for bad authorities to come to power to do whatever they wanted. And that is precisely what happened. I think that while explaining why it was in this region that such evil happened, my explanation is that the communist ideology also bears the blame for it.

[Announcer] Let us continue with questions from our viewers.

In Zenica, they have an electricity as well as a phone link with Sarajevo. Is the president familiar with the serious situation in Zenica and, above all, with the fact that the citizens are dissatisfied with the work of the Zenica government? The following question arises: Why does the Zenica government not want to accept the UNHCR's offer whereby it would take over the bakery and provide bread? The UNHCR claims it can solve this problem.

[Izetbegovic] I was not aware of that. I know that there is some criticism. I am aware of some complaints, although—given the distance—Zenica is almost a two days' walk from here. You know, I find it easier to know what is going on in the United States. It is a matter of five minutes. Whereas, for example, I have no phone link to Konjic. All kinds of things may take place in Konjic, but it can take me five days to learn of them, until the couriers who operate there arrive.

Communications have been disrupted. I have to admit there are complaints as far as Zenica is concerned. The police, the authorities, are being criticized, etc. People always complain. You cannot simply take every complaint and criticism at its face value. You have to examine every element. Still, this detail about the UNHCR and, as you mentioned, the bakery....

[Announcer, interrupting] Or what about another example. Why is it impossible to organize in Zenica the distribution and production of bread in the same way as in Sarajevo? In Zenica, the price of flour is 20 German marks. Adem Dervisevic from Zenica.

[Izetbegovic] These are good questions. I hope the people of Zenica as well as Zenica's authorities are listening to this. Let them try to explain this issue to those people there.

[Announcer] Here you go. Can the state do something to help workers, particularly those who are now living in Zenica but who worked and lived in the temporarily occupied areas?

[Izetbegovic] That is a totally justified question. It should be addressed to the government. As you know, the government has recently, government representatives have been doing some field work, examining this situation, and talking to people. They have been trying to find some solution. There are a large number of reports indicating that the situation in Zenica is extremely grave with regard to the humanitarian situation and food. It seems that the highest prices are being charged there at the moment. There is no flour. I can take notice of this....

[Announcer, interrupting] That was probably the reason behind such a question. [words indistinct]

[Izetbegovic] It is also a message to the local official there, so they can perhaps take a hard look at what they are doing if their citizens are making these complaints. I will take notice. All I can say is that tomorrow I will phone them in Zenica, and I will draw the government's attention to the complaints we have heard tonight.

[Announcer] One of our viewers asks: When will we dispense with municipal officials?

[Izetbegovic] I do not know. In what sense? Municipal officials are needed and will be needed in every situation....

[Announcer, interrupting] Is it your impression—you have toured extensively throughout our territory—that these municipal officials have now seized too much power?

[Izetbegovic] I believe that the viewer is right inasmuch that we also have realized that municipalities are attempting, due to this existing isolation, due to the fact that we had absolutely no communications until a few months ago [sentence as heard]. Municipalities had gone independent. They turned into statelets of sorts. We have realized this, and now we are trying, if possible, to trim that kind of autonomy a bit, to consolidate the state as this would be in everyone's interest. Municipalities have begun to conduct themselves in a self-interested way. It will not give the electricity if it has the electricity, or it will not give flour if it has flour, etc. I believe that the new government is trying to tackle this issue and that they are doing something.

You know how difficult it is to reclaim power from those who have seized it? It is easier to press the cork into the bottle than to take it out.

[Izetbegovic] A lady from Zenica asks: Are municipal authorities authorized to impound privately owned goods? Well, here we have Zenica again. It is indicative....

[Izetbegovic, interrupting] It is indicative. This is all coming from Zenica. Yes, there are some situations, although they have to be explicitly listed under the law. There are some cases, but I am not sure whether the number of these cases is high. Only in exceptional cases, of course, can the state interfere with private property. Only in exceptional situations.

[Announcer] What are the plans for central Bosnia, for Maglaj? We also have many questions about other areas. Will anything be done about the lifting of the blockade of Tesanj, Teslic, Maglaj, and the free territory of Doboj? When and how will this happen? How can the people there be helped?

[Izetbegovic] Of course, these are military issues, and soldiers would hold it against me if I revealed their plans. However, the soldiers have faced that issue of lifting the blockade of Maglaj for days. As far as aid to Maglaj is concerned, we have tried to push convoys through. We have done everything we could—sometimes even what we should not have done—in order to send them the convoys. The other day we managed to get a convoy through to the very entrance to Maglaj but, as you know, some civilians allegedly stopped the convoy at the very last checkpoint. The convoy returned to Zenica, and then to Belgrade.

[Announcer] The UNHCR says that people there are dying of starvation. The other day almost 10 people (?died).

[Izetbegovic] Yes, they know that. That is when we intervened. They increased the amount of air-dropped aid because this is more or less what Maglaj survives on. The air drops—aid dropped by parachutes—were increased. We ensured that aid is dropped and that it is dropped in the right place because it used to fall all over the place. There have been fewer mistakes recently. We are trying to send convoys, but sometimes we are completely powerless.

With regard to lifting the blockade, that is an issue that is on the agenda.

[Announcer] We have a question here by a soldier who has fought since the first day of the war. Could the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have done more and liberated more territories? I think that this question is very interesting—all the more so since we had to liberate all territories. When we remember what happened in the beginning of the war—the total occupation and all the corps of the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] that took control of almost all of our republic—it is obvious that we, after all, liberated everything we have now ourselves.

[Izetbegovic] Yes, that soldier used the right word when he said that we could have liberated more territory than we have. Practically, we have liberated all the territory we have today.

The people of Sarajevo know that best. There were six or seven barracks here from which the JNA had to be expelled. JNA soldiers were wandering around the city until 2 May. The situation was the same throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could we have done more? Perhaps it is not the time now to assess that. You know, one always asks oneself whether one could have done more, what would have happened had one done something different.

A few days ago I listened to one of their high-ranking generals, who said that they could have captured Sarajevo. He made this claim and went as far as giving details of how the Serbs showed themselves as cowards and saying that they should have done specific things on a day when he had asked them to in order to cut Sarajevo in two. I remember those days, and [words indistinct]. That is when there was fighting around the Marshal Tito barracks. We negotiated for them to hand over the barracks. Their other generals did not allow that. What we agreed on during the day was undone at night. A general goes to Lukavica, comes back, and says that the agreement was changed. They tried to cut the city in two in that area.

They can regret this and say that they failed to do something. We can say that we could have had Ilidza with a little bit more perseverance. Ilidza would have been ours if we had reacted at the right moment. You

know that we were in Ilidza. I mention only Ilidza, but the viewer who asked the question did not refer only to Sarajevo but also to other areas. I just wanted to illustrate that we could have done more in certain areas. We know that in Sarajevo we may have been able to keep Ilidza if we had sent only about 100 to 200 people at the right moment; however, there is no second chance there. We lost Ilidza. We did not react in time, and people had to withdraw. We could have had Ilidza, and the situation would perhaps be completely different.

[Announcer] [passage indistinct]

[Izetbegovic] A list of mistakes, of unlikely successes, and strange failures will probably be drawn up later. I think that there will be many more successes that will surprise people than failures. However, it is certain that there have been failures that could have been prevented—such as the fall of Doboj and Trnovo. Commissions have been set up to analyze this, as well as the incident on Igman. Did it have to happen? All circumstances indicate that it did not have to happen and that it was due to personal shortcomings.

[Announcer] One of our viewers asks about the military situation and the further organization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

[Izetbegovic] All I can say is that the Army is being constantly worked on in the sense that it is being strengthened, and that discipline is being stepped up. This is very important; there are no everlasting commanders. You will see. There will soon be a series of personnel changes in the Army. They are being prepared at the moment. I think that the decisions will be reached in two or three days. We are constantly trying to improve the situation in the Army by introducing changes, by promoting and appointing people who have proved themselves, by removing and replacing people who were not good, and by appointing to front lines and commanding positions those people who have proved to be good. Naturally, personnel issues are very delicate and difficult, and all sorts of mistakes can be made, but we are trying to improve the situation by constantly changing people. We also step up discipline.

The political department is active. They have recently issued a series of very useful booklets. Every army must have a political platform. It must know what it wants and how it plans to fight. Therefore, big steps have been made in that respect.

Foreigners have acknowledged that this is a real army. Of course, there is a lot more to do. I have mentioned the specific things that we are doing at the moment. We are working on the strengthening of Army personnel by making certain changes.

[Announcer] Various newspapers—I read some new papers that have appeared in Sarajevo—recently criticized the Army leadership, especially the people who have come from the former Yugoslav People's Army. I think that there were a lot of unjust accusations.

[Izetbegovic] It would be inappropriate for me to assess this publicly. You would like to know what our strategy is? Our strategy is to create in peacetime a small and very effective army. Not a numerically large army, but a very effective, well-equipped, and well-trained army. Perhaps even a professional army, which will not have more than 20,000 to 30,000 personnel. Our army currently has something over 200,000 people because we are at war.

[Announcer] An army that can, with the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], defend everything we create?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, it can defend everything. At the moment, we are trying to have as many mobile units as possible in the Army. Most units were not mobile. The Army is very large, and it can defend areas to which it is attached. Now we want to create mobile units; in fact, we are already creating them. There already is a certain number of mobile units, which is increasing every day. In any event, the perspective of our country is to create a small, effective, well-armed, well-equipped, and well-trained army.

[Announcer] What about members of the Patriotic League before the war? How can they survive in such conditions, with the humanitarian aid they receive?

[Izetbegovic] With difficulty.

[Announcer] Soldiers and the wounded from the Patriotic League organized a meeting in Zenica, also attended by the families of the dead soldiers. Who takes care of them?

[Izetbegovic] That is one of the elements of our state of affairs seen realistically. Some people here euphorically set some impossible goals without taking into account the actual state of affairs. Unfortunately, we who receive reports every day know the real state of affairs. It could be described—especially morale—as unusually high. The people's morale is surprisingly high—their readiness to fight and sacrifice themselves. On the other hand, of course, we have problems with food and the so-called (?MTS). We do not hide that.

Speaking about arms, we capture most of them, we produce some of them, and we import some. We are trying various paths to get something in, but that has been reduced recently because we are under a complete blockade. So—talking about the Army—we provide most weapons by capturing them from the enemy. These are not negligible amounts, but rather large quantities—sometimes very large—because they have a lot of weapons, and our actions occasionally yield results. We capture a certain amount of ammunition and arms, and we also make some.

[Announcer] Well, we have been talking for over an hour, let us take a look at humanitarian aid. The situation is extremely grave. You have singled out Zenica, central Bosnia. I would also add Sarajevo and eastern Bosnia to this list. What is going with regard to humanitarian aid?

[Izetbegovic] I do not have to conceal that this was a case.... [pauses] At some stages, humanitarian aid has been used as a method of pressing us. There was a drop in deliveries, you know. A person who regulates them, who holds the tap, turned them down a little so that we could feel what hunger and cold was and, hence, be more pliable regarding some concessions, political concessions. You could feel it on the ground. There has been no abundance of anything since the outbreak of war. In many places, however, the shortages had already reached a critical point.

It came as a result of this trickling tap policy of humanitarian aid, covered by some excuses to the effect that nothing could be done—that due to one attack in one location there could be no deliveries for a month, or an airport would be closed, Sarajevo airport, for example. Central Bosnia was in a very serious situation in some periods. I believe that, in that respect, conditions will get somewhat better and that perhaps we have already experienced the worst phase. It is no longer such a grave threat. We have been tested. We are leaving this winter, an icy winter, behind us.

We have refused to make unprincipled political concessions. I believe that they have not yielded any result, and I believe that this method will no longer be used. That is provided, of course, that our impression is correct that it was a result of what we perceive as deliberate moves. They claim that this was not the case, that it was a result of some other circumstances—snow, lack of safety, etc.

Let us wait and see. All in all, I believe that this method will no longer be used, so there will be a more positive situation in the near future in that regard. That is all the more so because the snow will melt away. You have mentioned the convoys that have arrived. There is also a huge delivery that is yet to arrive; it is expected to arrive from the direction of Split and Zagreb. It is being organized by a combination of Muslim and Catholic humanitarian organizations....

[Announcer, interrupting] [word indistinct] Mr. Separovic while he was in Sarajevo?

[Izetbegovic] There are huge amounts of food. It is available there. It only has to be transported. We have a transport problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

That is why we are making these efforts to calm down the situation on the ground. It is something people should know. Food must come. That is our imperative. At the moment, this is the law above all laws; food must reach Bosnia.

[Announcer] Could we have done more? We know our situation with regard to necessities—gas, electricity, etc. We know how everything goes. Yet we have no oil, no logs. For example, we are distributing humanitarian aid beans, although most elderly people and those who are all alone have no means of cooking these beans.

[Izetbegovic] I would not say that we could have done more. We even reached a point when we were ready to buy heating fuel from the chetniks. We even authorized someone to carry this out, to [words indistinct]. They spotted it and changed their mind. They did not want to give wood to us. That is how far we went because we feared that people would be dying in the cold.

Luckily enough, this has been a rather mild winter, except for the past few days. When it was at its harshest in December and January, however, we went as far as this. We believed that one day we would be able to explain to the people why we bought wood from the chetniks. Well, put simply, it was so you do not die from exposure here. They, however, cancelled it at the last moment. Hence, we had come close to and perhaps gone beyond the limit of—shall I say—the permissible in order to come up with a solution.

What we could have done, though, ... [pauses] We have now created a program. Last year—perhaps the general public does not know this—we imported a huge quantity of seed on time. This year we have drawn up again a program according to which every square meter will be sown. A draft law has now been set in motion that.... [pauses] There is a great deal of abandoned land, particularly in central Bosnia and in the Bosnia valley. People have fled. We are not going to tolerate this land not being cultivated. We are going to introduce a law so as to enable municipalities to give this land on temporary loan, for one year only. It would be extended every year for as long as the war goes on. Municipalities will give a plot of land and seeds to refugees. This will be far from any kind of advanced agriculture. There is no fuel for the tractors. People will have to sow in an old-fashioned way.

The government is doing its best to make sure that not a single patch remains unsown—whatever land is under the government's control—so we can end up with a maximum harvest of vegetables.

Last year we did a great deal, and partly thanks to this we had enough potatoes, a considerable amount of fruit was picked. As you know, there were enough vegetables....

[Announcer, interrupting] On balconies.

[Izetbegovic] Yes, on balconies etc. We distributed it systematically. However, humanitarian aid was not in our hands. What was up to us was not to create disruptions in the delivery of humanitarian aid. This is why people think we were subservient in a sense—we did not want to bring about a situation in which there would be no humanitarian aid.

[Announcer] Talking here, let us tell people whether there will be any improvements in gas, electricity, opening special corridors—you said very little about this. Are the United Nations, UNPROFOR going to take control of the gas valves, waterworks, and suchlike?

[Izetbegovic] We have a crisis headquarters, headed by Ganic. There are some other people, civilian and military people, civilian experts in this body. They are tasked with examining, in cooperation with UNPROFOR, how to open up Sarajevo in such a way that there will be benefits rather than damage from this opening up.

Many people perhaps have not much idea about the kind of damage that may ensue. There are some very problematic things that might arise from the opening of the city. We will be striving to open up the city in a way that will benefit the city without problems arising from this. Electricity, I believe, will soon return. It, electric power, has gradually stabilized at 20 MW. We used to have 20, and then it would drop to 6, to zero, and then back to 6 etc. Things have stabilized somewhat in this respect. We nevertheless believe that we will soon be able to get 70.

If there are no extraordinary circumstances, this will probably take place toward the end of this week. Saturday, Sunday we may get an extra 50 KW. This will make it possible for a considerable number of Sarajevans to receive electric power, at least four hours a day. This is what the power network expects.

As for gas, we are sometimes in a very difficult situation, we are on the brink of turning it off altogether. The Serb side is playing a game with this gas. We are in a position to cut their gas as well as our own. We can do it at any time if the amount of gas here in Sarajevo falls below a certain minimum level.

They are, however, holding us in what our people describe as a situation of too little to live on, too much to die. There is not enough gas. These quantities are, however, not so small as to make it sensible for us to cut it off altogether. The bakery would be then threatened etc. As far as gas goes, I am not really certain that there will be soon any improvements. I do not believe there will be any improvements soon.

[Announcer] What is the Presidency and government going to do about the disastrous humanitarian situation in Kakanj? Is it possible to do something more about the delivery of baby food to Zenica?

[Izetbegovic] I can only say that there is a committee working on the matter. They are doing their best but humanitarian aid is not in our hands.

[Announcer] We have four identical questions here: Is Tuzla airport to be opened? If so, when?

[Izetbegovic] If you want my prediction, I believe that the airport will be open. At some point my prediction was late February or early March. I still cling to this prediction—late February or early March.

[Announcer] We have already heard some hints. As far as I know, I heard it today, the airport is supposed to officially reopen on 7 March, so it seems you are right.

[Izetbegovic] Yes, but I made my prediction 15, 20 days ago, if you remember that occasion.

[Announcer] Let us go back to some other matters. What about Serb artillery in Ahatovici, Butilo, Paljevo, Rajlovac, in other words, behind Stup?

[Izetbegovic] According to some reports, well, in any case artillery has been either removed beyond the 20-km radius or placed under [UNPROFOR] control. There is the odd abandoned artillery piece that is being collected by UNPROFOR....

[Announcer, interrupting] [words indistinct] some districts.

[Izetbegovic] Except those pieces that are hidden, those pieces that are possibly hidden underground. In all probability UNPROFOR will spot or has already spotted these abandoned artillery pieces, and transfer them by helicopter and group them in certain locations.

[Announcer] In some five places, if I am not wrong.

[Izetbegovic] It was first assembled in eight places and they are now regrouping it in five places. As Mr. [name indistinct] said last night, they need to tighten, as they put it, the battlefield, in order to ease their control. I do not think that we will have any problems in that respect. Some artillery pieces have definitely been sent to Kiseljak, according to some information that we have. It was sold or given away there. Some of their weapons most probably ended up there.

[Announcer] As they have been doing so far, they have been selling their artillery.

[Izetbegovic] We have such reports, I must admit they are not confirmed, but came from very reliable sources.

[Announcer] What will happen to the heavy artillery after two years, a viewer asks. I think that the fate of it will be resolved before that.

[Izetbegovic] The fate of the weaponry once peace is restored is not resolved at the moment. We do not know what will happen to the artillery. Of course, we will request that it be destroyed. That will be the best solution.

[Announcer] What are the prospects for the return of refugees? Now we could mention all the refugees, but a viewer from Zagreb has raised this question in particular. When is this going to be possible?

[Izetbegovic] Refugees are one of our main motives in our painstaking negotiations with Croatia, following so many unsuccessful negotiations—and now we are again doing the same. It is our feeling that without an agreement with Croatia we cannot return the refugees. Roads are closed, airports are closed. They should be enabled to go somewhere, to travel along the road from Split to Sarajevo. Hence, our refugees are our main motive in these negotiations as we are trying in one way or another to reach some agreement with Croatia.

It is our desire to enable as soon as possible these people to return. Since this cease-fire in Sarajevo went into effect I have been receiving hundreds of letters and messages saying that people would like to return to the city. They want to know how they can return. In my replies I write of course as much as I can, as I cannot reply to every letter, that they should be patient for some time. The return of these refugees will nevertheless have to be done via Croatia and via the Ploce-Mostar-Sarajevo road or the Split -Sarajevo road. We must reach some agreement on this matter. This is a kind of imperative we have tasked ourselves with, we are tasked with solving this issue. First, we would, of course, withdraw the refugees from Croatia.

[Announcer] Talking about this, the question also arises of returning people to the strip here along the Drina river in particular, i.e. eastern Bosnia, including the question of why Foca has been bypassed in all the negotiations so far on drawing eventual borders. Why is it not included in the 15 disputed areas although Foca always had a majority Muslim population? After all, this point was raised in Geneva, as far as I remember, including the majority Muslim populations in eastern Bosnia as per the 1991 census [sentence as heard]. What is the present position of this entire area in the negotiations?

[Izetbegovic] We have a basic, rather broad formula. We say, give us back our areas, our land and you will have peace—this is our message to the other side. When we say our areas, we refer to those areas where the Bosnian population was in the majority according to the 1991 census.

[Announcer] Cajnice, Foca, Rudo, Visegrad [words indistinct] are of strategic importance to us....

[Izetbegovic, interrupting] In Cajnice we unfortunately were not in the majority....

[Announcer, interrupting] What about Rogatica, for example, where we were?

[Izetbegovic] We demand that they are given back. According to this formula we advocate—it was the Assembly's position too, if you remember, this is precisely how it is formulated—we can demand our majority areas. And we will demand them. We are determinedly carrying on in this direction, we have not been giving in, as you know, during over one year of negotiations. This is our message again. This was the instruction given to Silajdzic before he left for these talks. For now it is impossible to predict how the negotiations will end because various great powers are at play here. We, however, cannot give up this principle. It is a kind of platform passed by the assembly.

[Announcer] Can the presidency do something to help the Muslims who are still in Banja Luka? Yesterday, we saw some footage of dead people, they were killed there?

[Izetbegovic] Hardly anything. What we can do and what we are doing at the moment is to inform international organizations and the public, international organizations in particular, as it is their duty to take care of this. Regretfully, I have to state, though, that it is not an effective method.

Nobody is ready to react, verbally yes, but not to take concrete measures. They deem that for this reason they imposed the sanctions against Serbia but are not ready to enter Banja Luka and liberate those people. Whether we will ever be able to do that is open to question.

[Announcer] A question from Sipovo. When are we going to return home? What will happen to the western part of Herzegovina? The association of citizens of Grbavica and Vrace asks when they are going to return home. There are very many question of this sort.

[Izetbegovic] As to Grbavica and Vrace, I think that a while ago I replied to that question. The situation there is somewhat clearer than that regarding Sipovo or Banja Luka.

[Announcer] Now, toward the end of the program, some more questions remain to be answered. I think they are interesting, but I think it is primarily up to our government to reply to them. If you are ready, may we reply to them as well? What does the Presidency think about students drafted into the army? Will it enable them to continue the school year 1993-94? Are you thinking about sending some exceptional students from Sarajevo who have been admitted to some universities in Europe and elsewhere in the world? Finally, once educated, they are going to be useful as experts.

[Izetbegovic] In that respect we have to be very cautious in what we are doing. We should neither stop the process of education of talented people who can obtain education, nor on the other hand should be approach that process too liberally, because by this means we are weakening our army. Not because of the departure of a couple of dozen people, but because people here ask the question of who will defend the country, why should some people go to live and study comfortably in America or Turkey and so on, while we are getting killed here and so on.

That is a very delicate issue. I think that in this respect a rational solution must be found. We must not be left without cadres, because we will not get far. One day we will restore peace, we will have a state, that state and society need educated people. No state can do without them. No state can allow itself such luxury as to be left without any educated cadres. Therefore, perhaps we will have to examine that issue with great sensibility in such a way as to send the real talents abroad to acquire education. We should not turn down scholarships that have been offered. However, those to be sent abroad should be people who have fought over the past two years and who made their contribution, to be able to be withdrawn from the army. I think that people who did not fight should not enjoy such a privilege. But, by this I am not giving a final reply. Of course, this is a question that needs to be examined well.

[Announcer] Have you been informed about shooting in Sandzak over the past two days and the fluid situation in Bijelo Polje?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, I know. As you know we have drawn attention to the situation in Sandzak. We have done what can be done in this respect. I think that we have sent a letter to the UN Security Council, asking it to examine the situation in the light of the latest developments, the escalation of terror there. We will have to warn the Security Council to do something.

However, with regard to the experience that Bosnia has had with the Security Council in this connection, I think that we should not count on them to take any effective measures. I do not believe they would. As regards Sandzak, our strategy will be to try to tie it to the Bosnian problem. Therefore we put forward an initiative for a wider conference, some called it the Balkan conference. We advocated that standpoint in order to gain the chance to put the Sandzak issue on the agenda. It should not remain on the sidelines. We cannot tackle it within the resolution of the Bosnian issue. We can only tackle it if we extend it. In any case, regardless of the resolution of the situation in Bosnia, at one time the whole thing will have to be discussed in a wider context; at least, the complex including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia.

The issue of Sandzak, as soon as we deem it possible to do so, will be linked to the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina; we will try to resolve it in a package. In the meantime we can draw the attention of the international public and the relevant organizations to the violation of human rights.

[Announcer] When we are already talking about [words indistinct], can I ask you about Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], how do you view the blockade of the Macedonian borders and how do you view the possibility of the deployment of fresh U.S. troops in that republic. Would that be a chance for the Bosnia-Herzegovina issue to be resolved more quickly?

[Izetbegovic] We have condemned the latest moves by Greece against Macedonia, which is an independent and sovereign state. That was also done by the European public, but I do not think that they did enough in this regard. But, still, the international public and the international community have condemned Greece. However, Greece did not find it appropriate to rectify its behaviour. That is, indeed, a regrettable act.

I do not think that fresh American soldiers will be deployed down there. Anyhow, their number is only symbolic, but completely sufficient to make an attack on them an attack on the United States. That is very clear [words indistinct] the message is very clear. It is not important whether there are 300 or 600 soldiers [words indistinct]. I think that a military action against Macedonia cannot be expected.

[Announcer] Do you believe the war will end in May, a viewer from Tuzla asks. We are nearly at the end of the program, may I ask you what your prediction is, what will happen in the 23d and 24th month of the aggression against our country?

[Izetbegovic] I have to tell you [words indistinct]. I do not have the feeling that the war will end that quickly. I do not have that feeling. It would be good, we are in favor of restoring peace here as soon as possible. However, our objective is a fair peace—I do not think we can expect it in a month or two. Peace at any price could be signed tomorrow. We have to fight a bit more to restore a fair peace, we have to work toward it a bit longer, we still need some more time.

[Announcer] A message for the Sarajevans. Let us end as we started, can this situation be considered a nucleus of our free country Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] Sarajevo is very important [passage indistinct].

Delegation Leaves for Washington Negotiations

LD2502133294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Excerpts] Three Croatian politicians have left Frankfurt for Washington following an invitation from U.S. Secretary of Warren Christopher, including Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign affairs minister. Mate Granic is to have talks tomorrow with U.S. Government representatives and with his U.S. counterpart Warren Christopher.

A Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna delegation is traveling together with Minister Granic. It is led by Kresimir Zubak, president of the Presidential Council [of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna] and justice and administration minister. Presidential Council member Mile Akmadzic is also traveling with him.

In Washington they are going to discuss a possible agreement between Croats and Muslims and putting an end to the war. [passage omitted]

The Croatian side will display a high degree of flexibility and will do everything for a Croat-Muslim agreement to be reached, in which the United States and the European Union are interested, most of all the Croat and the Muslim nations, Minister Granic said in Frankfurt this afternoon. We will bear in mind that the fundamental interests of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be completely protected. We have won support for our stands from numerous important European countries. We are beginning the negotiations in good faith that an agreement is possible, and that reaching an agreement would mean the beginning of the end of the war and the restoration of a permanent peace. This agreement would give a chance to the third side [Serbs] to take their standpoint toward a future life together in Bosnia-Herzegovina that will be based on equality of the three nations, Minister Granic stated for Croatian media prior to his departure from Frankfurt.

Western Slavonija Protests Blocked Bridge

LD2402192494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1742 GMT 24 Feb 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Banja Luka, Feb 24 (TANJUG)—The local authorities of the Serb-held region of western Slavonija on Thursday requested from the U.N. Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) command and Yasushi Akashi to immediately order the deblockade of the bridge over the Sava river, close to Stara Gradiska, and warned that the population of the region will no longer tolerate such conduct which is pushing them towards death.

The Stara Gradiska bridge links the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK—formed by the local Serbs in parts of Croatia where they are in the majority in response to Croatia's secession from the former Yugoslav Federation), and the Srpska republic (RS) in the territory of ex-Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"By blocking the Pakrac-Okucani-Gradiska route, viewed by the Serb people as their sole lifeline, UNPROFOR has severed the supply of food and humanitarian aid, and halted the transport of the seriously ill to medical centres in RS and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," says the protest letter.

The letter asks whether "the peacekeepers were deployed in this region to maintain a cease-fire and help in establishing a lasting and just peace, or if they were brought in to threaten the Serb people."

RSK Deputy Prime Minister Branko Lubovac told Serbian radio Obrenovac that the Serb side fully controls the situation on the bridge and expressed hope that it will be resolved in a peaceful way, which depends on UNPROFOR.

He said that the Serbs have always been willing to take part in a dialogue and expressed hope that Friday's top level meeting between the representatives of RSK and UNPROFOR will give concrete solutions to the current situation.

Over 4,000 U.N. troops from Jordan, Argentina and Nepal have been deployed in western Slavonija, which is within the sector west of the U.N. Protected Area (UNPA).

Discussions on Blockade

LD2402162094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1520 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Feb (TANJUG)—Colonel Mark Wood, special envoy of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] commander for the former Yugoslavia, Jean Cot, today talked in Knin to representatives of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] about the problem of the Okucani bridge.

Citing unofficial sources, SRNA [news agency] says that the bridge near Okucani linking RSK and the Srpska republic will be discussed tomorrow in Belgrade by Yasushi Akashi, special envoy of Butrus-Ghali, and RSK President Milan Martic.

This morning at about 0530 UNPROFOR units completely blocked all roads between western Slavonia and this bridge. The "blue helmets" denied access even to trucks carrying bread.

Several hundred citizens gathered at about 1100 near the bridge to protest against this blockade.

As we have unofficially learned in Knin, the members of the RSK ministry for internal affairs, who control the bridge, have no intention of abandoning it. At today's talks Colonel Wood received an offer whereby members of UNPROFOR may control the bridge along with Krajina's police, SRNA says.

UN Troops Take Control

LD2402184094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Sources close to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] have said that the bridge across the Sava river, forcibly taken over by Serb paramilitary units on 18 February, is again under the control of UN peacekeeping forces. The bridge was taken over without incident and remains closed to Bosnia-bound traffic until further notice.

Serbian Krajina, Croatia Extend Truce

94P20404B Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 94 p 5

[Article by J.B.: "Truce Extended"]

[Text] Two days ago in Knin representatives of the general staff of the Serbian Krajina army signed the second consecutive agreement to extend the Christmas truce.

The first extension of the truce, signed on 13 January 1994 at the Turanj border crossing near Karlovac, expired last midnight. The second, newly signed extension is only a continuation of the previously signed agreements, and it will be in effect until the end of February.

This signing in Knin two days ago was mediated by UNPROFOR representatives, as was the previous signing in Zagreb.

This latest agreement, according to the general staff of the Serbian army of Krajina, provides for a cease-fire and readiness to continue negotiations until a general cease-fire is achieved.

Armed clashes on the Knin front have significantly decreased since 23 December of last year, when the Christmas truce took effect. Croatian forces at the Benkovac-Zadar front did not observe the cease-fire. Military clashes in this North Dalmatian theater continued almost uninterrupted, but they are considerably less intense than before.

Commentary: FRY Should Be 'Fully Isolated'

AU2302133094 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 13 Feb 94 p 2

[Commentary by Roman Latkovic: "Dumb Gambler Playing Roulette"]

[Text] If a miracle happens and NATO really gets going, on the expiration of the 10th day of the ultimatum for the Serbs—who have been killing both Sarajevo and its inhabitants (and thousands of other innocent victims who are not "fortunate" enough to be in front of television cameras) for almost two years, not fearing that they will be punished—those couple of hours necessary for Western state-of-the-art airplanes to destroy "possible 200 to 300 targets," will finally show that "the big world" has been participating in the crimes that Serbia has committed in this unfortunate land of ours. For the potentates of this world have been silent, silent in deed, while Vukovar was dying, Dubrovnik bleeding, and no one did anything to save Nustar and Dalj, Skrabrnja and Bjeljina, Mostar and Zadar, Karlovac and Gospic. Belgrade fascists—who call upon us on the occasion of "normalization" of relations, while their mines and chetniks still kill our people—have done so much evil and aroused so much hatred, soaked our land with so much blood and suffering. They had a free hand to "calm" former Yugoslavia and tailor-make it for values of the outdated world system, whether a "new" one or suddenly an "old" one, and since they cannot stop, as with every other fascism, for their evil is their sustenance, their evil that lives on other people's happiness and lives, perhaps, only perhaps, the time has come to stop them. [sentence as published]

And that is why this "ultimatum" to the Serbs, in spite of all the diplomatic negotiations, games, and child's play of the poor world politics that never had an ounce of morality, is an attempt to stop the horror that brings unease through television to happier homes all over the world. And since it is clear to everybody that we cannot even dream of procedures like putting Great Britain on trial for assisting the genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina accused Britain on those grounds), and we can therefore not expect to see potentates "of the big world" put on trial, those who only brought shame upon themselves and their countries by talking much without saying anything, while hundreds of thousands of innocent people were injured or killed throughout former Yugoslavia (except in Serbia, of course), but ONE MUST insist on putting on trial, in a new Nuremberg or Tokyo, those who are directly responsible for the war and the horror they arranged.

The Mud of Common Destruction

If this world wants a future in which, for example, Zhirinovskiy will not be a threat, in contrast to a future that, for the time being, seems to be controlled by people like Milosevic, Husayn, Karadzic, al-Qadhdhafi... then we must do everything to radically change the relations that rule the world today. The victims of the new fascism in the middle of Europe, and Croatia was the first, must provide the nucleus from which a new understanding of the future will originate. We will never be able to arbitrate like a Bill Clinton or a Butrus Butrus-Ghali and really influence global relations. But small as we are, we have an enormous strength as a VICTIM (never mind the fact that, due to Tudjman's politics, we have almost been put in the same basket with the aggressor and gambled away our victim status like a dumb gambler playing roulette) and the strength of justice that is on our side. Fascists like Slobodan Milosevic, madmen like Radovan Karadzic, or mass murderers like Ratko Mladic must not be put in a position where other people will listen to what they have to say. Except in the dock during a fair trial—that incredible advantage that not a

single inhabitant of Vukovar, Sarajevo, or any other miserable person from Josip Jovic onward, did not have. The future of the world, with its interdependence that gives us the chance to snicker at the black U.S. soldier who "took a spill" when disembarking in Somalia and a chance for the French political public to again "shudder with indignation" at the latest massacre in Sarajevo, is not a future that can guarantee peace and progress if fascists go unpunished. The appearance of Zhirinovskiy, the voracity of Belgrade's greater Serbian madness, the possible blood-lust of "mother Russia" for Belarus and other parts of the former Soviet Union (even the "democratic" favorite of the West, Boris Yeltsin, used tanks to destroy his parliament in the name of that very same "democracy"), the starvation in Africa, the silence of China, and the latent Latin-American timebomb—are a part of the same evil potential that can crush us down into the mud of common destruction.

Serbia—Infectious Patient

Croatia must be changed (both its political map and the people who created it, with a shame that should not be shared) and the time has come when it is perhaps discernible that the brutal killing and exile of people who have no way to protect themselves will not be tolerated indefinitely; Croatia must be the part of the "crisis" on the territory of former Yugoslavia that, as an active factor, will stand on firm foundations defending human dignity! Human rights, freedom, the immutability of borders, not permitting the legalization of "ethnic cleansing" (the most horrible conceivable genocide in which the euphemism "cleansing" is no less horrible, as if it were "Dash" or "Ariel" [laundry detergents] and not slaughter and destruction), and punishing the guilty are principles one MUST insist on if we want to break a deadlock that permits the killing of civilians. The road is clear.

Serbia must be further and fully isolated, as every infectious patient is. NATO or some other force should be deployed along its borders (even the token contingent of 300 U.S. soldiers have been an effective protection for Macedonia; the Seseljs and Arkans of the Serbian madness can enjoy themselves destroying defenseless towns and civilians, just as every other coward does, but it is unlikely that they would dare to attack the representatives of the world's only real military force), its military potential must be destroyed, its exports and weapons production must be banned for at least another century, a protectorate over Serbia must be introduced, Milosevic (and Cosic, and the members of SANU [Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts], and Karadzic, and Arkan, and their ilk—there are masses of them...) must be put on trial, and only then, by opening up the media and "normalizing" its inner life, making space for a germ of democracy, we can help that country. It must first repent and pay for its sins and then be given the opportunity to change. And to become democratic. To sober up from its Serbian-ness, from our sea, from Zadar, Plitivice, Vukovar, from all those "Serbian republics" and to start living a dignified life.

Resembling Its Enemy

Until then, there will be no happiness. The present Serbia, the fascist monster made of crime, the chetnik movement, and the plunderers, will do everything to survive, and in that—in addition to some ambiguous statements, to say the least, of some minor Russian personalities—it is helped by this kind of Croatian politics. THERE IS NO "normalization" of relations with fascism, and THERE SHOULD BE NO "normalization" when the rope around the neck of that fascism is tightening still. For, no matter what the "big world" is doing and regardless of the extent of vested interests at stake, interests that tacitly support Serbian crimes, those crimes will not stop. Too much blood has spilt across the borders of Europe and the world, and there is too much blood on the hands of all those Milosevics to be able to tighten the rope without getting blood on our hands too—whether we "normalize" relations or not.

While Serbia is breaking down in misery and moral decay, and while its only strength is the strength of its weapons (which it keeps using against us, taking the whole world for a ride, the world that swore "Never again!" when it was punishing fascists), while there are sanctions and while, for the first time, it is being seriously threatened, Serbia does not deserve anything else but for us to work for its final defeat.

That country lost this war long time ago. On human, moral, ethical, military grounds, if you will. And all it has "conquered" are charred remnants of bloodshed and houses and they mirror its chetnik fascism perfectly. Croatia, as its first victim, and therefore historically responsible for the outcome of our "crisis," must not look in that mirror and see that it resembles its enemy. Croatia must regain its allies, be it the Bosnians, the Albanians, the Germans, it does not matter, by re-establishing just relations on which future good neighborly relations with Serbia will be founded. There will be no justice and happiness if we contribute to Milosevic's "conference-making" in Geneva, etc., instead of in Nuremberg, and, to save the best for last, round off the journey Milosevic, the high representative of the occupier, began a long time ago in Split, on the island of Brijuni talking to Mr. Tudjman, with a possible visit to Zagreb, on the same road of "normalization" Zeljko Simic, FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] deputy prime minister, paved on our wounded land, as a guest of the Republic of Croatia.

Commentary Views Foreign Involvement in Bosnia

AU2402154294 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 94 p 1

[Commentary by Mirko Galic: "New Division of Interest"]

[Text] Have the Russians come to Bosnia to protect their "Orthodox brothers"? If we judge only by the three raised fingers [symbol of Eastern Orthodoxy, used by Serbian nationalists, and displayed by Russian troops

arriving in Bosnia-Herzegovina], we could be wrong. It is true that the Russian soldiers could not help their hearts (or perhaps they could not help the slivovits either, if they made a stop or two on the way) and that they too—surprised, probably, by the people applauding them—gave vent to their religion. However, Yeltsin is not a religious convert but a statesman who, regardless of the occasional caricatures with which he is described in the West, has the old reflex of his predecessors. Is the greater-Russian opposition pushing him toward imperial waters? Or the military leadership? Or has he himself found this way to put Russia back into world politics again? Yeltsin's egg is difficult to separate from the Russian chicken.

The return of Russia—provided that it is "neither temporary nor accidental," as the best French "Kremlinologists" prove—is radically changing political relations in Europe (and the world). Some strategists are jumping the gun in declaring "a new era of bipolarity," just like the one before the Berlin Wall came down. It is still better to wait: Can Russia, if it is not able to follow its imperial pretensions economically, be a "world factor" in some other way apar from by threatening a global conflict one more time? The latest experience from Bosnia induced Paris LE MONDE to speak about "the taste of the Cold War." Fortunately, only "the taste," for the present leaders in Moscow are far too dependent on Western connections to take the ultimate risk.

After the "tragic helplessness" throughout "Yugoslav crisis," Europe can do nothing but admit that it was given a three-year free play by the United States to stop the war on its territory, but could not do it. It remained a "political dwarf," as it does not have the means (the army) to realize its ambitions. Gradually, persuaded by Europe (or France) among other things, the United States is getting back into Europe, but as the only superpower, not just as an ally. Has it, as a tugboat, following the logic of the "old situation," pulled Russia along as well? A couple of years ago, when Moscow was disoriented, the United States would probably not have managed to pull it along, at least not so fast and efficiently. The way the "Russian phoenix" is rising from the ashes (according to Mrs. D'Encausse, the first to predict the collapse of the former empire) shows that it has the strength, or thinks that it has. Anyhow, Russia is here to save its friends, but also to protect its interests.

Does that create a new concept of European balance? One concept disintegrated with the fall of the Berlin Wall. How to build another one, without making it "a new Yalta"? Can one determine the borders of interest of "a new West" and "a new East" in the Balkans, for example, since we are talking about "Russian interests"?

Russia's entry onto the Bosnian scene is, in the eyes of many, to do with creating a new balance. Perhaps with creating a new division (of interests) as well.

Gligorov Sends Message to Papandreou

AU2402153594 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 24 Feb 94 pp 1-2

["Text" of message by President Kiro Gligorov to Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in Skopje on 23 February: "Normalization of Mutual Relations Is of Lasting Interest"]

[Text] Skopje, 23 February 94

Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister:

After today's talks with Hans van den Broek, EU commissioner for foreign affairs, and with his kindness, I would like to introduce you to the views of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] regarding finding solutions to the present problems in relations with the Republic of Greece.

The Republic of Macedonia, an independent country and a member of the United Nations, is deeply interested in constructing relations and cooperation with all its neighbors on the basis of good neighborliness and in the interest of peace and stability in the region. In that sense, we are interested in a broader development of relations and cooperation with the neighboring Republic of Greece, which is of multifold interest to both sides.

For that sake, we are encouraged to do our best to create conditions for the normalization of our mutual relations in a principled way and on the basis of equality, as a lasting interest for both countries, and of a larger significance.

On this occasion, I would like to reiterate our readiness to sign an agreement with your country guaranteeing the existing borders between the two countries. If necessary, we are ready to accept the United Nations or the European Union as guarantors of this agreement.

We support the idea of resuming a dialogue between our two countries as soon as possible, without any previous conditions, on the mutual relations and questions of dissent between us, including the use of the symbols, the name, and so on. That dialogue should continue within the framework of the United Nations and with the mediation of Mr. Cyrus Vance. We are ready to involve all necessary efforts to reach adequate and mutually acceptable solutions to the existing problems. Moreover, we highly appreciate the engagement of the European Union, as well as the promptness of other international factors, in finding the best solutions within the framework of the mentioned dialogue. Therefore, I extend a proposal for a meeting between the foreign ministers of our two countries in one of the European capitals, which will function as a dialogue between the two countries.

Mr. Prime Minister, I would particularly like to express our concern about the situation created after the measures undertaken by your government on 16 February this year in relation to our country. The sustenance and the continuation of this situation will cause undesired consequences for the peace and stability in this part of the Balkans, which will undoubtedly lead us to turn to the Security Council. Moreover, due to the European dimension of the problem, the engagement of the CSCE will be indispensable.

I firmly believe that, due to the seriousness of all these issues and the responsibility we are bearing, a way for their fast settlement will be found, on a principled and lasting basis, and in the interests of our two countries and peoples.

With respect,

Kiro Gligorov

Greece's Reply Conveyed

LD2402173594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1633 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Skopje, 24 Feb (TANJUG)—Hans van den Broek, EU commissioner for foreign affairs, arrived in Skopje from Athens this afternoon to convey the Greek reply to a proposal that the Macedonian president sent to Greece yesterday on overcoming the dispute and the lifting of the Greek blockade.

Upon his arrival at Skopje's Petrovac airport, van den Broek stated that he was bringing some positive messages to Kiro Gligorov, president of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], and the government. On the other hand, he added, much remained to be done, but in any case a dialogue must be restored in the forseeable future.

EU Commissioner Views Talks With Gligorov

AU2402153394 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 24 Feb 94 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "Solving Problems Through Dialogue"]

[Text] Hans van den Broek, EU commissioner for international relations, arrived in Skopje yesterday at the request of the EU ministers. Just after his arrival, van den Broek had talks with President Kiro Gligorov. According to the announcement released by the president's cabinet, they exchanged opinions about the present questions in Macedonian-Greek relations and the latest events after the trade embargo embarked on by the Republic of Greece against the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

President Gligorov gave the European commissioner a written message for Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, in which he reiterated the goodwill and preparedness of the Republic of Macedonia to resume talks in the framework of the United Nations, with the assistance of the European Union. The economic damages caused by the Greek embargo and the danger of new tensions in the region were particular subjects of discussion.

EU Commissioner van den Broek made a short statement after the discussions he had with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov regarding the situation created after the Greek embargo and the possible consequences and implications for Macedonia, but also for security and stability in the region.

"We had over two hours of intensive, fruitful discussions and exchanges of opinions with President Gligorov," Mr. van den Broek stated to the numerous journalists. "You know about our mission here—we are here, first of all, to help resume the dialogue between Skopje and Athens on a number of very dangerous and sensitive subjects. We are certainly convinced that the process of normalization in relations between Skopje and Athens is irreplaceable for stability and peace in this part of the region. And I think that both sides are very much aware of that.

"You live here, in a very dangerous part of the world, and it would be very careless if the relations between Skopje and Athens were to escalate the situation in the region," van den Broek said.

"I shall take the message of President Gligorov to Papandreou, whom I expect to meet tomorrow afternoon after my talks with Foreign Minister Papulias this evening, and tomorrow we are leaving for Brussels," said van den Broek.

Minister Warns of Consequences of Blockade

AU2402174894 Skopje MIC in English 24 Feb 94

[Unattributed report: "Grounded Goods—Unforeseeable Consequences"]

[Text] Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Minister of Economy Petrus Stefanov informed the head of the CSCE monitoring mission in Macedonia, Norman Anderson, that vast quantities of goods of vital interest for the Macedonian economy were currently held at the Salonika port and other routes throughout Greece.

During their meeting they also discussed that large quantities of goods which are expected to arrive via Greece in the upcoming period, and concluded that if this situation continued, it would create unforeseeable consequences on the Macedonian economy.

PDP Reaches Agreement With Government

AU2402193694 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 24 Feb 94 p 4

[Article by A. Damovski: "Tranquilization of Coalition Relations"]

[Text] An informal meeting was held three days ago [21 February] in response to a message from Djeladin Murati, PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] president, to Prime Minister Crvenkovski, in which he asked for an urgent government session with the participation of the PDP ministerial group. The meeting was attended by Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] President Kiro Gligorov, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, Parliamentary Chairman Stojan Andov, together with the parliamentary vice chairmen, [Interior] Minister Ljubomir Frckovski, and Risto Ivanov, and the PDP ministerial group. According to all the information available, the misunderstandings in the government coalition were overcome at this meeting.

Let us recall: In his letter to Prime Minister Crvenkovski, Djeladin Murati said that he had learned that the authorities had started a game of dishonest obstruction against the PDP group so as to conceal its approach to the new group from the other congress (Menduh Taci's group), and to hide the support that it was giving to it. The aim was, Murati said in his letter, to eliminate from political life and discredit Albanian delegates and ministers in a perfidious way. Murati thought that there were indications of Interior Ministry involvement, and that if the facts were not examined, "it would be possible to reexamine further activities within the institutions of the system."

Amazingly soon after that, on the next working day, the requested meeting was held and it was concluded that the PDP would remain within the institutions of the system. As an introduction to this conclusion, the visit of the Macedonian state delegation to Albania was mentioned, and, understandably, the alleged forcing of the split within the PDP.

As we know, minister-coordinator Bekir Zuta was a member of the Macedonian delegation that made a recent official visit to Tirana, and the Albanian side demanded his exclusion from the discussions with Albanian President Sali Berisha. The PDP leadership interpreted that as a kind of a shift in policy toward their party.

The second subject discussed at the meeting was the opinion expressed by the PDP about forcing Taci's position via the state media (Taci's interview for Macedonian Television and AFP in Albanian, the reports on the main newscast about the interview, reports of telephone calls with Taci on the main newscast of Macedonian Television, and the contribution of other journalists to the party's division).

The PDP group also brought up the problem of granting citizenship, as well as the great reservations demonstrated by the Macedonian leadership concerning the behavior of the Albanian Embassy in Macedonia, even going so far as to be directly involved in supporting Menduh Taci's faction....

Nonetheless, a certain agreement was reached. There are no more threats to abandon the coalition, the PDP is no longer so upset, and an image is being projected among its membership that their group is being consistent in its efforts to realize their policy goals.

Normalizing Relations With FRY Considered

94P20404A Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 94 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Offer to Belgrade?"]

[Text] Slovene Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle stated yesterday at a news conference that "Slovenia is considering normalizing relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]." According to Peterle, the Slovene Ministry of Foreign Affairs "is actively observing the state of everything that has recently changed in relations between Ljubljana and Belgrade." The diplomatic service in Slovenia is preparing information on what needs to be done to promote contacts between Ljubljana and Belgrade. Peterle pointed out that Slovenia's official position, favoring the normalizing of relations, is in Slovenia's interest, particularly because of the increasingly successful contacts between Zagreb and Belgrade.

Speculation on Early Recall of U.S. Envoy

94P20414A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 94 p 7

[Article by Ranka Kovacevic-Jelic: "Wendt Did Not Play Tennis With Jansa"]

[Excerpts] We could say that nowadays in Slovenia one of the behind-the-scenes battles for power has resulted in a story of two chairs. Figuratively speaking, Milan Kucan, Slovene president and commander in chief of the armed forces, "nearly fell" out of his chair when he heard about the presence of four high-ranking U.S. military officers in Slovenia during a conversation with Allan Wendt, U.S. ambassador to Slovenia. Now the "diplomatic chair" is shaking under Wendt. There are rumors of his recall because of alleged "special relations with the Ministry of Defense."

According to the Ljubljana paper REPUBLIKA, U.S. Ambassador Wendt is to leave Ljubljana in May, before the end of his term. The news is mentioned in the same context as the early recall of Lieutenant Colonel G.E. Lich, head of the U.S. officers group.

The Slovene public learned about the presence of four high-ranking U.S. officers, members of the "liaison group" who have for some time been guests of the Slovene Ministry of Defense, in the middle of last week when Lieutenant Colonel Lich, before his departure, paid a visit to a secretary of the Defense Ministry. President Kucan was not any better informed since he learned about it only a day earlier.

During the talk with Wendt, Kucan expressed interest in details of the "Partnership for Peace" program. He was told that Slovenia meets most political and military requirements, except for technical questions which are being resolved in the Slovene Defense Ministry with the aid of the four high-ranking U.S. officers. President Kucan had no idea this was going on, nor did Prime Minister Drnovsek, who was informed by the commander in chief about the U.S. officers' presence in Jansa's ministry. [passage omitted]

The Slovene power struggle has also divided U.S. officials in Slovenia. Some feel closer to Drnovsek's Liberal Democrats, others to Defense Minister Janez Jansa, who, according to a February DELO poll, is the most popular politician. Regarding DELO, it is interesting that this daily did not report this affair until recently. "Malicious persons" have found an immediate answer, namely, that the Ministry of Defense is trying to solve the housing problem of Tit Dobersek, DELO editor in chief.

Commentary Views Impact of Party Merger

AU2402140794 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 21 Feb 93 p 3

[Commentary by Vladimir Vodusek: "Sad Defeated Foes"]

[Text] "The biggest project after Demos," as Dimitrij Rupel has assessed the unification of the political center, marks the final defeat of the United List, which did not succeed in its transformation from a party of "directors" to a party with a social democratic profile. The United List has lost the unnecessary "crusade" against [Defense Minister] Janez Jansa and will after the unification of the center probably play a role of wealthy utopian communists with ample financial backing.

After the completion of the unification, the United List will probably be forced to withdraw gradually from the coalition although the protagonists of unification emphasize that a reshuffle of ministerial departments is not in its background. It is interesting that even [Foreign Minister] Lojze Peterle and the Christian Democrats oppose the Democrats, the Greens, and the Socialists assuming ministerial posts. They believe that the United List should stay in the coalition despite the unification of the center, because, owing to the burden of its past, it is more controllable than the new Liberal Democracy. Objectively speaking, the new party will take the segment of the political spectrum that has hitherto been covered by the United List and at the same time also a proportion of its voters, but it will primarily take ministerial posts.

The unification of the center also means the end of trauma for at least some Democrats, who with 9 percent of the votes at the first elections held the most important posts in Slovene politics for two years. The story about the political center also means the end of the utopian idea about philosophers and philanthropists in politics, who used to play the role of bad conscience in the parliamentary democracy and by doing so first killed off the Slovene Democratic Alliance, later Demos, and finally—people like Rudi Seligo and Tine and Spomenka Hribar—left the party, but not politics. Some intellectuals in politics even today cannot come to terms with the fact that their vote in parliament counts as much as a vote of a deputy of the Slovene National Party or the

Slovene Peoples' Party [SLS]. The problems in the unification of the center should, therefore, not be sought merely with the Liberal Democrats, but primarily in the Democratic Party, where some people are not absolutely convinced about the pragmatism of Igor Bavcar and Dimitrij Rupel. Even though Rupel, Bavcar, and Tancig would not relinquish their ministerial posts if "the reformists" left the coalition, the unification of the center is evidently a long-term project—especially in the light of the local elections, where parties lacking finances or party infrastructure will be condemned to defeat.

The emergence of the new Liberal Democracy also means that the ZSMS [the former Socialist Alliance of Youth] faction of Jozef Skoljc and the Democrats with their state-forming pedigree will clash again, but [Prime Minister] Janez Drnovsek obviously does not have much room for maneuver. The left wing is occupied by Milan Kucan, while on the right wing it is not yet quite clear how the conflict, whose main protagonists are brothers Podobnik and Lojze Peterle, will end for the Christian Democracy. Christian Democrat Ivan Oman on one occasion said that the Slovene Christian Democratic Party [SKD] and the SLS will merge only once its leaders have passed away. Of course, in realpolitik not even antagonisms last for ever, and one can thus at least expect a joint appearance of "the anticorruption league" at the local elections if not the actual unification of the SDK and the SLS. The "unprincipled coalition" would do the biggest service to Janez Jansa by pushing him into opposition, as he would then be able to prepare for the looming early elections in peace. There is a belief among the new Liberal Democracy that the prime minister yields to much to the defense minister and "the confessional" part of the coalition. We will soon see whether the new Liberal Democratic bloc is against the right wing or whether, at least as concerns the Democrats, an if-you-can't-beat-them-join-them strategy is lurking in the background.

The story about the unification, which will mark the Slovene political scene for a long time, is not merely about who will take what ministerial post but also about who will, through the Liberal Democracy, appoint ministers and form the government. The public opinion polls show that the rating of the parties has not changed much since independence and after all the affairs, with the exception of the United List, whose crisis headquarters have established that they had lost by their wrong policy of antagonizing Jansa, which at the same time weakened the influence of President Milan Kucan, and contributed toward the rising popularity of the defense minister.

Janez Drnovsek, who has never concerned himself much with faction struggles, will definitely remain the central figure of the new Liberal Democracy until the elections. Secretly, he is perhaps coveting the post of the president of the state, where he is not without competition even though Milan Kucan has announced on several occasions that he will not run in the forthcoming elections.

Beside the SKD and the SLS, which will definitely have advantage at the local elections, personnel is the key problem of the parties that have emerged with the democratic elections, because they cannot cover approximately 300 new communes. Namely, the total membership of some of these parties hardly exceeds the number of local communities, as it primarily consists of pragmatic elites. This is also how the interest in the unification of the center could be interpreted. The times of the proverb "two Slovenes, three parties," are over. Only those who have the money, the electoral base, and above all clear programs for which they are willing to fight until the end will survive on the political scene. "A bloc policy" is in the process of being created in Slovenia and the time of "the Cold War" is nearing, for which some politicians have already lost their nerve before it even starts.

Reorganization of Intelligence Services Suspended

AU2302115594 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 16 Feb 94 p 2

[Article by Joze Biscak: "New Organization of SOVA"]

[Excerpt] Ljubljana, 15 February—The debate over the new organization of the security and intelligence activity of SOVA [Slovene Intelligence-Security Agency] has been temporarily "put on ice." The members of the State Chamber commission for supervision of the work of security and intelligence services decided this at a closed session, after they failed to obtain written proposals on the future organization of SOVA. [passage omitted]

Federal

Jovanovic Welcomes Yeltsin's Initiative

LD2502124094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1044 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Kragujevac, 25 Feb (TANJUG)—There are several mutually conflicting initiatives at the moment. None of them is fully articulated, but it is obvious that the Russian initiative is the most serious one as it requires that the issue of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina be resolved at a summit between the major powers, or rather the most responsible powers, Yugoslav Foreign Affairs Minister Vladislav Jovanovic stated in the Hallmark of Time program broadcast on Kragujevac Radio [Serbia].

The fact is, the federal foreign minister said, that there is no other place that is more suitable nor any other participants more competent to take steps toward peace.

Commenting on other proposals, and the West's refusal to offer support to the Russian initiative, Jovanovic said: "There have been some proposals favoring small steps and referring to lower level meetings under the pretext that larger steps require longer preparation. It is difficult to say whether they are only a way to prevent the acceptance of the Russian initiative, or whether they are guided by rational reasons. At the moment it seems to be more important to prevent the Russian initiative than to offer another alternative plan that would be as good and as useful."

Reactions To Yeltsin's Proposal Viewed

LD2402231794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1748 GMT 24 Feb 94

[By Dusan Radovanovic]

[Text] Paris, Feb 24 (TANJUG) - A proposal by Russian President Boris Yeltsin that the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia should gather for a summit on former Yugoslavia's crisis has been received in the West with certain diplomatic reserves.

Using a familiar diplomatic formula that it cannot take a stand on the issue because it has not received Moscow's "official" proposal, Paris has clearly shown its restraint in the matter and thus concealed its reluctance to leave the initiative in former Yugoslavia's crisis to Russia.

French sources maintain that such a summit would be "premature", alleging that the choice of the countries to attend the summit is debatable.

After all their mediating efforts aimed at resolving former Yugoslavia's crisis which have not been very successful so far, the European Union believes that it has every right to attend the summit.

French daily Le Figaro refers to Russia's initiative as "spectacular" and goes on to say that its goal is "clear and ambitious" and directed to putting even more emphasis on the "Dalin aspirations to re-establish its status of the indispensable great power."

French commentators say Sayosin's undoubtedly successful diplomatic initiative around Sarajevo has enabled Russia "to take its place (?in) the international [word indistinct]," but Moscow, they claim, now insists on "playing the first violin in that orchestra."

Last week NATO was ready to launch air strikes in the Sarajevo area, which was in line with the ultimatum set to warring sides in Bosnia, requesting them to demilitarize Sarajevo. However, the ultimatum practically referred only to Bosnian Serbs.

Moscow, which severely critized the ultimatum set by the Western military alliance, guaranteed to Bosnian Serbs that Russian peacekeepers would be located in a buffer zone between Bosnian Serbs and Moslems in the Sarajevo area. It was only after they received these guarantees that the Bosnian Serbs pulled back their artillery.

First Month of New Economic Program Reviewed

LD2402223094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1720 GMT 24 Feb 94

[By Vesna Arsenic]

[Text] Belgrade, February 24 (TANJUG)—In one month's time of its implementation, the government's program aimed at reconstructing the monetary system and invigorating the economic recovery has revived optimism amongst people in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.).

The elimination of a hyperinflation is the most obvious success of the program makers, awaiting confirmation by official statistics for February. Between December 24 and January 24, the prices were growing at a rate of two per cent per hour. In the past month's time, however, the prices have constantly declined.

Before the program was enforced, one kilogram of meat sold for 50 deutsche marks (DM). Now, however, the price fell to around 6 dm (one DM to one dinar).

Confronted with shortages of ready money, which can no longer be obtained from primary issue, the shops and factories opened the doors of their storages, re-marketing the articles hitherto in short supply.

The new dinar superseded the "inflationary dinar," the purchasing power of which was next to nil. Old dinar bills, denominated in millions and billions, only were the money collector's attraction abroad.

The convertible new dinar is on a par with the DM, but because of the lack of new dinars, German currency circulates at the green market and restaurants. Since the foreign currency may be bought and sold freely, the government reserves have increased by 160 million DM in the past month's time.

Bankers announce the return of a variety of credit cards, while retailers begin to grant short-term consumer credits. These are the signs that inflation has been under control, while the value and the purchasing power of the national currency has stabilized.

The program makers have evidently won the first round in eliminating hyperinflation and regaining confidence in the national currency. What they face now is the re-start of production, the success of which is to determine the future of the program.

"The F.R.Y. implements this program relying upon itself, without any foreign support and under the conditions of economic sanctions imposed on it by the U.N. Security Council on May 30, 1992."

Serbia

Ruling Party Sends Delegation to Russia

LD2402103694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1003 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Feb—A delegation of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] led by Mihailo Markovic, a member of its executive group, began its first ever visit to Russia today, the SPS information department has reported.

During their stay in Russia the SPS delegation is expected to meet representatives from all of Russia's major political parties, members of the Russian government, and both houses of the Russian parliament, the SPS notes in its statement.

Kosovo

DSK Leader on Division of Bosnia

LD2502123694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1055 GMT 25 Feb 94

[Text] Pristina, 25 Feb (TANJUG)—Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK], said today that "if the international community recognizes the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina then the same principles of division along ethnic lines will be also valid for Kosovo."

At a news conference Rugova said that "what is valid for Muslims and Croats must be valid for Albanians as well," explaining that the option chosen by the DSK and other Albanian political parties was "an independent and neutral Kosovo." This option is also the minimum [of Albanian demands]—nothing less than that could be acceptable in the talks with the Serbian leadership, he said. This would be a compromise both for the Serbs and for the Albanians [as received], he believes.

Rugova today denied the existence of "the Defense Ministry and other ministries of the Kosovo republic" and called [the Serb claims of their existence] "a stage-managed political process." He also denied the role of his close aide Anton Koljaj in the group, which had been discovered recently, saying that these "arrests were organized with the aim of discrediting certain personalities and efforts for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo question."

Speaking about Boris Yeltsin's latest initiative for a summit of leading European and U.S. statesmen [on Bosnia], Rugova said that this was unnecessary and that "there can be no alternative to a global approach to the resolution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia."

"We do not want another Yalta and a reorganization of the Balkans into spheres of interest; instead we advocate integration processes," Rugova said, and added "Russia's role in the Balkans cannot be one-sided, but it must be adapted to the international community's principles."

Rugova welcomed the signing of the "Partnership" agreement between Albanian President Sali Berisha and the NATO alliance, describing it as "important for Albanian, all [ethnic] Albanians, and for the whole of the Balkans."

Serbian Court Sentences 17 Albanians

AU2402215094 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 24 Feb 94

[Text] The trumped-up political trials continue in Kosova. The Serbian Court convicted 17 Albanians in Prishtina. They were sentenced to a total of 80 years of imprisonment. Let us follow a report by Leke Musolli:

[Musolli] On Thursday, the Serbian Court of Prishtina region made up of a jury of five and presided over by Zoran Zavanic pronounced the verdicts on a group of 19 Albanians charged with collaboration with the intention of hostile activity and territorial infringement toward Yugoslavia. The prosecutor gave up the indictment against one defendant, while another was set apart from the penal procedure for health reasons. Meanwhile, 17 others were sentenced to a total of 80 years of imprisonment.

During this trial, about which numerous remarks were made, there were no witnesses at all to support, with even one word, the criminal act with which the Albanian defendants were charged. That is why we should nevertheless stress that this fact itself and the numerous violations of procedure against the defendants, both in the prosecutor's office or outside it, testify that this trial was completely a trumped-up political endeavor to convict as well as compromise the peaceful policy that the Albanian people in Kosova are following.

We should finally say that during the last 10 days alone, the Serbian communist justice sentenced 26 Albanians, nine in Peje and 17 in Prishtina, to a total of 120 years of imprisonment, something which testifies to the brutality and banality of a regime which denounces even the silent thought of Albanians.